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Abstract 	Minimum	incomes	legitimate	a	boundary	between	capital	and	labour,	profits	and	needs,	in	the	contest	over	value.	This	thesis	asks	how	minimum	income	setting	has	changed	since	the	1970s.	It	finds	answers	in	the	documentation	of	rationales	by	state	agencies	in	national	wage	cases,	policy	and	inquiries	into	income	support,	financial	regulation	and	the	Financial	Services	Royal	Commission.	The	minimum	wage	as	a	family	wage	was	overturned,	on	the	basis	of	two	partly	linked	factors,	employer	pursuit	of	reduced	labour	costs,	and	the	growing	proportion	of	mothers	in	paid	work	at	non-standard	hours.	A	previously	strong	union	movement	in	response	to	unemployment	crises,	laid	down	its	power	to	defend	the	minimum	wage.	The	minimum	wage	safety	net	from	1996	became	a	minimum	wage	for	a	single	person,	requiring	the	state	through	income	support	to	underwrite	the	cost	of	raising	children	in	low	waged	households,	but	without	compromising	current	labour	supply.	The	household	rather	than	the	wage	earner	became	the	object	of	both	public	policy	and	financial	capital’s	search	for	value.	Finance’s	invention	of	income	surplus	assessment	for	contracting	home	loan	repayments	placed	new	pressures	on	household	time	and	consumption,	reinforcing	the	labour	supply	imperative.	It	also	posed	a	novel	threat	to	financial	system	stability,	and	placed	the	setting	of	minimum	living	standards	as	a	boundary	not	just	between	labour	as	employee	and	employer	capital,	but	also	between	labour	as	household	and	financial	capital.	The	state’s	position	on	meeting	needs	through	minimum	incomes	requires	trade-offs	that	historically	were	dominated	by	social	and	industrial	order,	and	which	have	more	recently	been	refined	as	economic	policy	for	labour	supply	and	particularly	financial	stability.	Minimum	incomes	are	linked	to	labour’s	dual	position	as	a	cost	of	production	and	a	critical	source	of	financial	flows.	This	new	terrain	for	valuing	labour	sharpens	the	contradictions	to	be	managed	by	public	policy	that	accepts	profitability	as	the	underlying	imperative,	seeking	stability	of	flows	in	both	labour	markets	and	money	markets.	It	also	poses	challenges	for	labour	to	reshape	itself	as	a	conscious	agent	able	to	assert	its	needs	over	profitability,	and	to	challenge	the	hold	of	capital	over	livelihoods.				  
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Chapter	one.	Introduction			Rationales	for	minimum	income	setting	in	Australia	over	the	four	decades	since	the	end	of	the	post	war	boom	have	redefined	the	value	of	labour	in	three	domains:	wages,	income	support,	and	finance.	Together	these	domains	reflect	changes	in	the	ways	that	capital	and	the	state	subordinate	needs	to	profitability,	and	present	challenges	for	the	livelihoods	of	labour.		This	thesis	argues	that	changes	in	labour	and	finance	markets	embody	changes	in	the	terms	on	which	capital	values	labour,	and	on	which	labour	contests	that	valuation.	Actions	of	the	state	are	consistent	with	the	role	of	manager	of	order	in	favour	of	capital	within	that	contest,	rather	than	of	neutral	or	potentially	neutral	economic	policy	maker.	Living	standards	are	fundamentally	a	relational	rather	than	a	distributional	question	That	is	to	say	that	rankings	of	income	and	wealth	are	insufficient	to	explain	poverty,	inequality,	precarity	and	financial	stress.	These	conditions	are	the	product	of	structured	social	relationships	between	capital	and	labour.	These	relationships	are	mutually	dependent	(Lucal	1994	p140)	and	embodied	in	markets,	particularly	labour	and	finance	markets,	which	are	defined	and	supervised	by	the	state	in	laws,	regulations	and	policy.		The	labour	market,	wages	and	labour	organisation	have	been	regulated	sites	of	contest	over	value	since	around	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century	(Kay	&	Mott	1982	p117).	The	minimum	wage	in	Australia	in	1907	was	an	element	of	that	regulated	contest,	and	remains	a	focus	of	organised	labour’s	effort	to	secure	living	standards.	Commonwealth	unemployment	benefits	were	introduced	only	in	1945.	Government	policy	attends	to	minimum	incomes	available	through	income	support	as	a	system	to	underpin	the	supply	of	labour.	The	adequacy	of	income	support	for	working	age	people	had	at	least	until	the	1980s	received	far	less	attention	from	both	policy	and	organised	labour	than	had	the	adequacy	of	wages,	largely	because	the	minimum	wage	had	been	sufficient	for	personal	savings	and	home	ownership	(Castles	1994	pp13-14).			
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State	agencies	have	been	drawn	slowly	into	paying	attention	to	how	finance	sets	and	applies	minimum	income	standards,	after	the	late	20th	century	process	of	financialisation	was	well	underway,	and	especially	since	the	Global	Financial	Crisis.	Finance	had	developed	its	own	measures	of	minimum	living	standards	in	order	to	maximise	the	value	it	could	capture	through	the	household	sector,	before	the	risks	this	posed	for	financial	stability	came	to	the	attention	of	regulators,	especially	the	Reserve	Bank	of	Australia	(RBA	2004),	and	then	the	2017-2019	Royal	Commission	into	Misconduct	in	the	Banking,	Superannuation	and	Financial	Services	Industry	(FSRC).			These	three	domains,	wages,	income	support	and	finance,	are	sites	for	the	competing	claims	on	value	of	capital	and	labour,	and	for	action	by	state	agencies	to	avert	instability.	Capital’s	claims	on	value	as	employer	and	as	finance	are	in	competition	with	one	another.	The	flow	points	from	which	they	capture	value,	as	labour	and	as	finance,	generate	competitive	tensions	for	household	reproduction	and	viability,	and	thus	novel	threats	to	economic	stability	that	challenge	state	agencies	to	develop	policy	responses.	This	thesis	explores	how	the	nature	and	loci	of	minimum	income	settings	have	been	reconfigured	over	the	last	four	decades,	and	argues	that	it	is	neither	straightforward	nor	relevant	for	labour	to	challenge	the	inadequacy	of	minimum	incomes	solely	in	terms	of	wages,	or	of	public	policy	that	is	designed	around	profitability.		The	rationales	that	the	state	applies	through	public	policy	in	each	of	the	three	domains	of	setting	minimum	incomes	have	changed	since	the	1970s.	The	terms	have	changed,	on	which	trade-offs	are	made	between	meeting	needs	and	maintaining	conditions	for	profitability.	I	examine	the	initiatives	of	capital,	reactions	of	labour	and	changes	in	public	policy	through	which	the	new	rationales	for	valuing	labour	came	into	effect,	and	are	in	conflict	with	one	another.			The	initiatives	of	capital,	both	as	employer	and	finance	in	pursuing	new	sources	of	accumulation	have	posed	challenges	that	have	set	the	agenda	for	the	state.	The	emergence	of	finance	as	a	domain	of	minimum	income	setting	adds	a	new	layer	to	understanding	the	valuing	of	labour	power	as	setting	the	needs	of	wage-earning	
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households	after	earning	income,	in	contractual	home	loan	repayments.	It	is	capital’s	direct	leverage	over	livelihoods,	via	the	labour	market	and	finance	that	enables	capital	to	deny	needs.	This	denial	cannot	be	accounted	for,	or	overcome	by	reliance	on	redistributive	public	policy	within	the	parameters	of	economic	management.	The	prevailing	political	neo-liberal	ideology,	lack	of	a	redistributive	economic	policy,	or	the	weight	of	wealth	in	purchasing	influence	in	the	political	system	are	insufficient	explanations.		
Why	the	reasons	for	setting	minimum	incomes	matter			The	setting	of	a	minimum	income	sets	more	than	income	levels.	It	embodies	the	trade-offs	that	policy	makes	between	the	interests	of	capital	and	labour	in	labour,	financial	and	housing	markets,	in	order	to	maintain	stability.	Kay	&	Mott’s	concept	of	the	wider	law	of	labour	argues	that	the	administration	of	unemployment	including	the	level	of	unemployment	income	“did	not	emancipate	the	working	class	from	wage	labour,	but	simply	served	notice	of	poverty	upon	the	whole	class”	(1982	p110).	I	apply	the	concept	of	the	wider	law	of	labour	as	the	imperative	to	supply	labour.	In	the	21st	century	Australian	context,	the	wider	law	of	labour	applies	through	the	proximity	of	minimum	incomes	to	poverty	lines,	and	so	extends	the	disciplinary	force	of	minimum	incomes	beyond	only	those	households	living	on	them	in	the	present,	to	any	household	at	risk	of	being	unable	to	pay	its	bills.			The	purpose,	as	well	as	the	level	of	the	original	minimum	income	to	be	set	in	Australia,	the	minimum	wage	itself,	is	contested,	and	can	be	seen	as	meeting	needs,	or	as	managing	labour	supply	for	profitability.	From	an	organised	labour	perspective	the	minimum	wage	is	or	should	be	protection	against	unlimited	competition	in	living	standards	and	working	conditions.	Where	unions	have	won	increases	in	minimum	regular	incomes	this	has	lifted	living	standards.	From	a	state	perspective,	minimum	incomes	in	both	wages	and	income	support	are	an	ill-defined	“safety	net”	that	has	labour	supply	as	their	primary	rationale.		
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Prior	to	the	mid-1970s	minimum	incomes	were	conceived	of	in	terms	of	the	minimum	wage,	without	reference	to	income	support.	The	minimum	wage	itself	was	sufficient	to	save	for	longer-term	needs	including	home	ownership,	in	what	Castles	has	called	the	wage-earners	welfare	state	(Castles	1994),	except	in	times	of	unemployment	crisis.	The	end	of	the	post-war	boom	initiated	conflict	between	capital	and	labour	which	ended	the	social	contract	embodied	in	the	state’s	post	World	War	II	acceptance	of	a	nexus	between	citizenship	and	labour,	and	therefore	of	social	inclusion	through	rising	living	standards	and	full-employment.		The	minimum	wage	no	longer	defines	the	officially	recognised	needs	of	low-waged	households	raising	children,	which	now	receive	a	far	greater	proportion	of	their	incomes	from	the	state	than	they	did	four	decades	ago.	Even	households	earning	well-above	the	minimum	wage	can	find	themselves	living	on	disposable	incomes	that	place	them	at	the	level	of	the	Henderson	Poverty	Line	(HPL),	when	their	home	mortgage	repayments	contract	them	to	part	with	all	income	above	that	level,	as	shown	in	chapter	four.		Estimates	of	poverty	in	Australia	in	2004	ranged	between	1	and	4	million	people,	5%	and	22.6%	of	the	population,	with	the	Henderson	Poverty	Line	producing	the	highest	estimate	(Australia.	Senate.	Community	Affairs	Reference	Committee	2004	p35).	In	2018	the	Australian	Council	of	Social	Service	(ACOSS)	(2018b	p12)	reported	3.05	million	people	living	in	households	with	income	below	50%	of	median	household	disposable	income,	including	6%	of	households	with	a	full-time	wage	earner.		The	significance	of	poverty	and	how	to	measure	it	are	contentious.	Absolute	measures	of	living	standards	are	based	on	the	costs	of	a	basket	of	goods,	and	set	a	budget	standard,	which	rises	with	inflation	(Bittman	1997).	The	family	minimum	wage	was	set	in	this	way	by	reference	to	the	cost	of	living	index.	Relative	living	standards	and	poverty	lines	are	set	as	a	percentage	of	a	benchmark	of	an	average	or	median	income	(Johnson	1987	p45).	More	recent	US	research	identifies	income	volatility	as	a	dimension	of	poverty	that	is	not	accounted	for	in	standard	statistics	but	relates	to	spread	of	risks	over	time	(Morduch	&	Schneider	2017	pp159-161).	
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	There	are	broadly	two	camps	of	public	policy	advocacy	regarding	adequacy	of	living	standards,	identified	in	the	report	of	the	Community	Affairs	Reference	Committee’s	inquiry	into	inequality	(Australia.	Senate.	Community	Affairs	References	Committee	2014	pp1-6).	On	the	one	side	are	economists	such	as	Nobel	Prize-winner	Robert	Lucas	and	a	Professor	of	Economics	at	Harvard	University	Martin	Feldstein,	who	see	redistributive	policies	as	a	threat	to	the	economic	growth	essential	to	overcome	poverty.	On	the	other	side	inequality	itself	is	a	critical	impediment	to	well	being,	as	reported	in	the	influential	meta-analysis	of	international	research	by	Wilkinson	&	Picket	(2009).	This	is	consistent	with	a	perspective	that	deprivation	is	relative	to	social	context	and	to	the	living	standards	of	others	around	us,	and	is	in	that	sense	a	distributional	issue1.	Opponents	of	redistribution	emphasise	economic	growth.	Arguably	public	policy	attempts	to	reconcile	economic	growth	and	stability,	with	a	publicly	accepted	basis	for	meeting	needs	through	minimum	incomes.	My	thesis	argues	that	rationales	for	minimum	income	setting	show	the	incompatibility	of	these	two	goals,	and	attributes	the	denial	of	need	not	just	to	policy	on	income	distribution,	but	to	the	integration	of	the	management	of	labour	and	finance	markets	in	public	policy,	in	support	of	stable	conditions	for	profitability.			
1.1 The period  	The	origin	of	the	present	rationales	for	minimum	income	setting	can	be	dated	to	around	1975,	in	the	developments	following	the	end	of	the	post	war	boom.			The	regulating	role	of	the	state	since	1945	was	disrupted	when	the	global	economic	boom	ended	in	the	early	70s.	Jones	(1989)	argues	that	in	Australia,	the	exceptional	post-war	period	was	the	product	of	the	needs	of	capital	investment	and	development	at	the																																																											
1 Between 1974 and 2016 wages share has fallen from around 62.5% to around 55%, whilst profit share has risen 
from around 17% to nearly 25% (van Onselen 2018). 
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time,	rather	than	a	result	of	any	policy	intentions	to	subordinate	markets	to	the	state,	and	guarantee	full	employment.	Whether	or	not	disparate	advocacy	of	a	reduced	labour	share	after	the	boom	attained	any	deliberate	coherence	in	public	policy,	the	tangible	results	of	actions	of	the	combination	of	employer	advocacy	against	labour,	and	of	economic	policy	since	the	boom,	has	been	a	reversal	of	the	exceptionally	high	labour	share	of	GDP	in	the	advanced	capitalist	economies	(Piketty	2014),	including	Australia	as	shown	in	Figure	1.			
Figure	1:	The	labour	income	share	1960-2012	
	(Source:	Cowgill	2013	p5)		Economic	developments	associated	with	the	end	of	the	boom	that	had	an	impact	on	minimum	income	setting	include	the	break	down	of	the	fixed	exchange	rate	system,	the	emergence	of	financial	innovation,	the	outbreak	of	stagflation	and	the	development	of	economic	policy	with	a	counter-inflationary	consensus	at	its	heart	(Beggs	2015	pp1-3).	While	Friedmanite	free	market	theory	counter-posing	itself	to	the	errors	of	supposed	Keynesian	full-employment	policy	was	initially	influential,	by	the	1980s	scholarly	work	on	macroeconomics	had	reached	a	new	consensus	based	on	the	primacy	of	monetary	
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policy,	using	interest	rates	to	target	inflation	(Arestis	2009	p8)	and	therefore	the	unemployment	rate.			This	period	encompassed	a	series	of	downturns	in	the	advanced	capitalist	countries,	these	occurring	in	1975,	1982,	1991	and	2009.	The	downturns	have	been	the	context	in	which	standards	of	living	have	been	challenged,	including	the	end	of	full-employment	(unemployment	had	generally	been	2-5%),	structural	changes	in	industries	and	employment,	privatisations,	uneven	transformation	of	the	sexual	division	of	labour,	financialisation,	and	the	curtailment	of	union	rights.			The	rationales	for	setting	minimum	incomes	show	the	various	responsible	state	agencies	being	guided	by	economic	policy	and	concern	for	flows	in	finance	and	labour	markets.	There	are	tendencies	to	both	coherence	and	contradiction	in	the	state’s	approaches	to	minimum	incomes	and	living	standards.	State	policy	coheres	around	a	broad	goal	of	economic	stability,	but	that	stability	is	fragile	as	a	result	of	the	tension	household	living	standards	and	capital’s	constant	innovations	in	capturing	value,	particularly	through	financialisation.	While	markets	are	dependent	on	the	state	as	a	stabilising	force,	the	state	has	lagged	in	responding	to	the	innovations	of	capital.		
1.2 Concepts 	The	concepts	that	I	use	are:	needs;	value;	surplus	population	and	minimum	needs;	labour	time;	reproduction	of	labour	power	and	the	wage	earning	household;	and	the	value	of	labour	and	its	housing	as	an	asset.	I	outline	my	approach	to	the	agency	of	the	state	and	labour.				 	
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Needs		The	correspondence	of	needs	and	deprivation	with	income	arises	from	the	conditions	of	wage	labour	and	the	dominance	of	commodity	consumption,	two	phenomena	that	typify	capitalist	relations.	Indicators	and	thresholds	of	material	conditions	for	individual	human	well-being	extend	beyond	those	that	can	be	met	by	consumption	of	commodified	goods	and	services,	to	conditions	such	as	public	services	and	infrastructure,	the	living	conditions	of	neighbours,	clean	air	and	water	(Rao	&	Min	2018).	These	are	outside	the	scope	of	my	investigations.	Here	I	seek	to	identify	changes	in	rationales	applied	by	the	state,	capital	and	labour	for	setting	minimum	incomes	to	match	needs.		A	condition	for	profitability	is	that	there	is	a	pool	of	labour	ready	to	work.	Meeting	the	needs	of	this	pool	of	labour,	including	the	needs	of	their	household	members	who	are	not	currently	earning	an	income,	can	be	termed	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power,	or	the	value	of	labour	power	(Giussani	&	Vale	1992).			Rowthorn	identified	a	thread	that	is	common	within	variations	in	Marx’s	meaning	of	the	value	of	labour	power:	“if	the	minimum	(however	defined)	is	not	met,	then	there	'are	very	serious	consequences:	either	the	supply	of	good	quality	labour-power	declines,	as	workers	fail	to	maintain	or	reproduce	themselves	properly,	or	leave	the	capitalist	sector	altogether;	or	else	there	is	conflict	and	disruption	as	workers	fight	for	what	they	consider	is	their	just	reward'”	(1980	p210).	Harvey	summarises	this	thread	as	“the	threat	posed	to	the	further	accumulation	of	capital”	(2006	p50).		The	minimum	needs	for	the	reproduction	of	labour	were	first	recognised	in	Australia	in	the	form	of	the	minimum	wage	in	1907,	then	in	1913	linked	to	a	cost	of	living	index	(ABS	2005	p59).		I	do	not	produce	any	new	benchmarks	for	minimum	living	standards,	or	calculate	the	adequacy	of	the	measures	that	are	applied	in	decision-making.	In	each	of	the	domains	that	assess	minimum	incomes,	I	identify	indices	and	benchmarks	used	to	assess	the	
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adequacy	of	incomes	and	their	assumptions	and	make	links	with	the	contextual	rationales	for	minimum	income	setting.			The	Henderson	Poverty	Line	(HPL)	has	been	a	consistent	reference	point	for	matching	incomes	to	minimum	needs	since	it	was	released	in	1975.	State	agencies	across	many	policy	areas,	including	wages	and	income	support,	use	it	as	one	of	many	benchmarks,	as	do	social	researchers	and	even	financial	firms.	However	the	use	of	alternative	poverty	lines	has	increased,	according	to	The	Melbourne	Institute	(n.d.)	which	maintains	the	poverty	line,	because	of	“issues	such	as	the	move	away	from	the	traditional	male	breadwinner	model,	the	end	of	full-employment	and	problems	updating	the	poverty	line”.		In	looking	for	evidence	of	incomes	being	set	to	meet	needs,	I	look	for	transparency	and	application	of	criteria	for	the	adequacy	of	incomes,	absolute	and	relative	benchmarks,	and	predictable	and	timely	incomes.			
Value		Minimum	incomes	set	a	minimum	value	on	labour,	both	on	the	labour	power	of	individual	wage	earners,	and	the	living	standards	of	wage	earning	households	in	which	labour	power	is	reproduced.	A	stylised	fact2	of	Marxist	economics	is	that	wages	are	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power,	or	the	value	of	labour	(Bryan,	Martin	&	Rafferty	2008	p461).		The	gap	between	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power,	as	measured	in	wages,	and	the	exchange	value	that	labour	produces	is	at	the	root	of	capitalist	exploitation	and	so	of	inequality.	The	circuit	of	capital	M-C-M’	is	Marx’s	“general	formula	of	capital	as	it	appears	prima	facie	within	the	sphere	of	circulation”	(Marx	1867b).	In	its	simplest	form,	in																																																											
2 For an example of considering a Marxist concept as a ‘stylised fact’ see Fleetwood, S. (2001) p61.  
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relation	to	labour,	this	formula	shows	capital	as	M	purchasing	the	commodity	C,	labour	power,	through	the	application	of	which	capital	is	then	increased	in	value	by	an	increment	to	become	M’.	The	increment	can	also	be	called	profit,	or	return	on	investment.	Money	advanced,	or	invested,	to	obtain	the	increment	is	capital.	For	labour,	earning	a	wage,	money	is	not	capital	or	investment,	but	must	be	spent	on	maintaining	livelihoods,	or	its	own	reproduction.	The	M-C-M’	circuit	of	capital	is	a	reference	point	of	this	paper,	for	relations	between	labour	and	capital,	and	flows	of	value.			This	stylised	fact	accounts	only	for	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	employed	labour.	The	wage	appears	to	be	for	the	value	of	the	time	of	the	employee	only.	However	the	minimum	wage	concept	required	the	employer	to	meet	the	money	cost	of	reproduction	of	the	entire	family	of	an	employed	worker.	This	requirement	on	employers	was	only	set	after	the	intervention	of	the	state,	in	Australia	with	the	1907	Harvester	judgment,	and	not	until	the	1930s	in	the	USA	(De	Brunhoff	p10).			The	minimum	wage	functions	as	a	floor	price	on	labour,	i.e.	it	sets	a	bare	minimum	standard	of	living	for	the	employed,	based	on	a	standard	working	week.	It	is	the	rationales	for	the	setting	of	this	floor	that	concern	this	paper,	and	not	“instances	of	minimum	wage	evasion”	(Healy	2016	p319).			
Surplus	population	and	minimum	needs		The	minimum	wage	assumes	a	standard	full-time	working	week,	so	does	not	meet	the	needs	of	the	unemployed	or	those	working	fewer	hours	than	they	would	like.	People	in	these	positions	are	in	a	sense	excess	labour	supply,	available	to	work	more	hours,	and	motivated	to	do	so	by	the	fact	that	their	needs	are	unmet,	that	is	to	say	they	need	more	income.	In	Marxist	terms,	this	constitutes	surplus	population.			Historically	a	central	concern	of	the	state	has	been	to	maintain	order	against	the	tendency	for	social	and	political	disorder	generated	by	surplus	population,	when	people’s	livelihoods	and	the	reproduction	of	labour	power	are	in	doubt.	State	provision	
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for	the	needs	of	the	surplus	population	is	curtailed	by	the	capital’s	need	for	the	incentive	to	the	surplus	population	to	be	available	for	employment,	and	to	maintain	the	work	discipline	of	those	in	employment	(Kay	&	Mott	1982).	State	intervention	manages	“the	‘stock’	of	labour-power	needed	by	capitalists,	but	which	they	themselves	cannot	secure	directly”	(de	Brunhoff	1978	p10).	The	public	institutions	which	manage	labour-power,	especially	surplus	population,	“serve	to	minimise,	or	relocate	the	‘specifically	proletarian	risk’,	constituted	by	the	uncertain	conditions	of	the	commodity	labour-power;	they	are	unable	to	eliminate	it”	(de	Brunhoff	1978	p19).	“The	right	to	work	[at	least	for	a	minimum	living	wage]	is	incompatible	with	capitalist	command,	since	its	existence	would	imply	the	elimination	of	the	specifically	proletarian	risk	which	is	unemployment”	(de	Brunhoff	1978	p	24).		Surplus	population	is	relevant	to	minimum	incomes	because	it	survives	at	the	lowest	living	standard	that	can	be	imposed	by	the	state,	and	because	it	offers	competition	in	the	labour	market	for	employment.	The	state	consistently	sets	unemployment	benefits	lower	than	any	minimum	wage,	as	an	even	lower	floor,	or	basement,	living	standard.	If	the	minimum	wage	is	a	bare	minimum,	the	unemployment	benefit	forces	a	struggle	for	more	income.	This	exerts	downward	pressure	on	the	price	of	labour,	wages,	or	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power,	particularly	when	unemployment	rates	are	high.			This	connection	binds	together	considerations	of	minimum	wages	and	income	support	that	will	be	apparent	in	reasons	for	decisions	in	both	domains.	Evidence	for	this	will	be	identified	in	the	relevant	chapters.			
Labour	time,	reproduction	of	labour	power	and	the	wage	earning	household		The	contest	over	the	value	of	labour	power	is	a	contest	over	both	money	and	time.	While	I	focus	on	the	setting	of	the	minimum	wage	as	a	decision	about	money	the	length	of	the	working	week	is	implicated.	A	total	minimum	wage	income	depends	not	only	on	the	hourly	rate	of	pay,	but	also	on	the	length	of	labour	time.	Employers,	labour	and	especially	
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women	have	conflicting	interests	in	division	of	labour	time	between	waged	and	unpaid	reproductive	labour.			In	Marxist-feminist	theory,	“social	reproduction”	encompasses	“birthing	and	raising	children,	caring	for	friends	and	family	members,	maintaining	households	and	broader	communities,	and	sustaining	connections	more	generally”	(Fraser	2016	p99).	Where	this	labour	is	unwaged	and	not	exchanged	on	the	labour	market,	it	does	not	appear	in	the	accounts	of	capital	yet	capital	could	not	function	without	it,	as	there	would	be	no	labour	supply.	Employers	have	increased	their	demand	for	women’s	labour	time,	and	found	ways	to	take	advantage	of	women’s	needs,	especially	the	needs	of	working	mothers,	for	working	fewer	hours	than	the	standard	working	week.			The	increased	workforce	participation	of	married	women,	and	the	consequent	increase	in	household	hours	of	waged	labour	for	a	large	number	of	households,	increases	the	tension	for	time	allocation	(Pocock,	Skinner	&	Williams	2012).	This	makes	it	impossible	to	establish	an	equivalence	between	a	single	wage	and	the	minimum	needs	of	a	typical	family	or	household.	The	erosion	of	the	standard	working	week,	the	growth	in	underemployment,	and	increased	financial	stress,	mean	that	many	wage	earning	households	seek	to	increase	their	incomes	by	increasing	paid	work.			In	response	to	these	changes,	both	the	state	and	finance	replaced	the	normative	concept	of	the	male	breadwinner	family	when	calculating	incomes.	Banks	were	ahead	of	the	state	in	shifting	to	a	household	income	measure	in	the	late	1960s	(Bryan	&	Rafferty	2018	p148).	In	1973	the	government	commissioned	Henderson	Poverty	Line	(HPL)	provided	equivalence	scales,	describing	the	relationships	between	the	living	costs	of	a	standard	family	income	unit	and	other	types	of	family	income	unit	(Johnson	1987	p48)	in	part	to	act	as	a	standard	of	adequacy	for	social	security	payments	(p50).		Despite	the	formally	gender	equal	basis	for	setting	minimum	incomes	and	for	households	to	make	choices	about	allocation	of	time	between	waged	and	reproductive	labour,	responsibility	for	reproductive	labour	continues	to	fall	unduly	on	women	(Fraser	
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2016).	This	reinforces	and	combines	with	women	being	over-represented	in	minimum	wage	jobs,	meaning	that	women	on	average,	and	over	their	lifespan,	have	lower	incomes	than	men.			The	dimension	of	labour	time,	gender	and	reproductive	labour	plays	out	indirectly	in	the	revaluing	of	labour	in	all	three	domains.			
The	value	of	labour	and	housing	assets		“From	the	perspective	of	the	class	of	capital	(industrial,	commercial	and	financial)	[recent	developments	mean	that]	a	surplus	can	be	appropriated	from	labour	not	just	via	the	wage	relationship,	but	via	financial	relationships	also	-	be	it	interest	on	loans	to	workers,	commissions	on	their	investment	portfolios,	or	even	in	contractual	arrangements	for	essential	services.”	(Bryan	2008	p218)			The	most	significant	financial	relationship	implicated	in	minimum	incomes	lies	in	home	mortgages.	Home	ownership	rates	rose	from	53%	in	1947,	to	sit	above	70%	between	1967	and	1986,	and	have	been	falling	slightly	ever	since	(Hall	2017	p2).	The	value	of	residential	real	estate	equated	to	60	percent	of	wealth	in	Australia	at	$6.7trillion	in	2016	(Bryan	and	Rafferty	2018	p145).		Housing	is	both	a	use	value,	providing	an	essential	element	of	livelihoods,	and	a	store	of	value,	an	asset,	wealth.	Capital	has	innovated	to	more	systematically	unlock	the	value	of	housing	as	a	source	of	surplus	value	and	liquidity,	basing	this	directly	on	finance’s	calculations	of	household	minimum	needs.			The	concept	of	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power	enables	us	to	make	sense	of	finance’s	interest	in	minimum	incomes,	as	well	as	to	explore	possible	limits	in	the	profitability	of	this	interest.	Finance’s	interest	in	homebuyers,	specifically	households	contracted	to	make	mortgage	repayments,	also	poses	challenges	for	conceptualising	asset-purchasing	households	as	labour	subjects	exploited	by	capital.		
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	This	paradox	could	be	seen	as	capital’s	interest	in	household	incomes	and	expenditure	is	an	interest	in	constituting	“labour	as	a	form	of	capital”	(Bryan	et	al	2009	p462).			I	also	examine	and	qualify	Bryan’s	claims	that	“the	twenty-first	century	context	now	pertains	not	to	public	policy	about	working	class	minimum	standards,	but	to	financial	institution	calculations	about	credit	risk	in	relation	to	working-class	borrowers”	(Bryan	2008	p219).	I	make	a	case	that	an	essential	element	of	financial	institutions’	calculations	is	the	wage	income	of	their	working	class	borrowers.	Public	policy	continues	a	concern	with	minimum	incomes	in	wages	and	income	support,	if	not	transparent	standards	for	them,	as	an	essential	element	of	labour	supply	management.	The	management	of	financial	stability	now	requires	public	policy	to	be	concerned	with	minimum	incomes	in	relation	to	finance.		
Roles	of	the	state		While	the	value	of	labour	power	expresses	a	direct	relation	between	labour	and	capital,	the	state	has	a	hand	in	every	domain.	The	state	develops	to	counteract	economic,	political	and	social	instability	or	disorder	(Kay	&	Mott	1982	pp130-137).	This	mediation	by	the	state	is	not	neutral.	The	state’s	role	as	capitalist	is,	broadly	speaking,	“to	secure	the	economic	and	extra-economic	conditions	for	accumulation	in	the	conjuncture”	(Jessop	2014	p	419).		The	state,	in	setting	a	minimum	wage	to	be	paid	by	capital	to	labour,	mediates	the	capital	–	labour	relationship.	Income	support	as	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	unwaged	labour,	or	insufficiently	waged	households,	is	set	by	the	state.	Financial	capital’s	calculations	of	household	incomes	and	expenses	is	a	recent	innovation	in	calculating	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power,	in	which	the	state	has	also	developed	an	interest	because	of	the	risk	it	poses	to	financial	system	stability.			
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Specialist	state	agencies	make	decisions	in	each	domain,	with	some	cross-referencing,	most	notably	with	the	Reserve	Bank	of	Australia.	Government,	ministers	and	the	parliament	make	laws	and	decisions	that	set	the	purpose	and	terms	of	reference	for	the	decision-making	bodies.	This	configuration	produces	a	tendency	to	consistency,	but	with	contradictions,	which	Beggs	(2015	p13)	describes	as	“relative	coherence	of	modern	economic	policy,	across	multiple	branches.”	This	policy	coherence	is	a	response	to	market	relations.			This	is	consistent	with	concept	of	strategic	selectivity,	which	Jessop	elaborates	on	from	Poulantzas.	“The	state	is	not	a	subject	that	acquires	power	for	itself	by	depriving	various	classes	of	power;	nor	is	it	an	instrumental	depository	of	the	power	held	by	a	dominant	class	subject	located	beyond	it.	Instead	it	is	a	strategic	site	of	organisation	of	the	dominant	class	in	its	relationship	to	the	dominated	classes”	(Jessop	1999).		In	a	similar	vein,	de	Brunhoff	asserts	this	is	apparent	with	regards	to	economic	policy,	which	“acquires	a	disaggregated	mode	of	operation,	related	to	the	number	and	variety	of	flows	upon	which	state	action	is	expected	to	have	some	effect”	(1978	p83).	De	Brunhoff	challenges	the	conception	of	“economic	policy”	as	an	integrated,	enduring	and	independent	agent	in	circuits	of	capital	(pp64-65).	Her	challenge	would	discount	the	prospect	that	the	state	could	develop	and	implement	a	coherent	plan	for	an	incomes	policy,	which	manages	all	the	economic	variables,	without	disruption	to	stability	or	disadvantage	to	either	capital	or	labour.			She	rather	identifies	market-based	constraints	as	“the	real	processes	creating	unity”,	which	are	obscured	“if	the	unity	of	the	state	is	presupposed”	such	that	it	“is	always	to	be	found	behind	the	scenes,	manipulating	and	adjusting	flows”	(p84).			Accordingly,	I	do	not	claim	that	the	pressure	on	minimum	living	standards	since	the	end	of	the	boom	began	“with	a	coherent	project	resulting	from	a	global	objective,	towards	which	the	various	complementary	measures	[of	monetary,	fiscal	and	social	policy]	would	be	combined.”	This	would	“presuppose	the	existence	of	the	state	as	subject.”	Rather	I	
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seek	to	show	that	in	the	circumstances	of	the	end	of	the	post-war	boom,	the	state	has	in	effect	been	“‘called	upon	to	function	as	a	subject’	of	economic	policy”	even	though	the	policy	in	question,	of	more	effectively	subordinating	working	class	living	standards	to	profitability,	did	“not	in	any	sense	have	a	coherently	defined	totality	of	objectives	or	the	mechanisms	able	to	attain	them”	(de	Brunhoff	1978	p83).	The	mechanisms	in	effect	emerged	in	the	process	of	the	state	solving	problems	for	capital	accumulation	as	they	arose.			The	specific	state	functions	relevant	to	minimum	income	setting	in	which	disorder	could	arise	relate	to	the	management	of	the	‘peculiar	commodities’,	which	are	labour	power	and	money	(de	Brunhoff	p	4).	Because	the	contest	over	living	standards	does	not	originate	in	the	state,	the	state	cannot	resolve	the	tensions	between	meeting	needs	(which	in	some	senses	equates	to	the	reproduction	of	labour	power)	and	ensuring	conditions	for	profitability.	Capital’s	need	for	cheap	labour	supply,	and	financial	flows	mean	that	economic	policy	cannot	resolve	the	contradictions	of	labour	and	finance	markets	in	favour	of	living	standards,	all	the	more	so	because	the	demands	made	by	these	problems	“may	pull	in	different	directions”	(Beggs	2015	p17).		The	state	further	functions	to	avert	threats	to	the	legitimacy	of	minimum	income	setting	decisions,	institutions	and	processes.	Legitimation	of	new	imperatives,	and	risks	to	subsistence,	and	corresponding	strategic	efforts	by	the	state,	can	be	understood	as	“discursive	selectivity”	(Jessop	2008	p48).			Through	the	aggregation	of	agencies,	specific	decisions	with	an	overall	consistency	come	to	prevail,	and	ultimately	are	backed	up	by	state	sanctions.	These	decisions	do	not	and	cannot	direct	capital	investment	decisions.	I	do	not	presuppose	the	unity	of	the	state	as	an	agent	or	see	the	state	as	subject.	I	focus	on	the	rationales	for	decisions	by	state	bodies	about	minimum	incomes	because	they	reveal	the	considerations	and	intentions	of	the	decision-makers.	Rationales	take	into	account	what	the	decision	makers	want	to	achieve,	and	how	they	view	the	context,	including	the	conflicting	interests	of	capital	and	labour.			
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The	Strategic	Relational	Approach	to	the	state	elaborated	by	Jessop	is	the	best	fit	for	this	purpose,	as	it	combines	rather	than	counter-poses	structure	and	agency	in	a	way	that	can	account	for	multiple	state	actors	with	variant	strategic	intentions	in	relation	to	labour,	capital	and	one	another.		Potential	reorientation	of	state	policy	on	minimum	incomes	is	considered	on	the	basis	of	possible	political	struggle:		 “to	transform	the	structurally-inscribed	selectivities	of	the	state,	struggles	over	state	policies	within	these	limits,	and	struggles	at	a	distance	from	the	state	to	modify	the	balance	of	forces	within	the	state	and	among	those	with	privileged	access	to	it	with	the	result	that	more	or	less	excluded	interests	enter	into	the	political	calculation	of	those	with	more	direct	access	to	state	capacities	and	resources”	(Jessop	2006).		This	framework	suggest	that	a	public	policy	goal	of	switching	the	priority	in	minimum	income	setting	from	conditions	for	profitability	to	meeting	human	need,	holds	implications	for	an	elected	government	seeking	to	make	the	switch.				In	comparing	the	rationales	used	in	the	three	domains	of	minimum	incomes,	I	discover	“different	(and	potentially	contradictory)	institutional	logics	and	modes	of	calculation	in	state	and	economy”	(Jessop	2014	p	416).	Strategic	dilemmas	drive	changes	in	minimum	income	setting	in	the	form	of	conscious	trade-offs	made	by	actors	from	all	three	categories,	including	labour	as	capable	of	agency.			
Labour			I	use	labour	as	a	category	to	encompass	the	majority	of	the	population	that	depends	on	spending	time	under	the	direction	of	others,	to	earn	income	to	meet	needs.	Predominantly	this	is	wage	labour.			
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Labour	is	discussed	here	as	an	agent	in	two	senses.			The	labour	movement	is	made	up	of	bodies	of	organised	labour,	primarily	trade	unions,	as	well	as	other	advocates	for	low-income	households.	They	speak	on	behalf	of,	and	occasionally	mobilise,	employees	in	industrial	and	political	spheres.			The	other	form	of	labour	agency	lies	in	wage-earning	households,	seen	as	“units	of	production,	ownership	and	consumption”	(ABS	1995)	that	have	an	impact	on	value	flows	through	their	aggregate	decisions	about	work,	consumption	and	savings.	“The	labourer’s	instincts	of	self-preservation	and	of	propagation”	motivate	wage-earning	households	and	the	individuals	within	them,	to	work,	consume	and	save,	in	the	prevailing	social	and	economic	conditions	(Marx	1867a).			
1.3 Methodology 	State	agencies	document	their	income	setting	decisions,	and	policy	responses	to	threats	to	stability	arising	from	contests	for	value	share	between	capital	and	labour.	These	documents	are	my	primary	sources	for	monitoring	changes	in	rationales	for	minimum	income	setting.		Applying	Jessop’s	strategic-relational	approach	I	analyse	decisions	of	state	agencies	about	the	adequacy	of	minimum	incomes,	looking	for	“structurally	oriented	strategic	calculation”	based	on	recognition	of	the	trade-offs	available	to	each	agency.	The	state	agencies	must	emphasise	or	introduce	legitimating	rationales	exhibiting	Jessop’s	“discursive	selectivity”,	as	the	terms	of	the	trade-offs	change	over	the	four	decades.	I	assess	whether	or	not	a	tendency	to	structural	coherence	emerges	from	the	agencies’	concerns	with	minimum	income	setting	in	the	three	domains	of	wages,	income	support	and	finance.	Areas	of	lack	of	coherence	are	likely	indicators	of	areas	of	instability	and	further	change,	assuming	that	state	agencies	tend	towards	coherence	(Jessop	2001).		
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Predominantly	I	examine	decisions	and	policies	of	the	state	for	which	evidence	is	readily	available.	I	find	evidence	of	the	intentions	of	capital	and	labour,	where	state	bodies	consider	submissions	from	representatives	of	their	interests.	I	construct	the	position	of	capital	in	relation	to	minimum	household	needs	mainly	from	industry	advocacy	and	evidence	published	by	state	agencies,	including	the	needs	and	interests	that	decision	makers	and	advocates	impute	to	capital.	Some	information	can	be	gleaned	from	corporate	publications	and	public	commentary	from	industry	insiders.			Rationales	for	setting	minimum	incomes	have	strategic	relevance	on	the	basis	of	the	scope	of	information	and	analysis	on	which	they	are	based.			The	state	and	capital	are	by	definition	both	organised	assemblages	of	personnel,	expertise	and	aggregated	resources.	Information	gathering	and	analysis	is	what	the	state	and	capital	both	do.	The	state	collects	statistics	in	order	to	administer	the	commodity	labour	power	and	the	category	of	population	in	which	labour	power	is	embedded	(Kay	&	Mott	1982).	Capital	amasses	its	own	statistics	in	the	form	of	balance	sheets,	as	well	as	research	and	data	collection.			It	is	harder	for	labour	to	take	a	similarly	strategic	approach	as	it	lacks	command	of	aggregates,	other	than	as	amassed	and	organised	labour	power.	Organised	labour	has	more	limited	instruments,	and	limited	scope	of	knowledge,	and	a	limited	range	of	people	sharing	specialised	knowledge.			As	far	as	possible,	I	select	considered	statements	and	policy	positions	in	preference	to	statements	made	in	political	debate	or	campaigning.	The	aim	is	to	understand	the	actual	reasoning	used	by	implicated	state	agencies	and	advocates	for	capital	and	labour	within	the	logic	of	capitalist	class	relations,	rather	than	to	engage	in	discourse	analysis	of	legitimating	statements.	Consistent	with	this	paper’s	rejection	of	statism,	I	avoid	taking	at	face	value	statements	that	appear	to	be	designed	to	sell,	legitimate	or	mystify	the	purpose	of	policy	and	decisions	(Jessop	2008	p75).		
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1.4 Chapter outlines 	This	introductory	chapter	has	outlined	my	topic,	scope,	research	questions	and	the	theoretical	approach	I	use	to	interpret	the	evidence	gathered	by	the	research.			Chapter	two	traces	the	rationales	for	national	minimum	wage	and	safety	net	decisions	since	1975.		Until	the	1980s,	the	minimum	wage	was	set	with	reference	to	a	cost	of	living	index,	as	a	family	wage,	to	meet	the	needs	of	a	single	earner	family	of	two	adults	and	two	children,	and	was	subject	to	industrial	bargaining.	When	the	Henderson	Poverty	Line	was	set	in	the	1970s,	it	was	just	below	the	minimum	wage.	Since	the	mid	1990s,	the	minimum	wage	was	renamed	the	wage	safety	net,	and	industrial	bargaining	over	the	minimum	wage	became	illegal.	The	Fair	Work	Commission	(FWC)	sets	it	to	meet	the	needs	only	of	a	single	person	and	not	a	multi-person	household,	and	applies	no	specific	index	of	adequacy.	A	primary	concern	of	the	commission	prior	to	the	1990s	was	to	avoid	industrial	action.	The	primary	concern	since	the	1990s,	and	of	the	current	FWC,	is	to	trade-off	raising	the	minimum	wage	sufficiently	to	meet	the	needs	of	minimum	wage	earners	against	the	possibility	of	undermining	demand	for	labour.			From	the	late	1970s,	employers	called	for	the	state	to	detach	the	minimum	wage	from	the	cost	of	living	index	and	industrial	bargaining.	Employers	and	the	state	identified	wage	restraint	as	a	solution	for	the	inflationary	and	unemployment	crises	of	the	1970s.	In	the	crises	of	the	80s	and	90s	the	trade	unions	also	endorsed	wage	restraint.	The	Australian	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	Commission	(ACAC)	and	governments	proceeded	cautiously	to	make	decisions	and	reforms	that	changed	the	terms	of	minimum	wage	setting	in	order	to	avoid	broadening	the	industrial	action	that	some	unions	took	against	wage	restraint.	It	took	well	over	a	decade,	and	two	spikes	in	unemployment	for	organised	labour	to	fully	accede	to	the	end	of	the	centralised	wage	system.			
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Relations	between	capital	as	employer	and	labour	are	at	the	centre	of	this	redefinition	of	the	value	of	wage	labour.	The	contradictions	of	setting	a	minimum	wage	to	meet	the	costs	of	reproduction	of	labour	power,	as	a	family	wage,	were	amplified	by	women’s	greater	participation	in	the	workforce,	and	the	challenge	for	mothers	and	their	households	of	trading	time	for	waged	and	reproductive	labour.	Capital	initiated	industrial	change,	and	took	advantage	of	changes	in	women’s	role.	Capital’s	leverage	over	employment	and	livelihoods	persuaded	both	state	agencies	and	trade	unions	that	concessions	on	wage-setting	and	working	time	were	necessary.			The	resulting	drop	in	labour	income	share	of	GDP	from	over	58%	in	1975	to	47.1%	in	2018	indicates	that	capital	has	succeeded,	with	the	assistance	of	state	policies	and	union	misconceptions,	in	increasing	profitability	as	intended	from	the	end	of	the	post-war	boom	(Stanford	2018).			The	decisions	of	industrial	and	labour	courts	and	commissions	from	1975	to	2018,	along	with	commission	research	papers	and	statements,	are	the	primary	source	of	expression	of	the	rationales	for	minimum	wages,	or	the	minimum	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power.	I	analyse	the	(mostly)	annual	national	wage	case	‘Reasons	for	decision’,	the	arguments	and	terminology	used	in	the	body	of	documents.	Where	my	references	are	not	specific	to	one	named	body,	I	refer	to	them	as	“the	Commission.”	(See	Appendix	1	for	the	time	line	of	the	variously	named	commissions	and	industrial	courts).		In	Chapter	three	I	examine	changes	in	the	state’s	criteria	for	the	payment	of	income	support	for	subsistence	to	the	working	age	population.			The	drop	in	the	real	value	of	the	minimum	wage	between	1985	and	1995	saw	the	state	step	in	to	pay	for	the	costs	of	raising	children,	even	in	some	wage	earning	households,	via	the	tax	and	transfer	system.	These	costs	were	previously	met	by	the	family	wage	paid	by	the	employer.	Between	1995	and	2015	the	majority	of	increase	in	household	income	for	the	previously	normative	one	income	family	of	four	came	from	tax	concessions	and	transfers,	which	make	up	over	30%	of	its	income	in	2017,	up	from	under	3%	in	1973.		
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	The	large	increases	in	family	support	between	1996	and	2004	interrupted	the	trend	in	women’s	workforce	participation	by	discouraging	mothers	of	young	children	from	earning.	Since	2004	these	terms	have	been	modified	to	encourage	part-time	work	by	mothers	with	wage-earning	partners.	The	state	trades	off	incentives	to	women	to	earn	wage	income	as	current	labour	supply,	against	incentives	to	be	primary	carers	for	children,	the	future	labour	supply,	by	providing	income	support.			The	state	cross-references	income	support	for	the	unemployed	with	the	minimum	wage.	It	sets	income	support	lower	as	an	incentive	to	supply	labour,	even	though	the	needs	of	minimum	wage	earners	have	already	been	discounted	to	avoid	reducing	demand	for	labour.	The	work	incentive	is	currently	applied	most	intensely	to	single	adults	receiving	NewStart	Allowance	(NSA).	As	of	2017	the	NSA	provided	recipients	an	income	almost	35%	below	the	poverty	line.	Assurance	of	cheap	labour	supply,	via	pressure	to	take	up	even	low	paid	employment,	is	an	underlying	reason	for	the	state	withholding	income	support.			The	state	takes	responsibility	through	the	income	support	system,	for	ensuring	current	and	future	labour	supply,	by	targeting	income	support	to	varieties	of	household	composition.	Labour	supply	is	the	most	essential	condition	for	profitability,	and	a	role	which	capital	cannot	take	on.			Eligibility	for	income	support	and	the	amount	payable	is	set	through	commonwealth	budgets,	and	in	part	based	on	advice	from	the	departments	involved	in	administering	the	payments.	There	is	no	regular	process	of	adjudication	through	which	advocates	for	recipients	can	make	a	case	for	their	needs.	The	primary	source	materials	are	ministerial	statements,	government	and	parliamentary	inquiries,	and	public	policy	advisors.			Chapter	four	will	look	at	the	interest	of	finance	in	calculating	a	non-housing	subsistence	level	for	households.			
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When	issuing	home	mortgages	prior	to	around	2000,	the	major	banks	generally	limited	repayments	to	a	maximum	of	30%	of	household	income.	In	the	early	2000s	financial	institutions	began	using	a	Household	Expenditure	Measure	(HEM),	based	on	the	HPL,	for	all	borrowers,	regardless	of	their	income	or	expenses.	Lenders	priced	loans	on	their	own	calculations	of	default	risk.	Lenders	and	brokers	have	a	direct	material	interest	in	assessing	household	income	and	expenditure	against	as	low	as	possible	estimates	of	non-housing	costs	of	living.	Finance	exploited	the	willingness	of	households	to	trade-off	their	non-housing	subsistence	needs	against	their	most	expensive	subsistence	need,	i.e.	housing.		This	relatively	recent	interest	of	finance	in	the	cost	of	living	is	in	fact	an	interest	in	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power.	It	suggests	that	capital	captures	surplus	value	not	only	in	the	production	process,	but	also	afterwards,	in	consumption	via	housing	credit	that	combines	subsistence	consumption	with	asset	acquisition.		The	state	responded	to	the	proliferation	of	financial	institutions	in	the	1970s	and1980s	by	deregulating	the	major	banks,	which	had	been	losing	share	to	the	less	regulated	new	entrants	to	finance	markets.	The	resulting	increase	in	loan	volumes	and	profitability	also	increased	the	risk	of	systemic	financial	instability,	mortgage	stress	and	the	cost	of	housing	relative	to	incomes.			Light	touch	regulation	focused	on	system	stability	rather	than	compliance	by	financial	institutions	or	the	interests	of	bank	customers.	When	exposure	of	banks’	mistreatment	of	their	customers	became	a	scandal	that	threatened	the	legitimacy	of	the	financial	system,	the	government	set	up	the	FSRC	for	the	purpose	of	restoring	trust,	and	lenders	began	to	assess	loan	applications	using	more	carefully	calculated	actual	household	expenses.		The	state	is	again	reactive,	managing	the	potential	for	political	and	financial	disorder	where	capital	has	disrupted	livelihoods	and	maximised	the	value	it	can	capture	from	households	by	discounting	their	needs,	as	well	as	shifting	risk	onto	them.			
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The	state	supervises	lending	standards	via	the	Australian	Prudential	Regulatory	Authority,	enforces	legal	requirements	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	via	the	Australian	Securities	and	Investment	Commission,	and	monitors	financial	stability	via	the	Reserve	Bank	of	Australia.	The	RCFS	acquired	evidence	from	lending	institutions	about	their	otherwise	largely	confidential	practices.	These	four	bodies	are	the	major	source	of	primary	material	to	identify	the	rationales	of	finance	in	calculating	or	estimating	the	subsistence	needs	of	households.	Other	primary	sources	are	RFiAnalytics,	the	company	that	manages	subscriptions	to	the	Household	Expenditure	Measure	used	by	lenders,	and	public	comments	by	industry	insiders.			Chapter	five	concludes	the	thesis,	comparing	the	significance	of	the	findings	about	the	three	domains	in	which	minimum	living	costs	are	assessed.	Taking	account	of	the	context	in	which	these	minimum	cost	of	living	assessments	are	made,	and	the	implications	for	relations	between	capital,	labour	and	the	state,	this	thesis	explores	the	implications	for	labour	in	asserting	minimum	living	standards.			 	
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Chapter	two.	Redefining	the	minimum	wage		
2.1 Rationales for the minimum wage 	Could	an	industrial	tribunal	set	a	minimum	wage	that	is	a	living	wage	for	all	those	dependent	on	wages,	within	the	prevailing	relationships	between	employers,	labour	and	the	state?	Or	are	there	contradictions	between	the	concept	of	a	socially	minimum	standard	of	living,	and	the	demands	of	capital	accumulation,	that	an	agency	of	the	state	cannot	resolve	via	a	wage	mechanism?	These	contradictions	are	to	do	with	reconciling	profitability	(the	reproduction	of	capital)	and	subsistence	consumption	(the	reproduction	of	labour)	via	a	system	of	wage	fixation	that	cannot,	on	a	nation-wide	scale,	guarantee	both.			This	chapter	explores	how	the	commission	(with	different	names	under	various	legislation)	sought	to	reconfigure	ways	to	link	wages	to	minimum	standards	of	living.		I	link	three	aspects	of	Marx’s	concept	of	the	“socially	necessary	cost	of	the	reproduction	of	labour	power”	to	the	“minimum	wage”.	Firstly,	the	socially	necessary	cost	applies	not	to	the	livelihood	of	the	individual	wage	earner,	but	to	the	household	that	depends	on	its	wage-earning	member(s).	Secondly,	what	is	socially	necessary	is	contestable,	and	in	the	labour	contract	this	means	the	amount	of	the	wage,	as	well	as	the	time	of	labour	and	intensity	of	labour.	The	contest	over	the	wage	reflects	the	employers’	preference	to	minimise	labour	costs,	at	the	expense	of	labour’s	standard	of	living	and	share	of	output.	The	wage	is	not	defined	by	the	value	of	what	labour	produces	while	earning	the	wage.	Thirdly,	state	agencies,	particularly	the	commission,	in	this	contest	over	the	cost	of	the	reproduction	of	labour	power,	operate	to	maintain	order	including	the	legitimacy	of	order,	and	manage	the	contest	between	capital	and	labour	within	parameters	that	support	capital	accumulation.			The	Consumer	Price	Index	(CPI)	prevailed	for	decades	as	the	benchmark	for	wage	setting.	It	is	an	absolute	measure	of	the	cost	of	a	basket	of	goods.	The	wage	safety	net	that	
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eventually	superceded	cost	of	living	increases	uses	no	single	standard	or	benchmark	for	defining	minimum	needs.	Unions	and	advocates	for	low	income	households	have	made	submissions	for	minimum	wage	increases	that	define	needs	as	socially	relative	and	so	propose	a	relative	benchmark	for	the	minimum	wage,	such	as	a	percentage	of	average	earnings.	This	transition	from	centralised	wage	fixation	and	a	‘basic	wage’	indexed	for	increases	in	the	cost	of	living,	to	enterprise	bargaining	combined	with	a	wage	‘safety	net’	since	1997,	is	posed	as	the	shifting	terms	of	the	wage	contradiction.			The	changing	conditions	of	profitability	in	Australia	that	came	with	globalisation	and	a	culture	of	international	competitiveness	brought	an	apparent	need	to	have	wage	levels	and	working	conditions	consistent	with	profitability	of	capital	(and	not	just	for	importing	and	exporting	sectors).	This	has	served	to	steadily	break	the	connection	between	wage	levels	and	living	standards.		This	dilemma	has	been	consistently	represented	in	the	Commission’s	thinking	by	the	theme	of	the	trade-off	between	on	one	hand	the	needs	of	minimum	wage	earners,	and	on	the	other	hand	the	impact	on	aggregate	levels	of	investment,	employment,	and	profitability.	The	Commission’s	reasons	for	decisions	reflect	the	re-shaping	of	the	wage	contradiction	in	industrial	and	economic	terms.	This	chapter	draws	out	the	changing	counter-positions	and	trade-offs	that	confronted	the	Commission,	particularly	in	relation	to	wages	and	employment.		The	Commission	makes	decisions	within	the	constraints	of	the	government	legislation	and	policy	that	sets	its	terms,	and	on	the	basis	of	assessments	by	its	own	research,	as	well	as	other	economic	and	labour	market	policy	arms	of	the	state,	and	in	response	to	the	direct	leverage	exercised	by	employers	and	unions	in	backing	up	their	submissions	on	the	minimum	wage,	and	industrial	relations.	The	leverage	of	capital	and	labour,	in	relation	to	wage	setting,	has	also	changed,	and	is	discussed	in	this	chapter	as	a	shift	in	the	terms	of	legitimacy	that	resulted	in	the	abandonment	of	the	application	of	a	benchmark	of	need.			
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I	draw	out	contextual	factors	that	bear	on	adequacy	benchmarks	for	the	minimum	wage,	that	may	not	be	directly	acknowledged	in	the	Commission’s	decisions,	specifically	changes	related	to	women’s’	role	in	the	labour	market	and	in	the	cost	of,	and	household	labour	required	for,	the	reproduction	of	labour	power.		Concurrently	with	the	intensification	and	reshaping	of	the	terms	of	trade	off	through	the	1980s	and	1990s,	the	assumed	basis	of	setting	the	minimum	wage	for	a	standard	working	week	as	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power	in	the	form	of	two	adults	and	their	children	was	dramatically	undermined	by	women’s	increased	participation	in	waged	labour,	and	their	demands	for	better	and	easier	terms	for	that	participation,	that	allowed	for	dual	roles	in	unpaid	caring	or	reproductive	work	and	waged	work.	In	developing	this	proposition,	this	chapter	also	looks	at	the	social	presumptions	that	were	attached	to	the	minimum	wage,	in	terms	of	who	that	wage	was	supposed	to	reproduce.	It	traces	the	(re)emergence	of	women	into	the	workforce	as	a	critical	catalyst	for	part-time	and	non-standard	work,	and	the	rupture	that	development	put	into	the	connection	between	the	wage	and	living	standards.		The	chapter	derives	most	of	its	evidence	from	the	stated	reasons	for	commission	decisions	setting	the	minimum	wage,	in	order	to	understand	how	the	parties	to	wage	determination	–	employers,	trade	unions	and	the	state	–	played	out	shifts	in	the	wage	contradiction.			
The	family	wage	up	to	the	1970s		This	boundary	or	tipping	point	between	“starvation	or	pauperism”	on	the	one	hand,	and	“frugal	comfort	[and]	provision	for	evil	day”	on	the	other,	is	the	open	rationale	for	the	basic	wage,	the	original	form	of	the	minimum	wage,	from	inception	in	the	Harvester	judgment	of	1907	(McKay	1907	p4).	In	practice	it	was	qualified	on	other	bases.		The	basic	wage	for	women	was	discounted	because	a	woman	was	assumed	to	have	no	dependents.	The	wage	was	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	employed	man	and	his	family;	hence	
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it	was	a	family	wage.	All	award	wages	increased	together,	with	reference	to	a	cost	of	living	index	(ABS	2005),	but	these	increases	were	contested.	Unions	defended	the	minimum	wage	by	industrial	bargaining	(ACAC	1977b,	p8;	Moore	1982	p79).	Employers	challenged	cost	of	living	increase	on	the	grounds	of	capacity	to	pay,	and	sometimes	increases	were	withheld.			At	the	commencement	of	the	industrial	system,	capacity	to	pay	was	understood	at	the	firm	level,	and	the	basic	wage	was	to	apply,	specifically	excluding	“the	profits	of	the	particular	employer”	(McKay	1907	p1).	This	implied	that	an	employer	who	was	unable	to	pay	the	minimum	wage	was	not	expected	to	continue	in	business.	But	capacity	to	pay	came	to	apply	at	the	national	level,	when	in	1920	it	was	grounds	for	discounting	needs	as	estimated	by	the	Royal	Commission	into	the	Basic	Wage,	and	again	in	the	Depression	by	the	Basic	Wage	Inquiry	of	1931(Fair	Work	Commission	2015b).	The	development	of	macroeconomics	as	a	guide	to	post	war	policy	enabled	a	further	broadening	of	capacity	to	pay	at	an	aggregate	level.	After	the	wool	price	collapse	of	1953	a	government	inquiry	asserted	“the	only	proper	interpretation	of	capacity	to	pay	is	capacity	to	pay	wages	without	increased	price	inflation”	(Vernon	et	al	1965	p143).		Minimum	wage	contests	came	to	centre	on	tensions	between	full	employment	and	price	stability	(Vernon	et	al	1965	p46).	Despite	disagreement	about	whether	the	cause	of	inflation	in	the	1970s	was	primarily	imports	or	wages,	policy	makers	agreed	that	wage	restraint	was	a	necessary	response	(Beggs	2105	p154).	The	number	one	policy	target	shifted	from	the	exchange	rate	to	inflation,	and	targeting	inflation	meant	restraining	wages	(Beggs	2015	p170).	The	approach	of	the	state	to	the	connection	between	wages,	inflation	and	unemployment	is	discussed	further	in	relation	to	capacity	to	pay	arguments	later	in	this	chapter.		When	the	Henderson	Poverty	Line	(HPL)	was	established	in	1975,	it	was	set	just	below	the	minimum	wage	plus	child	endowment	(Johnson	1987	p52;	Bray	2013	p7).	The	minimum	wage	was	no	more	than	a	bare	minimum	standard,	and	barely	qualified	as	a	living	wage	(Healy	&	Pekarek	2017).	
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The	wage	safety	net		The	current	wage	safety	net	was	established	in	1996	by	the	Howard	Government.	The	wage	safety	net	can	be	interpreted	narrowly	as	covering	only	the	1.9%	of	employees	paid	at	the	National	Minimum	Wage	(NMW)	rate,	or	more	broadly	as	all	award	reliant	employees	which	the	FWC	estimates	“to	be	2.3	million	or	22.7	per	cent	of	all	employees”	as	well	as	some	other	categories	(2018	p5).	Although	awards	retain	some	basis	in	historical	rates	that	incorporate	gender	bias,	history	of	union	bargaining,	relativities,	skills	and	other	factors	that	differentiated	wages	prior	to	the	safety	net	(Broadway	&	Wilkins	2017	p26),	I	take	this	broader	view	of	the	minimum	wage	since	1996,	in	that	the	FWC	adjusts	awards	and	the	NMW	together	on	the	basis	of	a	common	set	of	rationales.			The	minimum	wages	objective,	under	which	the	NMW	is	set,	calls	on	the	FWC	to	satisfy	three	conflicting	factors	that	include	capacity	to	pay.	“Relative	living	standards	and	needs	of	the	low-paid”	are	traded	off	against	both	a	broader	capacity	to	pay,	expressed	as	“the	performance	and	competitiveness	of	the	national	economy,	including…inflation”,	and	against	a	presumed	effect	of	decreasing	demand	for	labour,	and	therefore	“workforce	participation”	(Fair	Work	Act	2009	s.284).			There	is	further	tension	between	the	latter	two	objectives	with	the	RBA	being	“called	upon	to	make	implicit	trade-offs	between	inflation	and	employment”	(Fraser	1995).	These	trade-offs	are	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	upcoming	section	on	capacity	to	pay.		The	“relative	living	standards	and	needs	of	the	low	paid”	are	qualified	and	unclearly	defined.	Benchmarks	were	not	needed	for	setting	the	level	of	the	safety	net,	according	to	the	Joint	Governments	1997	submission	“Reference	to	the	needs	of	the	low	paid	…does	not	presume	either	an	identification	of	those	needs	or	any	judgment	that	they	are	not	at	present	met	adequately”	(AIRC	1997b	p45).		
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The	section	in	this	chapter	on	women’s	independence	and	the	loss	of	the	family	wage	draws	out	broader	implications,	including	the	inadequacy	of	the	minimum	wage	as	a	guarantee	of	a	living	income	for	women.			The	FWC’s	framework	for	identifying	the	needs	of	minimum	wage	earner	households	has	limitations	in	terms	of	benchmarks,	diversity	of	household	composition	and	earnings,	a	confused	role	in	relationship	to	poverty	amongst	wage	earners,	and	inability	to	respond	to	financial	stress.	These	limitations	compound	the	trade-offs	made	on	grounds	of	capacity	to	pay	that	constrain	the	meeting	of	needs.	The	FWC	observed	in	2018	“despite	the	increase	of	3.3	per	cent	awarded	in	last	year’s	Review,	the	relative	position	of	many	NMW	and	award-dependent	household	types	with	children	vis-a-vis	the	relative	poverty	line	actually	deteriorated”	(FWC	2018	p20).		
The	trade-offs		The	original	benefits	of	the	family	wage	were	that	it	met	the	needs	of	two	adults	and	two	children,	not	just	the	one	adult	earning	it.	It	was	set	according	to	a	transparent,	even	if	contestable,	index	of	adequacy.	It	maintained	relativity	to	wages	generally,	including	some	share	of	productivity,	through	industrial	bargaining	and	the	centralised	wage	fixing	system.	The	replacement	of	the	family	wage,	and	the	advent	of	equal	pay,	could	be	seen	as	being	of	benefit	to	women,	being	considered	as	economically	independent	of	husbands.	Yet	the	value	of	the	minimum	wage	has	declined	and	the	gender	pay	gap	persists.	At	least	some	of	the	reasons	for	this	can	be	found	in	an	understanding	of	the	trade-offs	and	tensions	that	led	to	the	family	wage	being	replaced	by	the	wage	safety	net	(See	Figure	2),	and	the	need	for	it	to	be	supplemented	by	income	support.			 	
	 			
37	
Figure	2:	Components	of	real	disposable	income	1910-2015		Couple	family	with	two	children	and	a	single	male	minimum	wage	breadwinner.	
		(Source:	Bray	2017	p19	Figure	10)		The	demise	of	the	centralised	industrial	system	manifested	renewed	terms	for	the	trade-off	of	needs	in	response	to	the	intensification	of	the	profitability	imperative	after	the	end	of	the	postwar	boom.	A	persistent	yet	also	evolving	trade-off	in	the	labour	market	is	capacity	to	pay	versus	needs,	most	sharply	represented	in	the	needs	of	minimum	income	earners	vs	the	level	of	employer	demand	for	cheap	labour	supply.	The	reconfiguration	of	women’s	labour	time	and	the	reproduction	of	labour	power	are	both	caused	by	and	contributors	to	the	revaluation	of	wage	labour	in	relation	to	household	needs.			These	three	themes,	the	industrial	system,	capacity	to	pay,	and	women’s	labour,	explain	the	constraints	on	the	minimum	wage	meeting	needs,	discussed	in	the	next	sections.		
2.2 End of the centralised industrial system 	The	centralised	wage	system,	and	the	basic	wage	that	it	maintained,	was	the	foundation	on	which	Australian	labour	accepted	the	wage	relationship	for	most	of	the	20th	century.	
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When	wage	restraint	became	an	employer	demand	and	a	centerpiece	of	economic	policy	during	the	employment	and	inflation	crises	of	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s,	employers	began	to	question	the	benefits	of	the	centralised	system.	Unions	did	not	initially	accept	wage	restraint,	and	many	responded	with	industrial	action.	The	Australian	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	Commission	(ACAC)	played	a	vital	role	in	suppressing	and	mediating	the	wage	conflict	between	capital	and	labour,	much	of	which	played	out	under	the	Accord	from	1983-1996,	and	resulted	in	the	replacement	of	the	family	wage	by	the	wage	safety	net.	This	was	achieved	because	the	unions	were	persuaded	to	accept	the	end	of	essential	features	of	the	centralised	industrial	system,	including	that	the	minimum	wage	was	the	bargained	foundation	of	all	wage	rates,	tied	to	a	cost	of	living	measure	of	adequacy.	The	pressures	through	which	this	reshaping	of	the	labour	market	was	accepted	by	organised	labour	centred	on	capacity	to	pay,	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.			Centralised	wage	fixation	had	been	accepted	earlier	in	the	20th	century	by	all	parties	including	employers	as	a	means	of	control	of	the	labour	market	(Vernon	et	al	p132).	The	President	of	the	ACAC	observed	at	a	conference	of	the	industrial	parties	in	1977-1987	the	consensus	“that	national	wage	cases	should	continue	to	be	at	the	core	of	a	methodical	system	of	wage	fixation”	(Moore	1982	p72).		When	Labor	was	elected	to	government	in	1983,	the	ACAC	(1983b	p16)	stated	that	the	Accord	“constitute[d]	a	profound	change	in	the	context”	and	that	the	centralised	“system	based	on	prima	facie	full	indexation…would	provide	the	basis	for	a	more	rapid	economic	recovery	than	would	occur	in	any	alternative	system.”		In	the	same	period	a	New	Right	coalition	of	employer	groups	and	think	tanks	contested	not	only	CPI	increases,	as	employers	had	done	from	time	to	time	in	previous	decades.	They	also	agitated	against	centralised	wage	fixing	in	principle	(ACAC	1986a	p5;	ACAC	1988	pp33-35)	in	line	with	ideas	that	markets	should	not	be	regulated	by	the	state	(Bowden	2011	p69;	Cahill	2010).		Other	employer	groups	disagreed.	The	Business	Council	of	Australia	(BCA)	assessed	
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“that	to	move	now	to	a	more	decentralised	system	would	"threaten	a	major	breakout	with	adverse	macroeconomic	effects,	[which]	the	Australian	business	community	and	the	community	at	large	‘cannot	afford	to	risk’	”	(ACAC	1986a	p8).			Centralised	wage	fixing	with	default	cost	of	living	increases	still	fettered	wages	at	this	point,	because	the	ACTU	had	committed	not	to	pursue	additional	claims,	despite	the	capacity	and	appetite	of	some	unions	to	pursue	wage	claims	backed	by	industrial	action.	A	series	of	individual	unions	did	defy	the	ban	on	extra	claims.	The	ACAC	crystallised	a	choice	for	unions	stating	“that	the	trade	unions,	either	jointly	or	individually,	cannot	have	it	both	ways:	they	cannot	seek	the	benefits	of	a	centralised	and	stable	system	of	industrial	relations	and	at	the	same	time	destabilise	such	a	system	by	pursuing	sectional	claims	and	taking	industrial	action”	(ACAC	1988	p3).		The	BCA	commissioned	report	into	Avoiding	industrial	action	(Hilmer	et	al.	1991)	was	the	basis	of	the	solution.	The	minimum	wage	and	national	awards	as	a	safety	net	were	separated	from	enterprise	level	productivity	bargaining,	supervised	by	the	Commission	to	contain	industrial	action.	This	resolved	the	pressure	from	those	ACTU	constituents	who	believed	they	had	the	industrial	leverage	to	win	wage	“increases	based	on	profitability/	productivity/market	adjustments"	(AIRC	1991b	p2).	The	two-tier	wages	system	was	legislated	in	Labor’s	Industrial	Relations	Reform	Act	1993.	The	conditions	for	“protected	action”	specified	bargaining	and	agreements	at	enterprise	level,	with	awards	to	“act	as	a	safety	net	of	minimum	wages	and	conditions	of	employment	underpinning	direct	bargaining”	(s.88A(b))	severing	the	minimum	wage	from	both	bargaining	and	economy	wide	productivity	growth.		The	convergence	between	unions	and	employers	wanting	to	move	away	from	centralised	wage	fixing	provided	the	precondition	of	legitimacy	for	the	new	enterprise	bargaining	system.	The	state	both	mediated	progress	towards,	and	formalised	this	move	once	employers	and	unions	had	come	to	accept	it.			
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The	end	of	the	centralised	system	allowed	employers	to	contest	capacity	to	pay,	particularly	based	on	productivity,	directly	at	industry	level,	rather	than	across	the	economy	as	a	whole	in	national	wage	cases.	It	also	left	minimum	wage	earners	without	any	collective	leverage	to	assert	their	needs	against	policy	maker	and	employer	arguments	based	on	capacity	to	pay.	The	consequence	was	a	decline	in	the	real	and	relative	values	of	the	minimum	wage	(See	Figure	3).		
Figure	3:	Minimum,	average	and	median	full	time	weekly	earnings	
	(Source:	McKenzie	2018	p55)			  
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2.3 Capacity to pay versus needs  	Employers	had	a	history	of	contesting	union	asserted	needs	on	the	basis	of	capacity	to	pay.	We	have	seen	that	the	terms	of	that	contest	were	changed	in	the	1980s	and	1990s.		I	look	at	the	wages	vs	employment	trade-off	arguments	from	three	perspectives,	as	related	to	the	decisions	on	minimum	wages,	and	to	aspects	of	excess	labour	supply	(Figure	4).	The	first	is	an	organised	labour	perspective,	in	which	the	unemployment	rate	influenced	the	positions	that	unions	took	at	the	ACAC,	and	more	recently	on	the	wage	safety	net.	The	second	is	a	state	perspective,	via	broader	macroeconomic	policy	and	a	presumed	natural	rate	of	unemployment.	The	third	is	also	a	state	perspective,	of	the	commission’s	framework	under	the	safety	net,	of	mediating	labour	market	supply	and	demand	by	trading	off	wage	incomes	for	low	paid	workers,	against	potential	increases	in	employment.			
Impact	of	unemployment	on	union	positions		Union	cases	to	wage	setting	commissions	came	to	accept	a	trade-off	of	minimum	incomes	against	employment.			When	unemployment	and	inflation	both	began	to	rise	from	the	mid-1970s,	the	first	response	of	the	unions	before	the	Commission	was	to	continue	with	applications	for	quarterly	cost	of	living	increases,	to	compensate	for	inflation,	and	maintain	living	standards.	The	three-decade	period	of	effective	full-employment	when	unemployment	was	around	2-3%	had	ended,	but	the	unions	didn’t	know	that	then.				 	
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Figure	4:	Unemployment	in	Australia	1901	-	2007	
	(Source:	Kennedy	2007)		From	1976,	the	Metalworkers	union	leadership	initiated	work	on	an	alternative	economic	strategy,	aiming	to	protect	and	save	manufacturing	jobs	and	to	develop	the	Australian	economy	and	employment	(Brown	2002	pp109	–	112).	This	matured	to	become	the	Prices	and	Incomes	Accord	between	the	ACTU	and	the	ALP	government	elected	in	March	1983	as	unemployment	approached	10%.			The	Accord,	and	the	unions’	self-imposed	wage	restraint	produced	different	results	than	its	progenitors	had	intended.	I	contend	that	this	was	not	only	because	it	was	based	on	ACTU	imposed	discipline	on	affiliates	to	enforce	wage	restraint,	combined	with	a	misconceived	possibility	of	a	partnership	between	unions	and	supposedly	more	progressive	capital,	as	some	left	critics	emphasise	(Bramble	2000,	Humphrys	2014).			When	in	the	early	1980s	the	material	experience	of	unemployment	and	the	threat	of	unemployment	were	undermining	living	standards	(Brown	2003	p113),	union	leaders	accepted	the	condition	of	workers’	dependence	on	capital	investment	for	their	livelihoods,	for	jobs	and	wages.	The	Accord	was	a	ready-made	framework	through	which	
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union	leaders	expressed	and	implemented	this	acceptance	during	a	series	of	economic	crises.	Opposition	voices	were	silenced,	but	neither	did	anyone	of	influence	advocate	a	clear	alternative	approach	to	sustaining	working	class	livelihoods.		The	ACTU	in	seeking	to	assist	economic	recovery	via	the	Accord	from	1983,	when	unemployment	peaked	at	10.5%	(RBA	2018c),	agreed	not	claim	increases	beyond	the	CPI.	The	ACAC	declared	it	would	award	CPI	increases	except	“on	rare	occasions	because…of	exceptional	and	compelling	circumstances	[my	emphasis]”	(ACAC	1983	p19).	The	Labor	government	linked	economic	recovery	to	international	competitiveness	and	restraining	inflation,	to	achieving	“a	lasting	reduction	in	unemployment"	(ACAC	1984	p9),	a	position	implicitly	accepted	by	the	ACTU.		In	June	1986	ACAC	(1986a	p25)	had	affirmed	that	it	would	“not	lightly	depart	from	full	indexation.	The	economic	material	in	favour	of	such	a	departure	must	in	our	view	be	strong	and	persuasive.”	Between	October	1985	and	June	1986	unemployment	had	hovered	below	8%.	By	December	1986,	unemployment	had	climbed	above	8%	again,	where	it	stayed	for	over	a	year.	Rising	unemployment	turned	out	to	be	strong	and	persuasive,	to	both	the	ACAC	and	the	ACTU.		At	the	December	1986	wage	case	the	ACTU	offered	to	accept	partial	indexation	to	be	applied	to	the	minimum	wage,	and	"in	advance	of	the	current	system	self-destructing,	we	have	sought	as	a	fallback	or	secondary	position	a	modified	approach"	(ACAC	1986b	p5)	for	a	second	tier	of	wage	increases	that	could	be	negotiated	to	a	ceiling	outside	the	minimum	wage.	This	was	an	attempt	to	save	centralised	wage	fixing	from	defiance	by	unions	with	more	leverage,	by	allowing	for	increased	capacity	to	pay	in	some	sectors	of	the	economy,	whilst	accepting	capacity	to	pay	as	an	argument	against	maintaining	the	minimum	wage.		As	unemployment	bumped	down	during	1988	to	just	below	6%	for	the	last	quarter	of	1989,	a	number	of	unions	took	industrial	action	for	wage	increases.	While	employers	were	concerned	to	stop	industrial	action,	and	the	ACAC	was	concerned	to	assert	its	
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authority	and	maintain	wage	restraint,	some	unions	felt	in	a	position	to	reject	the	previously	cited	capacity	to	pay	arguments	accepted	by	the	ACAC	and	the	ACTU.			Unemployment	began	to	rise	again,	from	around	6%	in	1990	and	peaking	around	11%	from	June	1992	to	Dec	1993.	The	union	movement	intensified	its	willingness	to	partner	with	employers,	to	foster	conditions	under	which	they	would	increase	employment.	A	new	basis	for	negotiating	capacity	to	pay	was	introduced,	in	the	Structural	Efficiency	Principles	of	1991	(AIRC	1991a),	which	were	a	form	of	productivity	bargaining,	and	excluded	the	minimum	wage.			
Putting	jobs	first	was	the	subtitle	of	the	Accord	Mark	7	of	1994,	and	its	opening	words	reiterated	and	affirmed	a	“shared	commitment	to	promoting	sustainable	job	growth	and	substantially	reducing	unemployment...	a	comprehensive	approach	to	economic	and	social	policy,	based	on	co-operation	not	conflict"	with	its	first	objective	to	increase	employment	by	half	a	million	jobs	in	3	years	(Department	of	Industrial	Relations	1995	p111).	This	goal	was	attached	to	the	Working	Nation	package	and	to	"low	inflation".			The	Commission	noted	apparent	agreement	between	the	government,	the	Metal	Trades	Industry	Association	of	Australia	(MTIA),	and	unions	that	“if	our	national	growth	and	employment	objectives	are	to	be	achieved	and	if	our	standard	of	living	is	to	grow,	we	simply	have	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	our	economy.	We	have	to	expose	our	industries	to	international	competition,	strengthen	our	engagement	with	the	world	economy	and	shift	the	focus	of	decision	making	to	the	enterprise”	(AIRC	1994	p8).		The	level	of	unemployment	was	particularly	persuasive	of	the	unions	to	accept	capacity	to	pay	as	a	reason	for	limiting	national	wage	increases.	This	is	what	led	the	ACTU	to	concede	two-tiered	wage	increases,	opening	a	split	in	the	centralised	wages	system	that	became	the	legislated	enterprise	bargaining	system	with	the	wage	safety	net.			The	“strong	and	persuasive”	“economic	material”	was	expressed	as	the	wages	versus	employment	trade-off,	which	the	AIRC	noted	that	the	unions	accepted.	
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	“As	we	understand	the	Accord,	the	trade	union	movement	accepted	a	degree	of	wage	restraint.	One	of	its	purposes	was	to	facilitate	the	reduction	of	unemployment.	No	economic	commentaries	which	have	been	brought	to	our	notice	suggest	that	the	strategy	was	based	on	a	mistaken	conception	of	the	relation	between	aggregate	real	wages	and	employment.	Against	this	background	we	consider	that	an	overall	level	of	real	wages	higher	than	might	otherwise	have	existed,	brought	about	by	both	agreements	and	awards,	militates	against	the	expansion	of	employment	and	the	reduction	of	unemployment”	(AIRC	1997b).		The	spikes	in	unemployment	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	were	closely	associated	with	union	concessions	that	abandoned	the	application	of	any	measure	of	need	to	the	minimum	wage.			Under	the	wage	safety	net,	the	unions	no	longer	have	any	legal	industrial	leverage	to	pursue	minimum	wage	claims.	The	ACTU	tailors	its	argument	for	increases	to	the	wage	safety	net	according	to	unemployment	trends	under	a	broader	economic	outlook.	It	makes	the	case	that	restrained	or	modest	wage	rises	will	not	harm	employment	levels.	For	example	an	ACTU	submission	noted	“full-time	employment	continued	to	grow	strongly	in	March	2011	and	stated	that	this	supported	the	assertion	that	the	Annual	Wage	Review	2009–10	decision	did	not	have	a	negative	impact	on	employment”	(FWA	2010	p21).	When	unemployment	is	rising,	claims	are	restrained,	and	when	unemployment	is	falling	or	closer	to	the	natural	rate,	its	more	ambitious	claims	are	in	its	own	terms	“moderate”	(A	living	wage	2001).	ACTU	submissions	for	higher	increases	cite	research	showing	that	low	wage	earners	spend	a	greater	proportion	of	their	income	and	therefore	increases	in	minimum	and	award	wages	will	have	a	stimulatory	rather	than	contractionary	effect	on	employment	(AIRC	2001).			The	grounds	the	ACTU	has	cited	in	its	living	wage	claims,	have	not	only	failed	to	persuade	the	commissions.	They	implicitly	accept	an	unemployment-wages	trade-off	that	is	an	aspect	of	the	capacity	to	pay	argument.	ACTU	claims	take	a	relatively	modest	
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view	of	minimum	needs	of	wage	earners,	and	the	qualifiers	make	their	claims	for	improvement	to	minimum	wage	standards	vulnerable	to	both	rising	unemployment	and	policy	concerns	about	unemployment.			
Macro	economic	policy:	a	natural	rate	of	unemployment			Inflation	became	the	primary	target	of	macroeconomic	policy	with	the	end	of	the	post-war	boom,	and	the	first	appearance	in	1973	of	stagflation,	rising	inflation	and	unemployment.	Economists	and	policy	makers	had	linked	inflation,	wages	and	employment	for	many	decades,	and	in	the	post	war	context	applied	this	link	both	to	a	goal	and	actual	periods	of	full	employment.			The	Labor	government	in	1975	grappled	with	a	“wage	explosion”	(coincidental	with	equal	pay	for	women),	and	CPI	inflation	of	over	16%.	The	Minister	for	Labour	and	Immigration	considered	that	“a	substantial	proportion	of	the	wage	increases	obtained	by	most	workers	during	1974	was	in	excess	of	the	amount	necessary	to	compensate	for	productivity	improvement	and	the	maintenance	of	real	wages	in	terms	of	prices.	This	undoubtedly	was	one	of	the	major	factors	leading	to	the	squeeze	on	profits	which	in	itself	was	a	significant	factor	in	the	increase	in	the	level	of	unemployment.”	(Australia.	Cabinet	Minute	1975	p2).	The	increase	in	wages	above	productivity	produced	what	was	referred	to	as	a	“real	wage	overhang”	(Cowgill	2013	p6).		Treasury	prioritised	fighting	inflation	first,	holding	“that	a	sustained	period	of	unemployment	was	probably	necessary	to	hold	real	wage	growth	below	productivity	growth	long	enough	to	restore	the	traditional	distributional	share	between	labour	and	capital”	(Beggs	p211).	Emerging	monetarism	in	Britain	and	the	USA	bolstered	this	position.	The	monetarist	view	took	up	Friedman’s	criticism	of	alleged	Keynesian	macroeconomic	policy	in	the	post-war	boom.	Prioritising	full	employment	had	produced	a	dangerous	inflationary	spiral,	in	which	labour	had	excessive	bargaining	power.	Yet	full	employment	in	Australia	for	the	three	decades	prior	had	not	accompanied	accelerating	inflation.	Nonetheless,	inflation	had	accelerated,	and	growing	monetarist	policy	influence	
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coinciding	with	employer	opposition	to	cost	of	living	wage	rises,	fostered	the	political	conditions	for	decisions	by	governments	and	the	ACAC	to	retard	wages	growth,	and	the	RBA	to	set	interest	rates	with	a	view	to	preventing	unemployment	from	falling	below	a	so-called	natural	rate.			Since	the	early	1980s	economic	policy	assumed	that	unemployment	at	a	“natural	rate”	was	functional	to	the	achievement	of	low	inflation	and	high	productivity.	This	natural	rate	was	estimated	to	have	risen	from	around	2%	prior	to	the	1970s	up	to	around	5%	after	the	end	of	the	long	boom	(Gruen,	Pagan	&	Thompson	1999).	The	corollary	was	that	unemployment,	as	labour	over-supply,	placed	downward	pressure	on	the	price	of	labour,	and	is	a	primary	variable	for	managing	the	rate	of	inflation.		The	position	that	wage	inflation	was	at	the	root	of	the	general	rate	of	inflation	did	not	at	first	dominate	the	Commission’s	thinking.	In	1980	the	ACAC	(1980	p33)	asserted	that	“wages	have	lagged	behind	prices”	since	indexation	was	introduced,	and	that	to	hold	wage	increases	below	the	CPI	“would	be	to	impose	upon	wage	and	salary	earners	an	undue	burden	in	reversing	the	inflationary	trend	when	the	acceleration	of	this	trend	must	be	ascribed	mainly	to	factors	other	than	wages”	(p35).		ACAC’s	thinking	on	inflation	and	unemployment	changed	by	the	1986	review	of	wage	fixing	principles,	stating	grounds	for	discounting	CPI	increases	“related	to	the	state	of	the	national	economy	and	the	likely	effects	of	any	adjustment	on	the	economy,	with	special	reference	to	the	level	of	employment	and	inflation”(1986a	p27).	It	gave	“particular	weight	to…the	need	to	deal	with	the	resulting	threat	of	an	economic	downturn	and	increased	unemployment	by	rapidly	removing	the	gap	between	our	inflation	rate	and	that	of	our	trading	partners”	(p	61).	The	Workplace	Relations	Act	(WRA)	1996	sharpened	the	connection,	requiring	wage	decisions	to	be	made	with	“special	reference	to	likely	effects	on	the	level	of	employment	and	on	inflation”(s.103	(1)(b)).	The	point	of	the	CPI	itself	as	a	benchmark	of	need	was	inverted	when	it	“took	on	a	new	meaning.	Its	primary	policy	function	became	the	informing	of	the	setting	of	interest	rates,	as	
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incorporated	explicitly	into	the	government’s	1996	Statement	on	the	Conduct	of	Monetary	Policy”	(Bundy	2015	p628).		This	is	evident	in	the	Australian	Industrial	Relations	Commission’s	(AIRC)	1997	Reasons	
for	decision.	“Higher	inflation	rates	resulting	from	the	success	of	the	claim	may	lead	to	further	wage	claims.”	This	poses	a	threat	to	economic	activity	(or	investment)	when	combined	with	an	aspect	of	“the	allegedly	adverse	impact	of	wage	increases	on	employment”.	That	is	“a	higher	general	level	of	real	wages	tends	to	reduce	the	level	of	economic	activity	and,	for	any	given	level	of	activity,	to	reduce	the	quantity	of	labour	employed”	(AIRC	1997b).		In	referring	to	the	impact	of	“wage	increases	on	employment”	the	AIRC	was	concerned	that	“wage	increases	which	impose	or	accentuate	a	pattern	of	wage	relativities	different	from	that	which	would	emerge	in	an	unregulated	market	will	cause	structural	unemployment.	Administratively	imposed	relativities	are	contrasted	with	"flexible"	or	"market-clearing"	relativities.	Inasmuch	as	the	Commission	raises	the	relative	wages	of	particular	groups,	it	is	likely	to	exacerbate	unemployment	among	the	groups	which	the	Commission	wishes	to	assist”	(AIRC	1997b).	In	other	words,	the	AIRC	concluded	that	employers	adjust	the	number	of	employees	up	or	down	on	the	basis	of	labour	cost	calculations,	and	so	to	lift	low	pay	rates	for	those	with	jobs,	will	result	in	fewer	of	those	jobs	being	available.	The	application	of	this	assumption	to	minimum	wage	setting	is	discussed	further	in	the	next	section	on	mediating	the	labour	market.			The	inflation-	employment	trade	off	is	analysed	more	consistently,	in	greater	depth	by	the	RBA,	which	has	for	a	period	used	the	concept	of	a	natural	rate	of	unemployment,	or	non-accelerating	inflation	rate	of	unemployment	(NAIRU),	when	setting	interest	rates	(the	price	of	money)	at	a	level	designed	to	either	stimulate	or	contract	economic	activity.	The	RBA’s	primary	responsibility	for	money,	leads	it	to	focus	on	the	price	of	that	commodity,	whereas	the	Commission	approaches	the	trade-off	from	the	perspective	of	the	price	of	labour	power.			
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Wage	setting	decisions	since	1997	specifically	acknowledge	the	RBA’s	perspective.	For	example	“Wage	increases	sufficient	to	raise	inflation	above	a	rate	deemed	acceptable	by	the	monetary	authorities	will	cause	the	authorities	to	raise	interest	rates,	curtailing	activity	and	employment”	(AIRC	1997b).	“Wages	growth	has	not	yet	been	identified	as	contributing	to	the	recent	higher	headline	inflation.	The	RBA	has	indicated,	however,	that	labour	cost	pressures	are	one	of	a	number	of	factors	contributing	to	the	upward	shift	in	underlying	inflation”	(AFPC	2006	p10).		The	wage	setting	commission’s	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	unemployment	and	a	higher	level	of	minimum	wages	has	converged	with	the	understanding	of	monetary	authorities,	particularly	following	legislative	reforms.	Inflation	control	is	an	imperative	that	the	RBA	manages	via	the	interest	rate	in	response	to	too	low	a	rate	of	unemployment.	The	wage	setting	commission	on	the	other	hand	contributes	by	restraining	the	minimum	wage.	From	both	of	the	inflation	fighting	perspectives,	wage	earners	must	sacrifice	their	needs.		This	is	an	example	of	convergence	of	state	agencies	around	economic	policy,	which	enhances	the	appearance	of	the	state	as	an	economic	actor.	The	changes	to	industrial	laws	were	made	possible	by	the	separation	of	minimum	wage	setting	from	a	measure	of	need	backed	by	union	leverage,	and	in	turn	resulted	in	more	explicit	application	of	trade-offs	in	favour	of	profitability,	and	the	acceptance	by	policy	makers	and	unions	of	a	macroeconomic	trade-off,	disputed	only	at	levels	of	magnitude,	between	the	ability	of	minimum	wages	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	employed,	versus	the	likelihood	that	they	cause	a	greater	level	of	unmet	need	though	lifting	unemployment.			It	is	this	latter	trade-off	that	has	been	the	focus	of	the	wage	safety	net	as	the	commission	seeks	to	mediate	in	the	labour	market.				 	
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Mediating	the	labour	market			
Incentives	to	employ,	or	demand	for	labour		The	impact	of	minimum	wages	on	demand	for	labour	became	a	statutory	reference	point	under	the	wage	safety	net	system,	requiring	“attention	to	competing	considerations	such	as	employment	effects	and	the	needs	of	the	low	paid”	(AIRC	2005	p52).	The	AFPC	(2008	pp36	–	37)	has	posed	the	problem	as	a	trade-off,	or	“balance”	between	“a	desire	for	minimum	wages	to	promote	employment	opportunities	for	unemployed	and	low-paid	Australians	[and]…	the	need	for	minimum	wages	to	play	their	part	in	maintaining	a	safety	net”	(AFPC	2008	pp36-37).	This	came	to	be	discussed	as	the	disemployment	effect.		The	Commissions	repeatedly	noted	the	lack	of	evidence	of	the	impact	of	minimum	wage	increases	on	employment,	and	the	need	for	further	research.	The	AIRC	observed	in	2005	(p77)	“a	continuing	controversy	amongst	academics	and	researchers	about	the	employment	effects	of	minimum	wage	improvements…	[and]	nothing	…	to	indicate	that	the	controversy	has	been	resolved.”	In	2007	the	AFPC	declared	its	intention	to	commission	“research	into	the	impact	of	minimum	wage	adjustments	on	labour	demand”	(AFPC	2007	p51).	Four	years	later	it	sought	“studies	that	include	estimates	both	of	the	potential	benefits	(in	higher	incomes)	and	costs	(in	lower	employment)	resulting	from	minimum	wage	adjustments"	(Healy	et	al.	2011	pvi).	A	research	roundtable	under	the	FWC	found	that	“doing	research	on	the	employment	effects	of	the	minimum	wage	in	Australia	is	difficult—due	to	the	complexity	of	the	wage	setting	system	and	data	limitations;	[yet]	…	there	is	scope	for	doing	extra	research”	(Borland	2018	p1).		Despite	the	need	for	research	“the	relationship	between	the	level	of	minimum	wage	increases	and	employment”	remained	“pivotal	to	the	Commission”	(AFPC	2007	p51).	It	has	made	claims	along	the	lines	that	“substantial	safety	net	adjustments	may	have	some	negative	effects	on	employment	in	those	sectors	of	the	economy	in	which	a	high	proportion	of	the	workers	are	award-reliant”	(AIRC	2005	p52).	“Setting	minimum	wages	‘too	high’	will	have	a	detrimental	effect	on	employment	growth	and	could	even	cause	
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unemployment	to	rise…	The	basis	for	any	disagreement	seems	to	involve	the	magnitude	of	the	relationship	rather	than	its	existence”	(AFPC	2006	pp7-8).			The	AFPC	gave	the	benefit	of	the	doubt	to	employers,	responding	“a	slower	rate	of	growth	in	real	wages	may	result	in	even	better	employment	outcomes.	It	also	overlooks	the	possibility	that,	while	aggregate	employment	may	be	affected	only	slightly	by	increases	in	minimum	wages,	employment	of	low-paid	workers	may	be	disproportionately	harmed”(AFPC	2008	p39).		The	ACTU	(2008	p71)	and	ACOSS	(2008b	p3)	point	to	the	lack	of	evidence	for	disemployment	effects.	The	ACTU	referred	to	a	positive	economic	outlook	(p	11),	whilst	ACOSS	proposed	measures	of	need	(p	3).	Neither	of	these	refuted	the	effect,	or	defined	conditions	under	which	it	might	apply.	More	recently	the	ACTU	quotes	a	study	by	Card	and	Krueger	that	says “Recent	minimum	wage	increase	have	not	had	the	negative	employment	effects	predicted…	Some	of	the	new	evidence	points	towards	a	positive	effect	of	the	minimum	wage	on	employment;	most	shows	no	effect	at	all.	Moreover,	a	re-analysis	of	previous	minimum	wage	studies	finds	little	support	for	the	prediction	that	minimum	wages	reduce	employment”	(ACTU	2017	p15).		Coinciding	with	the	replacement	of	inflation	by	wage	stagnation	as	an	immediate	threat	to	economic	growth,	the	FWC	began	in	2017and	2018	to	consider	allowing	more	scope	than	previously	for	minimum	wage	increases.			The	FWC	(2018	p19)	found	“that	modest	and	regular	minimum	wage	increases	do	not	result	in	disemployment	effects	or	inhibit	workforce	participation”	It	cited	research	for	the	UK	Low	Pay	Commission	and	a	single	paper	by	Bishop	(2018)	for	the	RBA	which	reached	an	equivocal	conclusion	that	“finds	no	evidence	of	an	effect	of	award	adjustments	on	job	destruction,	[but]	this	does	not	rule	out	an	adverse	effect	on	employment”	(p	10).			
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Despite	moderating	its	view,	the	FWC	(2018	p99)	still	considers	“that	an	increase	to	the	NMW	and	modern	award	minimum	wages	of	the	size	necessary	to	ensure	that	all	household	types,	most	particularly	single-earner	families	with	children,	earn	more	than	the	relative	poverty	line	would	likely	lead	to	discernible	disemployment	effects.”	The	relative	poverty	line	rejected	by	the	FWC	is	the	“60	per	cent	of	median	wages”	towards	which	the	UK	is	moving	(2017	p219).	The	FWC	continues	to	be	cautious	about	substantially	increasing	the	minimum	wage	to	satisfy	any	measure	of	need.			To	the	extent	that	moderate	increases	are	awarded,	this	generally	depends	on	employment	growth,	as	noted	by	the	FWC	“Employment	continued	to	grow	strongly	in	the	economy	generally,	and	it	also	grew	in	three	of	the	four	most	award-reliant	industries”	(2017	p69).		There	is	no	research	pointing	to	how	low	the	minimum	wage	would	need	to	be	to	“clear	the	labour	market”.	Neither	have	any	ACTU	or	other	submissions	for	an	increased	minimum	wage	to	boost	demand	suggested	a	level	at	which	the	minimum	wage	would	stimulate	sufficient	demand	to	create	full	employment	without	causing	inflation	or	other	economic	instability,	or	identified	under	what	conditions	minimum	wage	increases	might	cause	unemployment	to	rise	above	the	‘natural	rate’.	There	is	no	research	quoted	on	a	relationship	between	rising	minimum	wages	and	labour	demand	during	an	unemployment	crisis,	or	in	relation	to	underemployment.			These	tensions	remain	even	where	moderate	increases	in	the	minimum	wage	are	awarded.	These	tensions	indicate	that	no	wage	level	can	be	found	that	both	meets	the	needs	of	wage-earning	households,	and	induces	employers	to	clear	the	labour	market.			
Incentives	to	work	,	or	labour	supply		Parallel	with	policy	concern	for	labour	demand	is	labour	supply.	Labour	supply	has	grown	steadily	since	the	1970s.	Employment	to	population	ratios	have	increased	from	
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around	56%	to	over	60%	in	40	years	to	2018,	and	the	labour	force	participation	rate	from	around	61%	to	over	65%	in	the	same	period	(RBA	2018c).			The	Commission	also	considers	the	impact	of	minimum	wage	levels	on	the	incentive	to	work,	as	a	labour	supply	factor.	The	incentive	to	work	is	calculated	in	the	difference	between	potential	household	income	from	wages	and	income	support,	called	the	replacement	rate.	The	replacement	rate	as	the	ratio	of	unemployment	benefits	to	minimum	wages	is	one	of	the	factors	in	some	calculations	of	the	natural	rate	of	unemployment	(Kennedy	2007).			The	replacement	rate	could	be	relied	on	as	a	reason	to	increase	the	minimum	wage	in	order	to	increase	the	incentive	to	work.	The	Labor	government	in	2010	submitted	that	an	increase	in	minimum	wages	can	“raise	the	financial	incentives	for	those	who	are	unemployed	or	not	in	the	labour	force	to	enter	paid	work”	in	preference	to	reliance	on	the	social	safety	net”	(FWA	2010	p69).			Employers	opposed	this,	with	the	Ai	Group	submitting	“If	minimum	wages	are	set	too	low	to	induce	supply	and	so	long	as	employers	can	at	least	cover	their	costs,	employers	will,	without	waiting	to	be	prompted	by	a	change	in	minimum	wages,	offer	higher	wages.	This	quintessential	market	adjustment	will	promote	greater	workforce	participation	and	social	inclusion	without	the	need	for	an	adjustment	in	minimum	wage	levels”	(FWC	2010	p70).		The	Commission	acknowledges	the	replacement	rate,	but	rather	than	lift	the	minimum	wage	to	meet	needs,	it	monitors	the	gap	between	the	minimum	wage	and	income	support.	For	example	in	2007	it	noted	Australian	Government	commissioned	modeling	which	“established	that	of	the	household	scenarios	analysed,	incentives	to	take	on	low	paid	work	were	highest	for	single	adults	and	lone	parents	with	one	child.	While	financial	incentives	to	take	on	a	low	paid	job	were	lower	for	couples	and	some	lone	parent	households	with	dependents,	they	were	still	substantial”	and	it	reaffirmed	“its	position	that	incentives	to	take	up	low-paid	work	remain	strong”	(AFPC	2007	p53).	
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	The	FWC	notes,	but	does	not	attribute	influence	on	its	decisions,	to	changes	in	the	tax-transfer	system.	The	FWC	mediates	a	connection	between	labour	demand	and	supply,	in	the	context	that	the	replacement	rate,	i.e.	the	work	incentive,	is	a	primary	function	of	the	tax	and	transfer	system.	The	setting	of	income	support	in	relation	to	labour	supply	and	the	replacement	rate	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	next	chapter.		
2.4 Women and the end of the family wage  	The	acceleration	of	workforce	participation	by	married	women	began	in	the	1950s3,	and	together	with	other	related	social	changes,	it	added	several	factors	that	undermined	the	assumptions	behind	the	family	wage.	These	factors	include	an	increasing	proportion	of	households	raising	children	that	earn	two	incomes,	decline	of	the	standard	working	week,	and	greater	diversity	of	household	needs	and	incomes	(Pocock,	Skinner	&	Williams	2012	p15,	p29,	p67).			Equal	pay	challenged	the	basis	for	identifying	the	needs	that	should	be	met	by	the	minimum	wage.	Unions	did	not	grasp	the	significance	of	growing	participation	of	married	women	in	the	workforce	from	the	1950s,	nor	of	equal	pay,	for	the	minimum	wage	as	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	the	household	unit.	The	ACTU	prosecuted	equal	pay	cases	in	1969	and	again	in	1973	without	recognition	of	the	long	history	of	employers	contending	the	average	size	of	a	household,	and	complaints	about	paying	wages	for	“mythical”	dependents	in	the	case	of	single	or	childless	men	(Plowman	1995	p261).																																																											
3 It was the participation of married women in the workforce that grew the most dramatically during the twentieth 
century. “Between 1954 and 1961, there was an increase of 154,748 or 53.4 per cent, in the number of married 
women in the work force, compared with an increase of 213,767 or 25.3 per cent, in total females in the work 
force. The largest increase (both numerical and proportional) in any age group was for married women aged 35-
39 years, where the increase in the seven years 1954-1961 was almost 82 per cent” (ABS yearbook 1964). The 
ABS attributes women’s growing participation in the workforce to “Changing social attitudes, the availability of 
safe contraception and planned parenting, …adequate child care facilities [and] growth in availability of part time 
work.”(ABS, 2011)  
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	In	1973	the	ACTU	submitted	that	the	Commission	could	“implement	a	uniform	level	of	minimum	wage”,	as	the	“current	standards	of	needs	for	the	average	family	unit	of	man,	wife	and	two	children”	(Plowman	1995	p279).	The	submission	lacked	awareness	of	the	vulnerability	of	such	a	formula	to	contest	on	the	grounds	that	it	would	exceed	minimum	needs.	Where	there	is	more	than	one	adult	minimum	wage	earner	in	a	household,	household	income	would	be	double	minimum	needs.		
Households		In	1977	the	Commission	recognised	changing	household	patterns,	and	the	challenges	this	posed	for	identifying	the	minimum	needs	to	be	met	by	wages.	“The	family	wage	concept	inherent	in	the	earlier	minimum	wage	[means	that]	a	wage	adjustment	is	not	an	appropriate	method	of	doing	equal	justice	to	the	single	person	and	the	family”	(ACAC	1977	pp14-15).			The	AIRC	acknowledged	the	problem	in	1997	of	“the	interrelation	of	need	and	family	composition	and	the	difficulty	of	relating	wages	to	measured	need”	(1997b	p44),	and	again	in	2000.		 “As	a	result	of	societal	change	it	is	often	the	case	that	there	are	two	wage	earners	(sometimes	more)	within	a	unit.	It	is	not	surprising	that	it	is	no	longer	as	simple	as	it	once	may	have	been	to	view	the	income	of	an	employee	as	an	indicator	of	household	income.	It	may	be	that	safety	net	wage	increases	intended	to	assist	the	low	paid	will	supplement	the	income	of	some	households	of	relatively	high	means.	We	accept	that	safety	net	adjustments	are	not	perfectly	targeted	to	meeting	the	needs	of	the	low	paid.	They	do,	however,	assist	in	meeting	those	needs”	(AIRC	2000	Clause	108).		By	2014	the	FWC	defined	the	needs	to	be	met	by	the	minimum	wage	safety	net	as	“the	single	person	household	rather	than	the	couple	household	with	children”	(FWC	2014	
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Clause	365).	It	has	nonetheless	continued	to	consider	households	and	their	needs	in	its	minimum	wage	decisions,	by	adopting	a	“multidimensional”	approach,	to	identify	"differences	in	need"	relating	to	“income,	expenditure,	and	household	wealth"	(Healy	et	al	2011	pv).			The	most	novel	measure	of	household	need	used	to	set	minimum	incomes	is	financial	stress,	first	surveyed	by	the	ABS	in	1998-1999	(ABS	2001).	The	ACTU	in	2002	was	the	first	party	to	raise	it	before	the	IRC,	citing	the	ABS	survey	that	“found	a	distinct	correlation	between	level	of	income	and	the	level	of	financial	stress	indicated”	(AIRC	2002	Clause	133).	The	FWC	acknowledged	financial	stress	in	2008,	but	it	could	not	apply	the	multiple	dimensions	of	household	need,	including	financial	stress	to	calculating	the	minimum	wage	(FWC	2008	p64).	The	relationship	between	incomes,	needs	and	finance	is	discussed	further	in	Chapter	four.		
Working	time			As	employers	increased	their	demand	for	part-time	labour,	women	increased	their	workforce	participation.	The	growth	in	part-time	and	non-standard	employment	since	the	1960s,	which	also	includes	men	from	1976,	then	young	people,	intensifies	the	disruption	to	setting	a	weekly	minimum	wage	to	meet	the	needs	of	a	household.		Employers	lobbied	for	and	used	industrial	reforms	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	to	extend	flexible	employment	practices,	including	casual	employment.	Part-time	employment	has	grown	faster	than	total	employment,	and	grew	fastest	in	the	decade	from	1986	(Borland	2017	pp2-3).	In	the	same	period	the	ACAC	ruled	“claims	for	reduction	in	standard	weekly	hours	below	38,	even	with	full	cost	offsets,	should	not	be	allowed”	(ACAC	1986a	p	45).		This	coincided	with	the	structural	efficiency	principles	in	wage	reviews,	and	was	consolidated	when	Howard	Government	workplace	reforms	of	1997	excluded	clauses	from	awards	and	disallowed	EBAs	from	specifying	proportions	of	an	enterprise	
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workforce	to	be	employed	in	categories	such	as	casual,	full	time	and	part	time	(AIRC	1997a).		Chapman	(2010)	argues	that	“most	of	these	working	time	developments	in	bargained	outcomes	were	driven	by	business	and	employer	imperatives	of	efficiency,	productivity	and	employer	discretionary	power,	rather	than	employee	interests	in	gaining	greater	autonomy	and	choice	over	working	hours.”	Employer	demand	for	flexible	access	to	labour	tapped	a	latent	source	of	labour	supply,	the	growing	interest	of	women	in	part-time	employment,	and	was	given	freer	rein	by	the	industrial	reforms	of	the	1980s	and	1990s.			The	minimum	wage	as	an	hourly	rate	is	not	a	living	weekly	income	for	part-time	workers.	Underemployment	surpassed	8%	in	the	four	years	from	2014	(ABS	2018a)	and	“31%	of	all	jobs	…involved	part-time	hours	compared	with	10%	in	1966”	(Australian	Institute	of	Health	and	Welfare	2017	pxiii).	Women	are	a	greater	proportion	of	both	minimum	wage	earners	(60%)	and	of	part-time	workers	(66%)	(ABS	2018b).	The	FWC	has	acknowledged	that	“award-reliant	employees	are	more	likely	than	other	employees	to	be	working	on	a	part-time	basis”	(FWC	2010	p70).	Women	are	more	likely	than	men	to	be	earning	less	than	a	minimum	weekly	income	when	being	paid	minimum	wage	rates,	because	they	are	more	likely	to	work	part-time.	This	outweighs	any	narrowing	of	the	gender	pay	gap	found	by	Broadway	&	Wilkins	(2017	p3)	to	be	associated	with	regulated	minimum	award	rates.		A	minimum	wage	cannot	be	a	living	wage	for	women	whilst	mothers	are	“homemakers	and	primary	care-givers	first,	and	part-time	waged	workers	second”	(Chapman	2010).	A	minimum	wage	can	only	be	an	equal	minimum	wage	when	it	is	paid	as	a	weekly	minimum	for	a	working	week	and	a	working	life	that	also	allows	sufficient	time	for	reproductive	labour.	Australian	unions	have	approached	the	problem	of	lack	of	time	for	caring	responsibilities	via	seeking	rights	for	employees	to	vary	hours	of	work	on	these	grounds,	and	in	so	doing	often	to	sacrifice	income.	For	example	the	ACTU	applied	to	the	IRC	unsuccessfully	in	2002	to	allow	for	hours	of	work	to	be	reasonable	in	relation	to	both	
	 			
58	
overtime	and	standard	hours	(Chapman	2010).	This	approach	places	the	responsibility	on	women	to	trade-off	time	for	care	against	need	for	income.			An	RBA	researcher	(Richards	2009	p20)	identified	an	increase	in	the	average	total	hours	of	wage	labour	per	households	headed	by	25-39	year	olds,	from	around	42hpw	in	1983	to	around	53hpw	in	2008.	The	combination	of	a	static	standard	working	week	since	1983	(ACAC	1983	p	31)	with	an	increase	in	two	income	households	has	made	this	increase	in	household	hours	of	labour	possible.	It	is	“presumably	partly	related	to	the	rise	in	housing	prices,	both	as	a	cause	and	effect”	(Richards	2009	p20),	intensifying	competition	between	households	for	income	to	meet	the	cost	of	housing,	and	so	is	also	relevant	to	Chapter	four	on	finance.		There	is	lack	of	legal	scope	for	adjusting	standard	working	hours	that	would	be	necessary	to	provide	a	minimum	weekly	income	from	minimum	wage	jobs,	by	tackling	both	the	level	of	underemployment	and	the	gender	bias	of	working	hours.	In	the	past,	as	productivity	increased,	labour	sought	a	share	not	only	as	wages,	but	also	as	shorter	hours	and	increased	leisure.	As	household	wage	incomes	decline	at	the	low	paid	end	of	the	workforce,	and	patterns	of	work	have	become	more	variable,	union	demands	have	been	focused	on	hourly	rates	of	pay	rather	than	hours	of	work.	The	ACAC	ruling	(1986a	p45)	that	“claims	for	reduction	in	standard	weekly	hours	below	38,	even	with	full	cost	offsets,	should	not	be	allowed”	also	served	to	close	off	campaigning	for	shorter	hours.			Wolfinger	&	McLaren	(2018)	argue	for	an	alternative	approach	to	valuing	reproductive	labour	time,	by	including	it	in	national	accounts,	on	the	grounds	that	“the	whole	market	economy	would	grind	to	a	halt	if	it	were	not	for	unpaid	caring	work	…	which	facilitates	the	paid	employment	of	family	members.”	This	challenge	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	sexual	division	of	labour	does	not	point	to	any	material	reforms	that	would	change	it	or	ensure	a	living	wage	for	women.				 	
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High	income	households,	low	paid	workers		Although	there	are	acknowledged	unmet	needs	for	even	full-time	minimum	wage	earning	households,	the	commission	is	inhibited	from	raising	the	minimum	wage	to	meet	these	needs.	A	minimum	wage	earner’s	household	could	benefit	beyond	a	minimum	standard	where	there	are	other	wage	earners,	especially	if	they	earn	above	minimum	rates.	This	is	against	the	underlying	principle	of	the	minimum	wage	that	it	should	be	no	more	than	a	bare	minimum.	This	is	evident	in	a	statement	from	the	AIRC	quoted	above	(2000	Clause	108).			The	AFPC	aims	to	avoid	the	minimum	wage	supplementing	the	incomes	of	relatively	high-income	households,	calling	on	research	into	households,	and	citing	this	as	a	basis	for	discounting	the	minimum	wage.			
2.5. Conclusion 	The	Commission	responsible	for	setting	minimum	wages	no	longer	applies	a	benchmark	of	need	or	adequacy,	since	the	industrial	relations	system,	households	and	their	waged	labour	have	been	transformed	since	the	1970s.		This	chapter	has	shown	that	the	role	played	by	the	minimum	wage	up	until	the	1970s	in	ensuring	a	socially	negotiated	minimum	standard	of	living	for	most	employees	was	contingent	upon	the	social	relations	of	the	time.	Changed	conditions	of	profitability,	and	to	the	normative	family	structure	that	was	supported	by	this	minimum	wage,	combined	to	undermine	the	socially	negotiated	basis	for	the	minimum	wage	meeting	a	benchmark	for	living	standards.			Capacity	to	pay	is	considered	at	multiple	levels,	creating	multi-directional	and	conflicting	pressures	on	meeting	the	needs	of	wage	earning	households.	At	a	time	of	rising	and	unexpectedly	high	levels	of	unemployment	from	the	1970s	to	the	1990s,	the	ACTU	responded	by	making	concessions	to	employers	to	discount	the	needs	of	minimum	wage	
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earners.	Coeval	with	the	union	concessions,	state	agencies	refined	their	approaches	to	management	of	money	and	labour	supply.			At	the	level	of	state	management	of	money,	inflation	and	labour	supply,	decisions	of	both	the	RBA	and	the	commission	counter-posed	systemic	capacity	to	pay	to	minimum	living	standards.	The	RBA	applied	the	concept	of	a	NAIRU	estimate	of	5%	unemployment,	by	setting	interest	rates	for	contraction	or	expansion,	to	maintain	unemployment	at	its	NAIRU.	The	wage	setting	commission	set	the	minimum	wage	to	minimise	a	disemployment	effect.	Between	the	two	agencies,	minimum	incomes	were	squeezed	by	unemployment	directed	against	inflation	on	the	one	side,	and	wage	restraint	directed	against	unemployment	on	the	other.			At	the	same	time	the	minimum	hourly	rate	of	pay	set	by	the	commission	no	longer	guarantees	a	weekly	income.	The	proliferation	of	part	time	and	casual	work,	resulted	from	a	combination	of	employer	demand	for	more	flexibility	in	their	purchase	of	labour	time,	with	women	trading	off	time	for	household	labour	against	wage	income.			The	diversity	of	household	needs,	and	the	lack	of	a	standard	weekly	income	that	allows	time	for	reproductive	labour,	entrench	gender	inequality	in	the	minimum	wage.	The	Commission	supervised	the	erosion	of	the	standard	working	week,	which	was	an	incentive	to	greater	workforce	participation	by	women,	but	has	done	little	to	solve	labour’s	associated	time	and	income	trade-off.			The	Commission	oversaw	this	redefinition	of	the	value	of	the	wage	without	major	social	disruption,	by	mediating	the	conflict	between	capital	and	labour.	Capital	acquired	leverage	over	labour	by	virtue	of	unemployment,	and	economic	policy	refined	a	more	comprehensive	set	of	levers	in	relation	to	money	flows	and	employment,	which	further	eroded	union	bargaining	power.	The	Commission	harmonised	wage	setting	with	this	broader	economic	policy.	Excess	labour	supply,	or	the	availability	of	a	surplus	population,	was	central	in	allowing	employers	and	the	state	to	assert	profitability	or	capacity	to	pay	over	needs	in	the	last	four	decades.		
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	Capital	does	not	take	on	direct	responsibility	for	averting	disorder	associated	with	unmet	needs,	and	the	management	and	reproduction	of	surplus	population.	The	state	is	called	on	to	do	this,	via	the	social	safety	net,	or	state	funded	income	support.		At	the	1997	Safety	Net	Review	the	Joint	Governments	submitted	that	the	“inclusion	of	award	employees	in	the	social	safety	net	meant,	however,	"that	the	Commission	is	relieved	of	any	obligation	that	might	otherwise	be	thought	to	exist	that	it	should	attempt	its	own	overall	estimation	of	ordinary	living	needs".	That	task	should	be	handled	through	the	processes	underlying	the	social	safety	net,	which	"addresses	the	needs	of	all	low	income	people,	including	people	on	low	award	wages"	(AIRC	1997b	p44).		The	ambiguity,	of	the	Joint	Governments’	caveat	was	expressed	by	the	FWC	in	2014,	when	it	stated	“Consideration	of	the	effect	of	changes	in	the	tax-transfer	system	on	the	absolute	or	relative	circumstances	of	the	low	paid	must	be	made	in	the	particular	circumstances	that	apply”	(Clause	358).		The	social	safety	net	and	the	tax-transfer	system	is	the	topic	of	the	next	chapter.				 	
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Chapter	three.	The	social	safety	net:	state	responsibility	for	meeting	
needs		
3.1 Introduction  	The	Joint	Governments’	position	in	1997	was	that	the	AIRC	need	neither	“attempt	its	own	overall	estimation	of	ordinary	living	needs”	nor	take	account	of	the	degree	of	protection	afforded	by	the	social	safety	net.	"By	its	very	nature	the	award	system	is	an	instrument	which	does	not	and	cannot	target	the	diverse	needs	of	workers.	Attending	to	that	diversity	is	part	of	the	role	of	the	wider	social	safety	net	which	is	highly	targeted	to	address	the	diversity	of	circumstances	affecting	people	"(AIRC	1997b	p45).		The	gaps	in	the	wage	safety	net	accounted	for	in	the	previous	chapter	resulted	in	the	state	taking	on	responsibility	from	employers	for	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power	at	the	margin	between	poverty	and	frugal	comfort,	identified	in	the	1907	Harvester	judgment.	Where	income	support	paid	by	the	state	was	historically	intended	to	ensure	the	survival	of	people	who	were	not	able	to	avoid	poverty	by	earning	any	wage	income,	income	support	is	now	paid	to	many	wage-earning	households.	Income	support	is	linked	to	labour	supply	in	new	ways.	I	interpret	the	rationales	for	setting	eligibility	for	and	levels	of	income	support	through	the	perspective	of	demands	for	labour	supply,	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	ensuring	the	functioning	of	the	labour	market.			The	question	that	this	chapter	seeks	to	answer	is	whether	the	state	can	be	guarantor	of	an	adequate	minimum	standard	of	living	for	all,	within	the	prevailing	relationships	between	employers,	labour	and	the	state?		Current	labour	supply	means	people	in	search	of	work.	Future	labour	supply	is	guaranteed	by	the	raising	of	children.	The	income	support	system	takes	account	of	both	the	time	and	money	costs	of	raising	children.	This	chapter	examines	the	contradictions	between	the	rationales	for	income	support	generated	by	the	tensions	between	demands	
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for	current	and	future	labour	supply,	which	qualify	the	extent	to	which	needs	are	recognised	and	met	by	the	income	support	system.	It	also	accounts	for	how	state	agencies	respond	to	shifts	in	the	gender	division	of	labour,	to	modify	incentives	for	reproductive	labour.		I	focus	on	forms	income	support	to	wage-earning	households	and	the	unemployed,	defined	as	tax	concessions	and	allowances	rather	than	as	pensions,	under	the	umbrella	of	the	tax	and	transfer	system.	My	primary	sources	are	official	reviews,	policies	and	decisions	of	government	on	setting	income	support	levels.			
Background		For	a	brief	period	it	seemed	that	needs	met	by	the	state	would	no	longer	be	set	at	a	poverty	level	of	subsistence,	but	rather	at	a	community	standard	of	living.		Gough	Whitlam	promised	in	1972	that	under	his	Labor	Government		“the	basic	pension	rate	will	no	longer	be	tied	to	the	financial	and	political	considerations	of	annual	Budgets…	the	basic	pension	rate	will	be	raised	…	until	it	reaches	25	per	cent	of	average	weekly	male	earnings.	It	will	never	be	allowed	to	fall	below	that	level”	(Hayden	1973).		Social	Security	Minister	Bill	Hayden	(1973)	made	a	case	based	on	the	principle	of	need,	for	the	Social	Services	Bill	of	1973:		“By	setting	common	benefit	rates	for	all	pensions	and	for	unemployment	and	sickness	benefits”	the	government	had	“largely	established	the	principle	that	common	needs	deserve	common	rates	of	benefit	…	A	man	supporting	a	wife	and	2	children,	drawing	unemployment	benefit	and	even	after	allowing	for	child	endowment,	has	been	paid	a	benefit	rate	some	$17	a	week	below	the	updated	Melbourne	University	poverty	line.	There	will	be	no	more	of	this	poor-house,	alms-giving	mentality	which	sees	merit	in	official	meanness	and	virtue	in	suffering,	as	long	as	it	is	in	others.”		
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		Limited	progress	was	made	on	these	intentions.		Just	as	the	Whitlam	government	had	done,	the	Hawke	Government	in	1983	committed	to	raise	the	Unemployment	Benefit	to	the	pension	level,	which	it	did	not	achieve	by	the	end	of	its	term.	The	last	progress	was	in	1994	when	unemployment	benefits	were	increased	as	part	of	The	Accord	commitment	to	lift	the	social	wage.		The	aim	of	a	uniform	scale	of	income	support,	regardless	of	the	reason	for	not	earning	a	sufficient	wage,	and	pegged	to	a	level	of	wage	earnings,	was	a	short-lived	radical	departure	from	previous	policy.			
3.2 From social wage to social safety net 	Poverty	in	working	families	had	become	an	issue	by	1987,	when	Prime	Minister	Bob	Hawke	promised	that	by	1990	“no	child	will	be	living	in	poverty’’	(ACOSS	2017	p3).	Wage	restraint	had	already	begun	to	reduce	the	value	of	the	minimum	wage	(Bray	2018	p260)	and	to	leave	unmet	the	needs	of	wage-earners	and	their	children.	A	crisis	of	reproduction	loomed.		The	ACAC,	unions	and	the	Labor	government	had	agreed	that	minimum	wage	increases	could	be	limited	in	return	for	increases	in	the	social	wage	(Cass	2005	p42).	The	ACAC	(1986	p6)	noted	“the	reduction	in	real	wages	resulting	from	the	Medicare	effect	on	the	CPI	was	an	important	feature	of	the	1983	wage	fixing	package.	Further	possibilities	of	wage	restraint	are	afforded	by	trade-off	of	taxation	and	social	welfare	benefits.”	The	government	went	on	to	substantially	increase	the	level	of	family	assistance,	as	compensation	for	declining	real	wages	(Wilson	et	al	2013	p633).	The	Family	Tax	Benefit	Part	A	(FTB)	was	linked,	from	its	introduction	as	part	of	the	Hawke	1987	child	poverty	pledge,	to	the	pension	rate,	which	was	in	turn	adjusted	for	changes	in	earnings.		
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The	social	wage	became	the	social	safety	net,	in	parallel	with	the	minimum	wage	being	redefined	as	the	wage	safety	net.	It	opened	the	way	for	the	state	to	underwrite	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	power	via	income	support,	and	refine	the	combination	of	incentives	for	labour	supply	and	reproductive	labour.			The	drop	in	the	real	value	of	the	minimum	wage,	and	its	redefinition	as	a	single-person	wage	safety	net	rather	than	a	family	wage,	required	the	state	to	step	in	to	pay	for	the	costs	of	raising	children	even	in	wage-earning	households.	Between	1995	and	2015	the	majority	of	increase	in	household	income	for	the	erstwhile	typical	family,	came	from	tax	concessions	and	transfers.	These	make	up	over	30%	of	the	income	of	a	single	wage-earning	couple	with	two-children	household	in	2017	(putting	the	family	4%	above	the	poverty	line),	when	state	transfers	made	up	less	than	3%	of	such	a	household’s	income	in	1973.	4		
Employer	costs	shifted	to	the	state			This	shift	of	responsibility	for	the	cost	of	reproduction	of	labour	from	employers	to	the	state	has	an	impact	on	government	budgets.			Employers	express	a	preference	for	income	support	over	wages	to	meet	household	needs.	The	Ai	Group	argued	“that	providing	the	income	safety	net	via	the	tax/transfer	system	[rather	than	more	substantial	increases	in	the	minimum	wage]	is	more	“cost	effective”	since	adjustments	can	“be	delivered	without	having	a	negative	impact	on	the	demand	for	labour”	and	“can	be	relatively	tightly	targeted	to	low	income	households”	(AFPC	2007	p64).																																																											
4 Minimum wage to social wage proportions 1972 to 2017 calculated on following basis. Child endowment, or 
Family Allowance for 2 children in 1972 totaled $1.50 per week (Social Security Guide 2018).  The minimum 
weekly wage in 1973 was $60.10 (Western Australian Industrial Gazette 2008). The minimum wage in 2018 is 
$719.20 a week. Tax Annual $3,130. HPL for couple, head in workforce and 2 children is $971.05 (Poverty Lines 
Australia 2018)..  
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	Public	policy	has	obliged	employers.	Family	income	support	rose	from	0.9	per	cent	to	2.6	per	cent	of	GDP	between	1980	and	2008	(OECD	Data	2019),	falling	to	1.5%	in	2016.	The	Family	Tax	Benefit	A	was	received	by	1.5	million	families	for	assistance	with	the	cost	of	raising	children,	as	at	December	2016	(Australian	Institute	of	Health	and	Welfare	2017	p16).	In	contrast	spending	on	unemployment	payments	fell	from	0.7per	cent	to	0.5	per	cent	of	GDP	between	1980	and	2008	(Wilson	et	al	2013	p626).			Even	though	the	National	Commission	of	Audit	(NCOA)	projected	that	the	Family	Tax	Benefit	Program	would	“remain	relatively	static	at	around	$20	billion	per	year	over	the	forward	estimates.”	(2014	p237),	Treasurers,	both	Labor	and	Coalition,	have	made	amendments	to	contain	its	unexpected	growth	(Swan	&	Macklin	2009).	The	main	avenue	for	containing	expenditure	on	income	support	is	eligibility,	rather	than	the	rate	at	which	it	is	paid.	The	primary	factors	considered	in	setting	levels	of	income	support	are	the	trade-offs	between	enabling	households	to	raise	children,	and	ensuring	labour	supply	in	the	form	of	incentives	to	work	via	the	replacement	rate,	and	the	differentiation	between	these	for	the	un(der)employed,	and	for	wage-earning	households	raising	children.			
3.3 The labour supply imperative 	The	four	criteria	to	measure	adequacy	of	income	support	identified	by	the	Australian	Senate	Community	Affairs	Reference	Committee	(2014	pxxi)	are	replacement	rates;	poverty	lines;	budget	standards;	and	financial	stress	indicators.	The	Committee	recommended	that	an	“optimal	basis	for	benchmarking	payment	levels”	be	based	on	determining	“the	merit	and	weight	to	be	placed	on	each	of	the	…	measurements.”	There	has	been	no	publicly	established	optimal	benchmark	for	payment	levels.	Government	and	its	agencies	are	not	accountable	to	meet	any	measure	of	need.		I	argue	that	the	replacement	rate	as	a	measure	of	the	intensity	of	the	incentive	to	work,	to	ensure	labour	supply,	is	the	principle	constraint	for	setting	income	support	levels	to	meet	needs	or	alleviate	poverty.		
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	Scholars	identify	this	principle	of	income	support	policy	under	various	terms.	The	incentive	to	work	is	enforced	through	conditionality	“involving	the	use	of	a	range	of	sanctions	to	coerce	the	unemployed	into	low	wage	jobs”	(Mendes	2015	p9).	This	policy	is	also	described	as	activation,	with	the	objective	“to	increase	the	efforts	of	the	unemployed	to	find	work	and	bring	more	people	into	the	labour	force	by	requiring	them	to	actively	look	for	work”	(Whiteford	2016).			It	is	consistent	with	the	first	outcome	set	for	the	Department	of	Employment	to	“foster	a	productive	and	competitive	labour	market	through	employment	policies	and	programs	that	assist	job	seekers	into	work,	meet	employer	needs	and	increase	Australia’s	workforce	participation”	(Department	of	Employment	2017	p13).		The	NCOA	in	2014	also	considered	unemployment	benefits	in	conjunction	with	the	minimum	wage,	as	well	as	family	tax	benefits.	It	specifically	identified	that	“If	the	level	of	income	support	is	too	close	to	the	minimum	wage	then	recipients	have	a	reduced	incentive	to	obtain	work”	(NCOA	2014	p315).	It	simultaneously	identified	that	where	the	minimum	wage	is	“too	high	relative	to	income	support	then	Newstart	Allowance	recipients	with	low	levels	of	skill	or	experience	may	be	priced	out	of	the	labour	market	and	may	not	be	able	to	find	employment”	(p315).		
Underemployment	and	part-time	work		As	the	demand	for	part-time	labour	increased	(as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter’s	section	on	working	time)	policy	makers	discovered	that	the	income	support	system	discouraged	recipients	from	earning	even	small	amounts,	because	the	system	had	not	been	designed	for	this	type	of	labour	demand.	Disincentives	to	part-time	work	were	reviewed	and	reduced,	so	that	income	support	payments	tapered	as	wage	income	increased,	in	order	to	avoid	the	loss	of	income	support	acting	as	a	deterrent	to	non-standard	employment.	Sanctions	for	declining	any	work	offer,	no	matter	how	few	hours	reinforce	this.	
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	Complex	disincentives	to	part-time	work	have	been	identified	in	reports,	and	then	addressed	in	budgets	(Cass	2005	p44;	McClure	2000;	Yeend	2012;	NCOA	2014	p315).	RBA	research	has	demonstrated	interest	in	work	incentives,	finding	that	higher	levels	of	family	payments	and	support	can	decrease	the	employment	rate	of	sole	parents	(Belkar	et	al	2007	p30).		NewStart	Allowance	(NSA)	is	the	standout	payment	for	which	penalties	for	earning	have	not	been	removed	(ACOSS	2012	p8).	However	the	combination	of	sanctions	since	1989	against	recipients	if	they	failed	to	“accept	any	part-time,	casual	or	temporary	work	within	their	capacity”	(Ey	2012	p15),	and	the	low	replacement	rate	(ACOSS	2012	p7)	make	NSA	recipients	available	for	low-paid	work	and	non-standard	hours.	Over	15	hours	paid	work	a	week,	the	same	number	of	hours	as	mutual	obligation	requirements	for	NSA/YA	jobseekers	(Social	Security	Guide	2019),	is	worth	more	than	the	NSA.	Replacement	rate	data	from	the	OECD	(OECD.Stat	2018)	for	2001-2015	show	a	decline	over	that	period	from	40%	to	32%	in	single	unemployment	benefits	assuming	wage	income	of	67%	of	Average	Weekly	Earnings.	In	2018	the	Henderson	Poverty	Line	(HPL)	benchmark	for	a	single	unemployed	person	was	76%	of	NSA	(Poverty	lines	Australia	2018	p1;	Social	Security	Guide	2019	Section	5.1.8.20)	which	is	itself	widely	challenged	as	insufficient	to	meet	needs.	Given	the	wide	acceptance	(except	by	government)	that	NSA	is	inadequate,	and	that	the	poverty	line	for	a	single	NSA	recipient	is	76%	of	the	NSA,	a	case	could	be	made	that	the	HPL	has	lost	touch	with	real	standards	of	living,	and	is	not	an	indicator	of	the	border	between	poverty	and	well-being.		
3.4 Women and households: labour supply and reproductive labour 	The	income	support	system	creates	incentives	for	women	to	trade	off	time	for	reproductive	labour	against	time	in	paid	labour,	by	the	extent	to	which	it	meets	the	minimum	consumption	needs	of	households	with	children.	Raising	of	children	is	at	heart	of	much	social	security	system	design	and	re-design	(Cass	2005,	Whiteford	1995,	Donath	1995).	Children	are	the	next	generation	of	the	labour	force.	Where	the	family	or	
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household	cannot	adequately	fund	child-raising,	then	the	state	has	stepped	in,	usually	but	not	always,	within	parameters	of	maintaining	incentives	for	workforce	participation	by	mothers.	There	is	a	tension	with	counter-incentives	for	reproductive	labour,	that	discriminate	by	family	type.	The	cost	to	a	household	of	raising	children	is	the	principle	basis	on	which	the	income	support	system	funds	a	gap	between	wage	income	and	needs.			
Women	as	independent	wage	workers		Mothers,	including	and	especially	single	mothers,	are	subjected	to	workforce	participation	policies,	where	previously	the	minimum	wage	and	income	support	systems	had	favoured	women’s	reproductive	labour.	New	problems	for	income	support	design	were	produced	with	formal	equality	of	men	and	women	in	both	wage	and	income	support	systems,	yet	continuing	earnings	inequality	combined	with	persisting	inequality	of	time	spent	in	reproductive	labour.	The	solution	for	income	support	is	to	define	needs	according	to	household	type,	a	measure	that	is	recognised	in	wage	setting,	but	which	cannot	be	applied	there,	as	identified	in	the	previous	chapter.		The	unemployment	benefit	system	is	the	crux	of	the	gap	between	meeting	needs	through	wage-earning,	and	denial	of	needs	for	failure	to	earn.	Although	women	had	won	an	equal	minimum	wage	in	1972,	and	their	workforce	participation	had	been	growing,	the	state	still	formally	treated	married	women	as	dependent	on	a	male	breadwinner.	Policy	denied	women	unemployment	benefits	until	1995,	when	“very	substantial	changes…	involved	the	partial	individualisation	of	the	benefit	system	for	unemployed	couples”	(Whiteford	2000	p24).	Once	women	were	recognised	as	independent	wage	earners,	income	support	was	also	redesigned	to	apply	to	various	combinations	of	household	types,	with	a	focus	on	its	dependent	children.		From	around	2000	costs	of	raising	children	are	the	only	income	support	set	on	the	basis	of	readily	identified	and	published	research	into	costed	needs	for	working	age	people.	Research	includes	a	2003-2005	review	of	Child	Support,	using	complex	data	modelling	(Henman	et	al	2007;	Parkinson	2005	p2)	and	policy	disentanglement	(Smyth	2005	p60).	
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The	cost	of	dependents	and	children	in	poverty	was	calculated	in	2012	(Australia.	Senate.	Education,	Employment	and	Workplace	Relations	Reference	Committee	p36).	The	NCOA	(2014)	measured	the	“costs	of	children”,	relying	on	studies	by	the	National	Centre	for	Social	and	Economic	Modelling	(NATSEM).		The	adequacy	of	payments	for	raising	children	is	nonetheless	traded	off	against	considerations	of	labour	supply.	The	NCOA	identified	that	“in	designing	family	payments	there	are	trade-offs	between	the	adequacy	of	assistance;	appropriate	targeting	to	those	in	genuine	need;	and	the	desire	to	maintain	incentives	for	parents	to	participate	in	the	workforce,	particularly	secondary	earners”	(2014	p235).	It	recommended	reforms	intended	to	“ensure	that	the	family	payment	system	achieves	its	objectives	of	supporting	families	to	cover	the	costs	of	children	without	creating	unnecessary	workforce	disincentives”	(2014	p240).		The	legitimation	of	women	as	wage	earners	conflicted	with	the	earlier	norm	of	the	stay	at	home	mother	that	had	been	reinforced	by	the	family	wage.	With	women’s	growing	workforce	participation	came	time	pressures	on	households	in	general,	and	women	in	particular,	to	trade-off	waged	and	reproductive	labour	(Pocock,	Skinner	&	Williams	2012).	The	income	support	system	for	a	brief	period	actively	created	incentives	for	partnered	mothers	to	choose	reproductive	labour	to	the	exclusion	of	waged	labour.			
Incentive	to	reproductive	labour		“Family	payments	were	consolidated	in	the	2000	budget	which	also	introduced	the	Goods	and	Services	Tax	(GST)	and	Family	Tax	Benefit	(FTB)	…The	introduction	of	FTB	represented	a	significant	expansion	in	family	payments	in	terms	of	the	generosity	of	the	payments,	expanded	eligibility	and	increased	Commonwealth	expenditure”	(NCOA	2014	p237).		Prime	Minister	Howard	declared	of	FTB	concessions	that	“They	are	tax	relief	for	a	universal	reality	–	that	it	costs	money	to	raise	children”	(Mendes	2009	p108).	Howard	
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announced	in	2004	that	“to	ensure	complete	fairness	of	treatment	for	families	where	one	parent	makes	the	choice	to	stay	at	home	full	time,	we	will	provide	an	appropriate	increase	in	the	rate	of	Family	Tax	Benefit	B”	(Mendes	2009	p108).	Howard	could	also	have	said	that	it	takes	time	to	raise	children.	FTBs	were	a	disincentive	for	women	in	a	two-parent	household	to	be	in	paid	work,	and	an	incentive	to	prioritise	reproductive	labour	(Hill	2004).	Along	with	child-care	restrictions,	FTBs	led	to	a	fall	in	“women’s	employment	participation	rate	in	[the]	western	suburbs	of	Sydney	…	from	49.9	per	cent	to	47.2	per	cent”	between	1996	and	2000	(Summers	2003).		Howard’s	family	payments	design	was	an	interruption	to	both	social	trends,	meeting	employer	demand	for	women’s	labour	and	the	direction	of	policy,	which	were	all	for	increasing	women’s	labour	force	participation.	The	incentives	for	mothers	to	prioritise	reproductive	labour	have	been	wound	back.	Treasurer	Costello	softened	the	penalties	for	partnered	mothers	of	young	children	returning	to	part-time	work	in	the	2004	budget	(Hill	2004).	‘Affluence-testing’	was	applied	to	FTB	eligibility	by	Labor,	after	its	2007	return	to	government,	trimming	Howard-era	generosity	to	middle	income	households	(Wilson	S	et	al	2013	p633)	and	reducing	disincentives	to	women	working,	but	continuing	to	supplement	the	wage	earnings	of	low-income	households.	The	NCOA	in	2014	proposed	the	removal	of	FTB-B	because	it	“is	particularly	detrimental	in	terms	of	workforce	participation	incentives	and	this	particularly	impacts	women	as	they	are	more	likely	to	take	time	out	of	the	workforce	to	care	for	children”	(p241).		
Labour	supply	overrides	reproductive	labour			Income	support	for	incentives	to	prioritise	or	enable	reproductive	labour	in	single	parent	households	has	been	diminishing.	Parenting	Payments	originally	applied	for	parents	of	children	up	to	sixteen	years	old.	Sole	parents	are	under	earlier	pressure	to	increase	their	hours	of	paid	work	since	the	Howard	government	in	2006	(Ey	2012	p226),	and	Gillard	government	in	2013	(Yeend	2012)	transferred	them	from	Parenting	Payment	to	NSA	when	the	youngest	child	is	eight	year	old.	The	NCOA	recommended	a	further	cut	in	eligibility	to	age	of	six	(2014	p241).		
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	Coalition	governments	committed	in	2014	to	expanding	child	care	places,	a	non-income	but	rather	a	reproductive	labour	time	element	of	social	security	policy	for	women’s	labour	force	participation	(Productivity	Commission	2014).			The	post-Howard	changes	to	family	payments	restored	the	direction	of	policy	and	social	trends,	to	continue	the	shift	towards	mothers’	combining	reproductive	labour	and	wage	labour,	and	reducing	barriers	to	employer	access	to	the	labour	of	both	women	and	men,	though	provisions	remain	that	reinforce	the	gendered	basis	of	reproductive	labour.		
3.5 Setting the level of income support 	
Defining	adequacy		The	social	safety	net	for	working	age	people	that	is	delivered	via	the	tax	and	transfer	system,	both	supplements	wage	income,	and	is	a	sole	source	of	income	for	the	unemployed.	It	allows	the	income	support	system	to	target	households	by	composition	and	therefore	calculated	need	in	relation	to	actual	or	potential	workforce	participation.			The	household	category	to	which	an	individual	belongs	is	the	starting	point	for	calculating	income	support.	Government	agencies	use	extensive	reports	based	on	data,	that	categorise	households	according	to	income,	composition	and	labour	force	status,	and	model	adjustments	in	wages,	taxes	and	transfers.	They	include	the	Household	Income	and	Labour	Dynamics	survey	(HILDA)	produced	by	the	Melbourne	Institute,	which	also	maintains	the	Henderson	Poverty	Lines.	HILDA	draws	on	ABS	data	from	the	Household	Expenditure	Survey	(HES).	Findings	from	the	National	Centre	for	Social	and	Economic	Modelling	(NATSEM)	were	used	by	the	NCOA	(2014	pp239	-	240).	The	Commission	setting	minimum	wages	refers	to	“equivalised	household	disposable	income	-	ABS	Household	Expenditure,	Income	and	Housing”	(FWC	2018	p73).		
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Some	payments	and	taxes	are	attached	to	a	cost	of	living	index,	the	longest	running	of	which	is	the	Consumer	Price	Index	(CPI)	applied	to	NSA	and	family	payments.	In	some	cases	the	inadequacy	of	the	CPI	is	recognised,	and	specialised	indexes	are	used,	such	as	the	Pensioner	and	Beneficiary	Living	Cost	Index	(PBLCI).		Aged	pensioners	face	“limited	or	no	expectation	of	work”	(Australia’s	Future	Tax	System	&	Henry	2009	pxx).	The	exceptional	basis	on	which	the	pension	is	adjusted	indicates	that	there	is	scope	for	governments	to	choose	methods	of	greater	benefit	to	households	when	awarding	increases.	It	has	been	boosted	in	addition	to	cost	of	living	increases,	in	1997	and	2009.	(NCOA	2014	p164).	It	is	indexed	to	both	wage	movements,	and	the	cost	of	living,	whichever	is	the	higher	at	the	point	of	half-yearly	indexation.	“As	such,	pensioners	share	in	productivity	improvements	and	rising	living	standards	as	their	income	moves	in	line	with	that	of	people	still	in	the	workforce,	rather	than	simply	being	maintained	in	real	terms	over	time.”	(NCOA	2014	p160).	Nonetheless	for	those	without	superannuation,	the	pension	itself	is	no	more	than	a	safety	net.		This	contrasts	with	NSA,	which	was	last	boosted	in	1994	and	is	adjusted	by	reference	to	the	CPI.	“Since	1994,	the	single	rate	of	NSA	has	fallen	from	92%	to	72%	of	the	poverty	line	and	from	26%	to	21%	of	the	fulltime	median	wage”	(ACOSS	2012	p6).	The	Rudd	government’s	2008	stimulus	package	made	lump	sum	payments	to	most	categories	of	people	receiving	income	support	yet	specifically	excluded	the	poorest	–	the	unemployed	(ACOSS	2008).			The	differences	between	the	reasons	for	these	calculations	of	need	applied	to	Newstart	Allowance,	FTB	and	pensions	are	explained	by	the	workforce	participation	imperative.		There	are	two	underlying	and	consistent	calculative	directions	to	the	setting	of	income	support	payments,	cheap	labour	supply,	plus	ensuring	households	can	meet	the	cost	of	raising	children,	as	the	next	generation	of	labour	supply.	NSA	was	last	evaluated	for	adequacy	on	government	initiative	in	the	1994	and	is	being	allowed	to	fall	below	a	level	that	even	the	Business	Council	of	Australia	considers	sufficient	to	support	job-searching	activities	of	single	people	without	children.	There	is	a	general	absence	of	active	
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calculation	of	the	needs	of	NSA	recipients.	Family	payments	are	being	curtailed	more	cautiously.	The	need	to	maintain	incentives	to	work	for	households	with	children	is	tempered	by	government	commissioned	research	into	the	costs	of	raising	children.	More	stringent	means	testing	to	target	FTB	to	low-income	households,	is	the	direction	of	current	reform.			A	subsidiary	calculation	is	the	taper,	or	rate	at	which	income	support	payments	reduce	against	earned	income.	Despite	cost	to	the	federal	budget,	these	taper	rates	have	all	been	made	more	gradual.	As	an	incentive	for	labour	supply,	this	has	reinforced	the	increase	in	non-standard	hours	and	forms	of	employment.		A	third	calculation	is	government	expenditure.	The	Howard	Government’s	Family	Tax	Benefit	scheme	undermined	the	consistently	stated	objective	of	containing	budget	expenditure.	This	objective	is	also	evident	in	terms	of	reference	for	reviews	and	in	the	design	and	enforcement	of	eligibility	for	payments.	Transferring	people	from	more	generous	pension	entitlements,	to	lower	level	job	seeker	allowances	(eg	by	raising	the	pensionable	age,	lowering	the	age	of	dependent	children	for	supporting	parents,	redefining	disability	and	the	related	special	minimum	wage	rates	for	workers	with	a	disability)	offer	both	budgetary	savings	and	addition	to	the	ranks	of	active	job-seekers.		The	Henry	tax	review	of	2012	proposed	changes	to	achieve	“better	co-ordination”	between	the	elements	of	the	tax	and	transfer	system,	including	establishment	of	“adequacy	benchmarks”	and	for	“adequacy	of	payments”	to	be	“maintained	by	common	indexation	arrangements”	even	though	“full	integration	of	the	tax	and	transfer	systems	is	not	practicable	given	their	different	objectives”	(Australia’s	Future	Tax	System	[inquiry]	&	Henry,	2009	pxx).	These	recommendations	would	make	benchmarks	for	adequacy	and	indexation	a	subject	for	public	debate,	and	have	not	been	taken	up	by	government.		
Convergence	of	policy		
	 			
75	
The	unprecedented	frequency	of	government	inquiries	and	reviews	into	social	security	since	the	1970s	is	evidence	of	novel	challenges	arising	from	social	and	economic	change.	The	state	has	refined	its	responses,	not	only	to	markets,	especially	the	labour	market,	but	to	the	transformation	of	the	gendered	division	of	labour	and	the	reproduction	of	labour	power.	Regan	(2014	pp1-2)	notes	recurrent	themes	throughout	reviews	of	social	welfare,	such	as	employment	and	the	labour	market,	conditionality,	targeting	of	payments,	adequacy	of	benefits	and	incentives/disincentives	to	work,	and	the	relationship	between	the	tax	and	transfer	systems.			Since	2000	especially	there	has	been	convergence,	but	not	complete	integration,	in	the	way	that	state	entities	consider	the	needs	of	low	paid	workers	and	welfare	recipients	in	relation	to	incentives/disincentives	to	work.	Both	wage	safety	net	decisions	and	tax	and	transfer	rate	settings	are	made	with	reference	to	labour	force	participation,	household	categories	and	poverty	measures,	such	as	median	earnings,	poverty	lines,	and	financial	stress.			The	Howard	Government’s	extension	of	the	Family	Tax	Benefit	system	was	anomalous,	going	against	the	trend	of	growth	in	women’s	participation	in	the	labour	force,	by	providing	income	support	on	the	basis	that	mothers	are	out	of	the	workforce.	Later	governments,	both	Labor	and	Liberal,	have	sought	to	restore	the	incentive	to	work,	and	to	curtail	expenditure,	both	policy	trends	that	Howard’s	system	had	subverted.		Ultimately	the	level	of	income	support	is	set	by	Treasury	in	the	Budget,	after	consultation	with	variously	ministries	concerned	with	social	and	family	services,	employment	and	workplace	relations.	Policy	goals	to	reduce	government	debt	and	cut	taxes	motivate	governments	to	reduce	the	budget	allocation	for	income	support,	by	limiting	both	eligibility	for	and	indexation	of	payments.			The	provision	of	a	social	safety	net	under	the	umbrella	of	the	tax	and	transfer	system	allows	for	cross-referencing	between	state	agencies	in	harmonising	income	support	policies	with	other	labour	market	policies,	particularly	increasing	incentives	or	
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decreasing	disincentives	to	work.	This	is	apparent	in	both	taxation	policy	(Australia’s	Future	Tax	System	&	Henry	2009	pp506-507)	and	minimum	wage	setting	decisions	of	the	Commission,	which	considers	“the	complementary	roles	of	wages	and	the	tax/transfer	system”	(AFPC	2007	p64).	This	creates	greater	policy	coherence	and	the	appearance	of	the	state	as	a	unified	agency,	rather	than	as	a	site	of	contest	between	competing	perspectives	on	income	support	to	meet	needs.			
3.6 Contesting regulated inadequacy 	Several	income	support	policies	have	been	controversial,	including	income	management	and	payments	to	cashless	debit	cards	(Department	of	Social	Services	2017	p4),	and	the	greater	number	of	hours	of	mutual	obligation	activity	in	the	remote	work	for	the	dole	scheme	(Social	Security	Guide,	2019),	both	of	which	apply	disproportionately	to	indigenous	Australians.		It	is	the	level	of	NSA	that	is	most	contested,	a	contest	that	has	been	spearheaded	by	ACOSS	since	at	least	2012	(ACOSS	2012).	ACOSS	proposed	that	NSA	be	restored	to	its	former	value	relative	to	minimum	wages.	“Compared	to	wages,	the	single	rate	of	NSA	is	the	lowest	unemployment	payment	in	the	OECD,	at	just	40%	of	a	low	fulltime	wage	after	tax	(two	thirds	of	the	average	wage),	including	Rent	Assistance”	(ACOSS	2012	p7).	ACOSS	argued	that	“There	is	scope	to	increase	the	single	rate	of	NSA	substantially	without	undermining	work	incentives”	(p7)	citing	the	government’s	own	inquiry	into	the	tax	system	which	acknowledged	that	the	level	of	“Allowance	payments	were	inadequate”	and	“counterproductive	in	encouraging	people	on	income	support	payments	to	seek	employment”	and	recommended	“that	allowance	payments	should	be	indexed	to	a	measure	of	wages	as	well	as	the	CPI”	(ACOSS	2012	p6).		Nevertheless,	the	minimum	wage	itself	is	contained	in	order	to	keep	down	labour	costs,	on	the	grounds	that	this	increases	employment.	This	places	a	ceiling	on	the	recognition	of	need	of	people	receiving	income	support.	“The	minimum	wage	also	impacts	poverty	indirectly	through	its	relationship	with	the	social	security	system”	(ACOSS	2018	p5).	
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	Advocates	for	recipients	of	income	support	accept	the	need	for	a	gap	between	income	support	payments	and	the	minimum	wage	“in	order	to	ensure	there	is	an	adequate	reward	for	paid	work”(ACOSS	2018a	p5).	It	is	the	extent	of	the	necessary	gap	that	is	disputed.	However	the	Australian	Unemployed	Workers’	Union	(AUWU	2018)	challenges	the	need	for	the	gap	between	NSA	and	wages,	citing	ABS	statistics	indicating	low	demand	for	labour	with	Australia	having	“record	high	ratios	of	job	seekers	to	job	vacancies”	of	around	16:1.			The	economic	argument	for	substantial	increases	in	both	wage	and	state	funded	incomes	is	that	increases	in	incomes	for	the	low-paid	in	particular	will	generate	economic	activity.	ACOSS	commissioned	economic	modeling	of	a	$75	per	week	increase	in	unemployment	benefits	and	other	allowances,	showing	a	“prosperity	effect”	of	“an	additional	12,000	people	being	in	work	in	2020-21”	and	increased	tax	collections	(Deloitte	Access	Economics	2018	p2)		Despite	widespread	agreement,	even	from	employers,	that	NSA	is	punitively	low,	governments	have	not	lifted	unemployment	benefits	in	real	terms	for	over	two	decades.	Mendes	(2015	p435)	attributes	the	lack	of	success	to	the	combination	of	a	policy	of	budgetary	constraint,	and	the	influence	of	“international	trends	in	favour	of	conditional	welfare	systems	which	construct	income	security	payments	as	a	mere	gateway	to	workforce	participation	and	self-reliance.”		I	would	argue	that	there	are	two	additional	factors	at	play	to	those	identified	by	Mendes	(2015),	which	explain	the	failure	of	the	ACOSS	campaign	to	raise	NSA.	Firstly	there	is	question	of	legitimating	the	denial	of	needs,	which	was	hard	won	through	the	reshaping	of	the	minimum	wage,	and	has	ensured	cheap	labour	supply.	This	is	a	critical	discursive	selection	made	by	the	state.	Denial	of	the	needs	of	single	unemployed	people	legitimises	the	work	imperative,	and	reinforces	cheap	labour	supply,	through	the	low	replacement	rate.	Secondly	there	is	the	construction	of	economic	policy	around	conditions	for	profitability,	which	incorporate	a	low	replacement	rate	of	unemployment	benefits	as	an	
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element	of	the	natural	rate	of	unemployment.	Policy	has	achieved	relatively	stable	conditions	for	profitability	from	employment	in	Australia,	in	part	from	the	management	of	supply	and	demand	in	the	labour	market.	These	labour	market	factors,	as	conditions	for	profitability,	lead	the	minimum	income	setting	agencies	to	discount	the	needs	of	people	who	depend	on	these	sources	of	income.		Any	government	or	political	party	that	undertakes	to	substantially	increase	and	apply	transparent	benchmarks	of	needs	to	minimum	incomes	is	likely	to	be	countered	by	advice	from	its	own	agencies,	such	as	Treasury	and	the	RBA.	A	lifting	in	NSA	could	point	to	a	lifting	in	the	minimum	wage	to	maintain	the	replacement	rate	as	an	incentive	to	labour	supply.	This	could	cause	inflation,	job	losses	and	retard	growth	and	trade.	To	the	extent	that	these	are	possible	consequences	of	setting	minimum	incomes	on	the	basis	of	need,	a	government	intent	on	such	a	reform,	would	also	need	to	conceive	of	alternatives	to	profitability	for	coordinating	economic	activity.			The	adequacy	of	income	support	to	wage-earning	households	with	children,	and	of	levels	of	payments	for	the	cost	of	raising	children,	are	less	contested	than	NSA.	Given	the	proportion	of	household	income	that	these	represent	for	minimum	wage	earning	households,	and	the	impossibility	of	a	standardised	family	wage,	the	ACTU’s	living	wage	claim	is	incomplete	without	supporting	claims	for	income	support	for	the	costs	of	raising	children.			Women	particularly	face	the	tension	between	time	for	reproductive	or	caring	labour	and	for	paid	labour.	Adequacy	for	them	lies	in	both	time	and	money,	including	time	for	their	waged	partners	to	increase	their	contribution	to	caring	work.	Income	support	is	designed	mainly	for	the	costs	of	raising	children.	To	the	extent	that	income	support	accounts	for	the	time	households	need	to	raise	children,	it	is	limited	to	inadequately	paid	parental	leave	of	18	weeks,	and	partner	leave	of	2	weeks	(Paid	Parental	Leave	Guide,	2019).	The	value	of	a	shorter	standard	working	week	was	identified	in	Chapter	two.	The	adequacy	of	paid	parental	leave	length	of	time	and	rates	of	pay	could	also	be	contested.			
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3.7 Conclusions  	The	trade-off	between	jobs	and	wages	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	in	relation	to	wage	setting	and	the	replacement	rate,	plays	out	in	reverse	in	income	support	policies.	Wages	must	be	low	so	that	employers	will	employ.	Income	support	must	be	low	so	that	recipients	will	seek	additional	hours	of	work.			These	labour	market	imperatives	are	not	new,	but	the	state	must	consider	and	co-ordinate	changed	tensions	between	the	purposes	of	income	support.	To	adequately	fund	a	significant	proportion	of	the	cost	of	raising	children,	and	to	enable	one	parent	per	couple	household	to	choose	fewer	hours	of	work	in	order	to	care	for	young	children,	can	undermine	incentives	for	all	adults	in	a	household	to	increase	their	hours	of	work.	Employer	preferences	for	income	support	are	irreconcilable.	They	advocate	that	income	support	be	sufficient	to	meet	household	needs	above	the	single	person	minimum	wage,	and	at	the	same	time	income	support	should	remain	low	enough	to	be	an	incentive	to	those	households	to	seek	additional	employment			The	standard	of	living	supported	by	the	minimum	wage	is	not	verified	against	any	identifiable	benchmarks,	and	is	already	near	the	Henderson	Poverty	Line.	The	living	standards	of	recipients	of	income	support	are	doubly	penalised	by	the	replacement	rate	concept,	because	their	living	standard	must	be	discounted	further	than	minimum	wage	earners’	living	standards.			While	public	concern	for	income	levels	in	relation	to	poverty	is	no	longer	expressed	in	income	support	policy,	finance	developed	an	interest	in	poverty	level	income	definitions,	for	the	purpose	of	assessing	credit-worthiness.	The	HPL	established	in	the	1970s	is	used	not	by	the	state	as	a	target	to	lift	households	above,	but	rather	by	financial	institutions	and	the	financial	system	regulators	to	assess	whether	households	income	is	sufficient	for	subsistence	plus	loan	repayments.	The	impact	of	this	on	households	is	captured	in	newer	measures	of	household	need	that	are	referred	to	in	wage-setting	and	income	support,	
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measures	of	financial	stress.	This	interest	of	finance	in	minimum	incomes,	and	its	implications	for	asserting	household	needs,	is	the	subject	of	the	next	chapter.		  
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Chapter	four.	Finance	and	income	surplus		
4.1 Introduction 	By	turning	to	the	relationship	between	finance	and	minimum	living	standards,	I	seek	to	investigate	the	connection	between	surplus	value	in	production	and	finance,	raised	by	Bryan.	“A	surplus	can	be	appropriated	from	labour	not	just	via	the	wage	relationship,	but	via	financial	relationships	also”(Bryan	2008	p.218).			This	connection	underlies	the	state’s	consideration	of	minimum	living	standards	across	the	three	domains	of	wages,	income	support	and	finance.	That	the	state	would	find	links	between	markets	in	money	and	in	labour	makes	sense	from	the	theoretical	perspective	of	de	Brunhoff	(1978),	who	identifies	them	as	peculiar	commodities.	Bryan	and	Rafferty	(2018	9-11)	have	identified	finance’s	innovations	in	relation	to	value	stores	and	flows,	risks	and	liquidity.	These	pose	new	challenges	for	the	state’s	approach	to	the	financial	system	and	its	relationship	to	households,	as	well	as	to	labour’s	approach	to	contesting	its	value	relationship	to	capital.			My	focus	is	finance’s	interest	in	lending	to	the	household	sector,	particularly	home	loans,	on	the	basis	of	calculations	of	minimum	living	standards	and	ability	to	pay.	This	chapter	shows	that	living	standards	have	become	a	more	significant	and	calculated	element	in	household–finance	relationships	and	capital	accumulation.	The	implications	for	broader	contests	over	living	standards	and	value	cannot	be	understood	if	finance	is	theorised	only	as	the	domain	of	capital-capital	transactions,	from	which	labour	and	production	is	separate.			The	calculation	of	household	incomes	has	become	a	central	concern	of	lending	institutions	and	of	the	state	via	its	financial	regulators,	as	the	relative	weight	of	household	lending	has	grown	on	the	books	of	finance,	competition	between	financial	institutions	has	grown,	and	household	mortgage	payments	have	become	a	larger	and	
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more	integrated	component	of	financial	flows.	Lower	and	middle-income	households,	including	those	with	volatile	levels	of	income	to	service	a	mortgage,	have	become	more	important	to	both	profitability	and	stability.		Rates	of	home	ownership	peaked	in	1966,	when	71.4%	of	dwellings	were	owner-occupied,	up	from	53.4%	immediately	after	the	war,	and	fell	to	67.1%	in	2016	(Hall	2017).	The	rise	in	home	ownership	up	to	the	1970s	was	possible	because	of	the	extent	to	which	the	wage	incomes	of	households	were	more	than	sufficient	to	meet	the	cost	of	living,	and	savings	could	be	invested	in	purchasing	homes.	The	fall	in	other	living	costs,	such	as	food,	also	increased	scope	for	spending	on	housing	(Tetlow	2018).	Home	ownership	and	savings	have	deteriorated	despite	the	promises	that	financial	deregulation	and	other	reforms	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	would	open	up	opportunities	to	households	that	had	previously	been	excluded.	Rather	finance	invented	ways	to	use	hoe	lending	to	capture	household	incomes	above	a	minimum	standard	of	living.		Financial	competition	and	innovation	intensified	globally	from	the	1970s,	and	Australian	governments	in	a	series	of	steps	removed	regulations	to	allow	for	the	expansion	of	financial	markets	and	increased	competition.	Competition	has	made	it	imperative	for	each	financial	institution	to	try	to	increase	its	market	share.	The	household	sector	grew	dramatically	as	a	proportion	of	lending,	primarily	mortgage	lending,	since	the	1980s.			Lenders	trade-off	the	risk	and	cost	of	default,	against	projected	earnings,	using	calculations	of	household	minimum	spending	requirements,	in	order	to	maximise	the	chance	of	issuing	loans,	and	income	from	repayments.	Regulators	calculate	the	trade-off	between	the	ability	of	households	to	make	repayments,	against	the	parameters	of	fostering	competition	and	profitability,	so	as	to	contain	the	risk	to	the	financial	system	of	any	sharp	escalation	in	defaults.	Households	trade	off	their	non-housing	consumption	needs	against	the	ongoing	cost	of	their	most	expensive	necessity,	at	the	highest	standard	they	expect	that	they	are	able	to	afford.		
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For	private	capital	the	goal	is	to	maximise	profits,	the	capture	of	value	from	households,	whilst	hedging	their	own	risks.	For	the	state	the	goal	is	that	stable	financial	flows	and	institutions	are	maintained.	This	partnership	between	capital	and	the	state	negotiates	the	calculation	of	minimum	incomes	for	various	types	of	households	within	this	framework.	It	gives	finance	access	to	household	incomes	that	are	above,	around	or	even	below	minimum	consumption	or	poverty	levels,	such	as	the	HPI.	Increases	in	the	cost	of	housing	in	this	context	are	closely	related	to	household	income	and	the	corresponding	increase	in	availability	of	credit.			The	chapter	begins	with	a	historical	overview	of	why,	how	and	when	household	living	standards	become	a	primary	concern	of	financial	institutions.	It	then	examines	the	way	in	which	the	actors,	finance,	the	state	and	households,	approach	the	calculation	of	minimum	household	incomes	and	living	standards.			The	implications	of	the	findings	of	this	chapter	are	that	increasing	minimum	wages	and	income	support	will	not	necessarily	raise	living	standards,	whilst	financial	institutions	lend	the	maximum	that	they	calculate	households	are	able	to	repay	after	meeting	minimum	consumption	needs.	Reforms	to	or	demands	placed	on	the	state	and/or	employers,	without	attention	also	to	the	role	of	finance	in	capturing	household	incomes,	cannot	resolve	problems	of	working	class	living	standards.	Where	labour	had	been	able	to	earn	wage	incomes	above	the	minimum	necessary	for	the	reproduction	of	labour	power,	finance	has	found	ways	to	recapture	the	value	embodied	in	those	wages.	As	in	the	setting	of	the	minimum	wage,	this	development	has	been	produced	by	a	partnership	between	the	state	and	capital,	with	the	demands	of	capital	initiating	the	process,	and	the	state	working	for	orderly	management	of	the	process	of	capital	increasing	its	capture	of	value.		
4.2 The financial importance of households 	Up	to	the	1980s	lower-income	households	seeking	a	mortgage	were	limited	by	regulation	to	borrow	no	more	than	90%	of	the	value	of	the	property	(Loan	To	Value	ratio	
	 			
84	
–	LTVR),	with	repayments	of	no	more	than	30%	of	household	disposable	income	(Debt	Service	Ratio	-	DSR).	Household	income	was	assessed	on	the	basis	of	pay	slips,	which	varied	little	from	fortnight	to	fortnight.	By	the	turn	of	the	millennium	banks	and	other	lenders	no	longer	relied	on	these	ratios	but	on	income	surplus	models.	An	income	surplus	model	calculates	a	minimum	household	cost	of	living,	and	designs	a	loan	on	the	basis	that	all	household	income	above	that	cost	of	living	can	be	committed	to	loan	repayments.	The	origin	of	the	income	surplus	model	lies	in	the	development	of	the	finance	sector	over	a	similar	period	for	which	minimum	wages	and	income	support	were	transformed,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	two	chapters.		Up	to	the	1970s	banking	and	finance	in	Australia	was	protected	from	overseas	competition,	and	institutions	operated	within	clearly	defined,	distinctive	roles.	“Institutions	were	specialised:	trading	banks	lent	to	businesses;	savings	banks	lent	to	households,	almost	entirely	for	housing;	and	finance	companies	lent	for	more	risky	property	loans	and	consumer	credit”	(Debelle	2010).			“The	system	was	not	open	to	foreign	bank	entry	or	to	offshore	transactions.	Banking	business	was	essentially	a	low-risk	proposition	conducted	at	regulated	prices.”	Securities	markets	were	undeveloped	(Edey	&	Gray	1996	p7).			The	globalisation	of	capital	and	finance	in	the	1970s	was	a	significant	trigger	for	financial	deregulation	in	Australia.	The	Deputy	Governor	of	the	Reserve	Bank	in	2007	accounted	for	the	beginning	of	financial	deregulation	in	the	1970s,	in	the	pressure	that	increased	international	capital	flows	placed	on	the	Australian	dollar	exchange	rate,	making	domestic	financial	conditions	and	liquidity	difficult	to	manage.	“One	of	the	first	major	steps	in	the	deregulation	process	was	the	removal	in	1973	of	controls	over	the	interest	rates	that	trading	banks	could	pay	on	some	wholesale	deposits”	(Battellino	2007	p79).			This	led	to	it	being	harder	for	the	Reserve	Bank	to	control	liquidity,	which	in	turn	responded	by	issuing	securities	at	tender,	so	that	the	market	set	the	interest	rate,	not	the	
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Reserve	Bank.	The	fixed	exchange	rate	on	the	Australian	dollar	inhibited	the	government	securities	market,	and	in	1983	the	Australian	dollar	was	floated	(Battellino	2007	p79).			The	impetus	for	the	1980s	deregulation	came	from	the	banks	themselves,	responding	to	competition	from	newer	unregulated	financial	intermediaries.	Bank	share	of	financial	markets	had	fallen	from	70%	in	the	early	1950s,	to	40%	by	the	early	1980s	(Battellino	2007	p78).		Continuing	deregulation	in	the	1980s	included:	admitting	foreign	banks	from	1985,	removal	of	the	ceiling	of	13.5%	on	housing	loan	interest	rates	in	1986;	removal	of	the	distinction	between	savings	and	trading	banks	in	1989,	all	of	which	“allowed	the	existing	big	players	to	expand	the	scope	of	their	activities,	as	well	as	for	an	increase	in	competition	from	smaller	players”	(Debelle	2010).		The	financial	sector	nearly	doubled	in	size,	relative	to	GDP	in	just	over	a	decade	from	the	1980s,	through	a	process	in	which	a	credit	boom	following	financial	deregulation	gave	“capacity	to	satisfy	long-standing,	repressed	demands	for	finance…	Availability	of	finance	contributed	to	an	asset	price	boom	which	further	fed	back	into	credit	growth”	(Edey	&	Gray	1996	p10).	Although	the	banks	had	sought	deregulation	so	that	they	could	expand	their	operations,	that	deregulation	also	increased	competition.	Specialist	institutions	did	not	incur	the	costs	of	cross-subsidising	other	services	that	banks	had	to	provide.	Securitisation	markets,	mortgage	brokering	and	electronic	banking	all	accelerated	(Battellino	2007	p80).	Towards	the	end	of	that	period	of	finance	sector	growth,	the	reversal	in	share	of	business	vs	housing	lending	accelerated.	Between	1988	and	2010	business	lending	fell	from	62%	to	35%	of	lending,	whilst	housing	lending	grew	to	58%	(Debelle	2010).		According	to	Assistant	Governor	of	the	Reserve	Bank,	the	principal	reason	for	the	banking	system	shifting	its	focus	from	business	lending	towards	housing	lay	in	the	1990s	recession,	when	banks	suffered	their	“largest	losses	in	forty	years”	(Gizycki	2001	p20).			
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The	losses	on	housing	loans	were	“relatively	mild”,	in	comparison	to	large	losses	on	business	loans,	“notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	unemployment	rate	rose	to	about	11	per	cent	and	mortgage	rates	reached	as	high	as	17	per	cent”	(Debelle	2010).	In	other	words	banks	realised	that	households	were	lower	risk	borrowers	than	business,	they	had	a	capacity	to	stay	on	payment	for	housing,	even	when	their	incomes	were	squeezed.	Or	as	noted	by	Bryan,	Rafferty	and	Tinel	(2016	p	53)	“Households	want	to	keep	paying	these	bills	just	as	long	as	they	can,	for	they	are	the	means	of	accessing	subsistence	items.	If	they	default	on	payments,	households	lose	their	means	of	subsistence.”		This	appreciation	by	finance	of	lower	risk	in	household	lending	was	already	taking	shape.	The	RBA	issued	guidelines	in	1988	(when	it	was	still	the	banking	sector	regulator)	that	implemented	the	Basel	Capital	Accord	for	a	risk-based	measurement	of	banks'	capital	adequacy	in	which	“housing	loans	were	given	a	risk	weight	of	50	per	cent,	whereas	business	and	personal	loans	had	a	risk	weight	of	100	per	cent”	(Debelle	2010).		The	shift	of	focus	by	the	banks	to	a	preference	for	housing	lending	led	to	“considerable	product	innovation	in	the	Australian	mortgage	market	[from	about	1995	to	2005]	Lenders	sought	to	cater	for	a	wider	range	of	potential	borrowers	and	found	new	ways	to	assess	their	borrowing	capacity”	(Debelle	2010).	A	significant	accompanying	innovation	was	the	growth	of	asset-backed	securities.	“The	securitisation	market,	whose	growth	since	the	1990s	had	been	a	major	contributor	to	increasing	competition	in	housing	loan	markets,	was	one	of	the	hardest	hit	by	the	GFC”	(Davis	2011	p318).		Securitisation	as	a	financial	process	of	risk	management	and	risk-shifting	has	extended	and	deepened	the	integration	of	household	incomes	beyond	significant	market	share	for	lenders,	to	an	underpinning	of	the	financial	system.	The	level	of	risk	posed	by	the	possibility	of	a	critical	mass	of	household	defaults	gave	rise	to	the	concern	of	state	policy	for	the	financial	stability	of	households.	“Household	payment	streams	emerg[ed]	increasingly	[as]	an	anchor	for	the	monetary	system”	(Bryan,	Rafferty	&	Tinel	2016	p48).		
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Regulators	in	Australia	have	taken	concerted	action	to	reduce	the	risks	posed	by	securitisation	and	household	default.	Asset-backed	securities	grew	from	the	1980s,	and	plummeted	in	2007-2008	from	nearly	$30billion	to	under	$5billion	(RBA	2017	p38).	APRA	formulated	new	standards	for	securitisation	over	five	years	from	2011-2016	(Brennan	2016).	In	2008	Treasury	ordered	the	Australian	Office	of	Financial	Management	to	purchase	RMBS	(Residential	Mortgage	Backed	Securities)	to	remove	a	potential	for	disruption	to	the	system,	and	then	to	divest	in	2015	(Hockey	2015).	The	value	of	asset-backed	securities	has	regrown	slowly,	but	by	2017	was	only	just	above	$10	billion.			Securitisation	as	a	form	of	product	innovation	by	finance,	and	the	response	of	Australian	regulators	to	systemic	risks	posed	by	securitisation,	epitomise	a	relationship	between	capital	and	the	state,	in	which	capital	takes	the	initiative	as	profit-seeker,	and	the	state	follows	to	manage	the	contradictions	unleashed	by	capital,	if	necessary	with	market	actions	that	may	short-term	constrain	profits,	as	well	as	regulation	to	preserve	system	stability.			The	RBA’s	emphasis	on	financial	stability	was	“possibly	the	most	significant	development”	of	the	decade	from	2000,	brought	to	greater	prominence	by	the	GFC.	“Re-adjusting	financial	regulation	to	promote	financial	stability,	including	by	affecting	the	structure	and	inter-linkages	within	the	financial	sector,	without	impeding	socially	valuable	financial	innovation	and	efficiency,	was	the	main	challenge”	(Davis	2011	p345).	The	RBA	published	its	first	annual	Financial	Stability	Review	in	2004.			The	“process	of	financial	system	evolution	[from	oligopolistic	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	to	a	more	open	and	competitive],	while	driven	largely	by	market	forces,	has	been	assisted	by	prevailing	regulatory	and	supervisory	arrangements.”	(Edey	&	Gray	1996	p6)		The	state	has	played	a	necessary	role,	in	money	and	financial	market	policy,	that	has	enabled	and	responded	to	change.	“The	consequences	of	reforms	are	not	always	entirely	predictable...	the	removal	of	one	set	of	controls	often	put	pressure	on	other	controls.	This	
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meant	that	the	reform	process,	once	it	had	begun,	developed	its	own	momentum”	(Battellino	2007	p80).		The	contradictions	and	trade-offs	considered	by	finance,	the	state	and	households	are	the	dynamics	of	this	momentum.	At	the	core	is	profitability.	Household	living	standards	are	assessed	via	a	Net	Income	recognised	for	Serviceability	(NIS)	model.	This	allows	for	the	lowest	viable	estimates	of	household	consumption	costs	to	maximise	the	value	captured	from	households,	on	which	rests	the	profitability	of	mortgage	lending	and	securitisation.			
4.3 Household ability to pay  	From	the	1990s	finance	developed	income	surplus	policy	based	on	ability	to	pay	theory	which	says	that	“households	will	attempt	to	keep	paying	their	mortgages	despite	equity	considerations	and	only	default	when	their	incomes	no	longer	cover	the	repayments	and	subsistence	consumption	expenses”	(Bryan	&	Rafferty	2018	p148).	The	NIS	models	are	the	method	for	implementing	income	surplus	policy.			These	“new	ways	to	assess	borrowing	capacity”	(Debelle	2010)	allowed	finance	to	issue	larger	mortgages	to	households	than	they	would	have	been	able	to,	under	the	long-standing	30	per	cent	rule	of	thumb	that	banks	had	previously	applied	to	mortgage	repayments	as	a	proportion	of	disposable	income.			Lenders	develop	their	own	methods	for	assessing	the	living	costs	of	mortgage	applicants.	Prior	to	the	1990s	the	common	method	used	by	banks	to	assess	whether	a	household	could	afford	mortgage	repayments	was	the	DSR,	which	compares	debt	and	other	fixed	payments	to	the	borrower’s	gross	income,	and	which	by	definition	assumes	that	living	expenses	increase	with	the	borrower’s	income	(Laker	2007	p4).		The	Chairman	of	APRA	explained	that	NIS	“models	require	the	borrower	to	have	a	minimum	surplus	of	net	after-tax	income	after	taking	into	account	debt	servicing,	other	
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fixed	payments	and	a	basic	level	of	living	expenses.	In	contrast	to	the	debt	servicing	ratio	method,	these	expenses	do	not	vary	with	the	borrower’s	income”	(Laker	2007	p3).	In	other	words	NIS	models	assume	an	across	the	board	minimum	standard	of	living.	The	advantage	of	NIS	models	to	lenders	is	that	they	can	assess	more	households	as	able	to	repay	larger	mortgages.			APRA	found	that	in	1998	only	around	half	of	banks	used	a	NIS	model,	and	by	2006	ninety	per	cent	did	so	“some	in	conjunction	still	with	the	debt	servicing	ratio”	(Laker	2007	pp3-4).	From	2017	the	APRA	Prudential	practice	guide	included	only	a	NIS	model,	and	the	DSR	method	reference	was	removed.		When	in	1999	a	major	bank,	the	ANZ,	first	used	default	cost-of-living	expenses	based	on	data	from	the	ABS	to	calculate	servicing	margin	for	mortgages	it	was	said	to	have	“resulted	in	practice	in	a	tightening	of	credit	standards”	(Eslake	2007	p80).	The	subsequent	easing	of	credit	standards	could	be	the	result	of	banks	having	lowered	their	default	cost-of-living	estimates.		By	2006	lenders	were	applying	an	NIS	model	with	a	benchmark	or	measure	of	a	minimum	living	expenses	that	was	generally	“either	the	Henderson	Poverty	Index	(HPI)	or	(the	higher)	Household	Expenditure	Survey	(HES)	data	from	the	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics”	(Laker	2007).	After	2010	lenders	began	to	use	a	new	index	as	a	NIS	model,	the	HEM.	“Senior	Credit	Risk	Managers	(through	the	Risk	Managers	Roundtable)”	asked	the	Melbourne	Institute	of	Applied	Economics	and	Social	research	to	develop	the	new	measure	as	an	alternative	to	the	Henderson	Poverty	Line	“as	the	HPL	was	increasingly	being	viewed	as	out-dated	and	unsuited	for	the	purpose	of	assessing	household	expenditure	levels”	(RFi	Analytics	2018a).			The	Melbourne	Institute	bases	the	Household	Expenditure	Measure	(HEM)	on	data	from	the	ABS	produced	HES	(conducted	every	6	years),	and	augments	it	with	the	quarterly	CPI	combined	with	assumptions	about	rates	of	increase	in	living	costs.	In	contrast	to	income	
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support	(previous	chapter),	the	HEM	differentiates	by	geographical	location,	state	or	territory,	and	inside	or	outside	a	capital	city	(Household	Expenditure	Measure	2014).				“The	principal	objective	of	[HES]	is	to	facilitate	the	analysis	and	monitoring	of	the	social	and	economic	welfare	of	Australian	residents	in	private	dwellings”	Lenders	of	finance	being	significant	users	of	the	HES,	can	be	counted	among	its	other	identified	main	users	“government	and	other	social	and	economic	analysts	involved	in	the	development,	implementation	and	evaluation	of	social	and	economic	policies.”	It	“collects	detailed	information	about	household	expenditure	and	financial	stress”	(ABS	2017).	And	like	income	support	policies	(previous	chapter)	it	measures	for	household	types,	single	or	couple,	and	numbers	of	children	from	none	to	three	or	more.			The	HEM	classifies	the	600	expenditure	categories	of	the	HES	as	“absolute	basics”	(spend	cannot	be	avoided	or	varied),	“discretionary	basics”	(spend	cannot	be	avoided	but	can	be	reduced	in	times	of	need)	and	“Luxury”	(spend	can	be	avoided)….	By	making	the	split	between	absolute	and	discretionary	basics	the	HEM	ensures	it	is	not	overly	generous	by	design”(RFi	Analytics	2018a).	The	HEM	differentiates	between	households	on	the	basis	of	income	with	13	bands	from	$20,000	or	less	up	to	$100,000	or	more	per	annum	(Household	Expenditure	Measure	2014).		The	RBA	(2012	p40)	anticipated	the	impact	of	banks	moving	from	using	the	HPI	to	the	HEM	for	debt-serviceability	calculations.	“The	new	measure	was	designed	to	be	a	more	accurate	estimate	of	households'	living	expenses.	The	impact	of	the	change	will	vary	for	different	borrowers.”	The	RBA	expected	only	minor	changes	to	the	availability	of	credit	overall.			The	HEM	level	itself	is	subject	to	confidentiality.	Subscribers	(at	a	minimum	cost	of	$1850	per	annum)	must	agree	“For	internal	use	only,	and	not	to	release	the	underlying	data	and	reports	outside	their	organisations	/	serviceability	calculation	engines”	(RFiAnalytics	2018b).			
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The	data	appears	to	have	been	published	more	widely	once	only	in	2012,	attributed	by	Dargan	(2012)	to	the	Commonwealth	Bank’s	(CBA)	HEM,	until	an	exhibit	at	the	Financial	Services	Royal	Commission	(FSRC)	from	NAB	(2017).	The	2012	data	compares	the	HEM	to	the	HPI.	A	single	adult	with	no	children	is	assessed	by	the	bank	using	the	HEM	as	being	able	to	survive	at	88.5%	of	the	HPI	measure	of	the	poverty	line,	and	a	single	adult	with	three	dependents	as	able	to	survive	on	less	than	73%	of	the	HPI.	A	couple	with	two	or	three	children	is	assessed	at	around	99%	of	the	HPI.	A	HEM	assessment	above	the	HPI	is	made	for	a	couple	with	no	dependents	or	only	1	child.			The	Commonwealth	Bank	(FSRC	2018a	p36)	labels	the	standard	of	living	afforded	at	the	HEM	benchmark	as	“modest,	but	above	the	level	of	‘substantial	hardship’	as	it	includes	some	discretionary	expenditure,	which	consumers	would	generally	be	able	to	give	up	if	required.”	A	Bank	of	America	Merrill	Lynch	(BAML)	report	in	2011	pointed	to	banks	“playing	down	the	cost	of	living	…	below	the	Henderson	Poverty	index…By	the	banks	using	low	default	living	costs,	they	are	able	to	artificially	inflate	the	level	of	debt	they	can	provide	to	borrowers"	(Liondis	2011).		Another	source	quoted	the	BAML	report	as	saying	that	“the	average	bank	cost-of-living	assumption	is	seven	per	cent	lower	than	the	[Henderson]	poverty	index,	14	per	cent	lower	than	our	[Merrill	Lynch]	barebones	budget,	and	even	more	for	our	adjusted	[living	costs,	based	on]	ABS	survey	[data]”	(Houses	and	Holes	2011).		The	motivation	to	issue	credit	was	apparent	again	when	APRA	conducted	an	exercise	with	lenders	in	2014-2015	on	their	application	of	NIS	calculations.	At	the	start	at	least	5	of	the	17	lenders	discounted	customers’	declared	living	expenses.	Nine	months	later	in	a	subsequent	test	APRA	concluded	that	“all	ADIs	now	reflect	the	customer’s	declared	living	expenses	where	these	are	higher	than	the	[HEM]	benchmark”(Richards	2017	p8).			As	ASIC	noted	“HEM	is	a	conservative	measure	of	expenditure,	rather	than	a	typical	or	average	figure,	which	means	that	many	consumers	will	have	higher	expenses	than	HEM.	We	identified	significant	numbers	of	loans	across	several	lenders	where	the	consumer	
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expenses	were	stated	to	be	equal	to	the	HEM	benchmark.	While	lenders	and	brokers	may	be	able	to	use	benchmarks	such	as	HEM	as	part	of	their	process	for	verifying	consumers’	expenses,	they	are	still	required	to	make	inquiries	into	the	consumer’s	actual	expenses.		The	HEM	as	a	minimum	was	not	always	applied.	The	FSRC	heard	evidence	that	the	HEM	was	used	by	banks	when	the	consumer’s	declared	expenses	were	even	lower	than	the	HEM,	i.e.	the	banks	had	made	inquiries	into	consumer	incomes.	The	HEM	was	being	used	not	as	a	floor,	but	a	ceiling	for	living	expenses,	above	which	repayment	could	be	supported,	in	order	to	calculate	the	size	and	terms	of	loan	approvals.	For	example	it	was	described	by	Ernst	&	Young	(EY	2017	p6)	“as	an	area	of	concern”	that	NABs	serviceability	calculator	defaults	to	the	higher	of	HEM	and	the	customer’s	GLEE	(general	living	and	entertainment	expenses),	which	represents	customer	advised	level	of	living	expenses.”	NAB	admitted	to	the	FSRC	that	it	waived	policy	standards	on	about	15%	of	its	loans”	(FSRC	2018b	p212)	including	in	cases	of	a	“debt	servicing	deficit”,	i.e.	“that	there	is	an	inability	on	the	part	of	the	customer	to	repay	the	loan	based	on	the	assessment	of	their	financial	situation”	(FSRC	2018b	p208).		The	pressure	on	households	created	by	low	estimations	of	consumption	needs	embodied	in	the	HEM	is	intensified	by	the	use	of	mortgage	brokers.	Brokers	“are	responsible	for	arranging	around	half	of	all	home	loans	in	Australia…	in	2012	brokers	arranged	47.7%	of	home	loans	for	the	lenders	in	our	review.	In	2015,	this	increased	to	54.3%”	(ASIC	2017	p8).	ASIC	found	in	2017	that	the	standard	model	of	broker	remuneration,	“of	upfront	and	trail	commissions	creates	conflicts	of	interest…	a	broker	could	recommend	a	loan	that	is	
larger	than	the	consumer	needs	or	can	afford	[emphasis	added]	to	maximise	their	commission	payment.”	The	FSRC	(2019	p45)	made	recommendations	recognising	this	conflict	of	interest.			In	late	2018,	after	the	FSRC	had	gathered	evidence	on	home	lending	practices,	and	lending	standards	had	tightened,	the	RBA’s	view	was	of	a	lower	risk	NIS	that	“allows	for	household	expenditure	to	increase	with	income,	and	has	the	advantages	of	granularity	and	ability	to	take	into	account	differing	household	characteristics”	(RBA	2018b	p33).	
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The	RBA’s	2018	picture	is	of	a	lower	risk	NIS	model	that	can	better	discriminate	between	types	households.	APRA’s	2007	understanding	was	of	a	higher	risk	model	that	sets	needs	regardless	of	income.			
4.4 Regulators and the state – sharing risk management 	While	lenders	develop	their	own	methods	and	criteria	for	approving	loans,	the	state	monitors	the	wider	system	consequences	and	risks.	ASIC	sets	standards	for	responsible	lending	and	supervises	implementation	by	lenders,	including	loan	serviceability	assessments	and	household	default	risk	monitoring.	APRA	oversees	the	solvency	of	lending	institutions	and	their	prudential	practices,	including	loan	serviceability.	The	RBA	takes	an	overview	from	the	perspective	of	the	financial	system	and	macroeconomic	risk.			RBA	Deputy	Governor	(Battellino	2007	p81)	observed	that	risk	had	become	a	more	important	dimension	for	both	regulators	and	banks	since	deregulation.	“Once	regulations	are	removed,	competition	can	result	in	a	surge	in	risk-taking…	Supervisors	need	to	be	prepared	for	this	and	need	to	monitor	developments	in	the	banking	system	closely.”	This	monitoring	and	supervision	of	risk-taking	is	government’s	preferred	approach	to	state	intervention	rather	than	“prescriptive	regulation”	which	it	sees	“may	come	at	the	cost	of	hampering	business	investment	opportunities	in	Australia	and	abroad”	according	to	a	2004	report	of	the	Financial	Sector	Advisory	Council	(Grant	2005	pp74-75).		There	is	continuing	tension	between	the	preference	of	lenders	to	issue	loans,	and	manage	their	own	risk,	versus	regulators	seeking	to	contain	prudential	and	systemic	risk	without	disrupting	competition	or	availability	of	credit.	State	regulation	and	supervision	of	lending	standards	form	the	parameters	within	which	lending	institutions	are	supposed	to	operate.			The	risks	in	the	application	of	NIS	and	the	lowering	of	living	standard	estimates	are	open	to	self-regulation	by	financial	risk	management,	and	subject	to	state	monitoring	for	
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systemic	risk,	and	to	regulation	via	prudential	standards,	penalties	and	reputational	damage.			
Self-regulation	of	financial	risk		The	assessment	made	in	2017	(Westpac	Banking	Corporation)	identifies	the	risks	arising	from	looser	lending	standards.		 “To	date	most	industry	thinking	about	the	consequences	of	responsible	lending	failures	has	been	centred	on	the	potential	for	fines,	reputation	damage	and	the	costs	of	any	remediation	necessitated	by	a	breach.	It	is	now	clear	that	thinking	needs	to	broaden...	there	is	a	risk	that	responsible	lending	issues	could	impact	enforceability	of	our	security	and	accelerate	losses	in	a	downturn.”		Banks	and	other	lenders	have	developed	internal	risk	management	systems,	to	deal	with	potential	for	losses	and	defaults.	In	relation	to	home	lending	this	includes	active	collection	of	intelligence	and	advice	from	consultants	and	industry	experts,	who	monitor	household	consumption	needs	in	measures	of	consumer	sentiment,	such	as	confidence,	financial	anxiety	and	stress.	These	measures	of	consumers’	reported	needs,	and	challenges	in	meeting	their	needs,	help	investors,	including	finance,	to	predict	household	demand	and	capacity	to	pay.			For	example	Digital	Finance	Analytics	(North	2018b)	states	that	it	has	“52,000	households	in	our	sample	at	any	one	time”	and	asks	“detailed	questions	covering	various	aspects	of	a	household’s	financial	footprint”	relating	to	job	security,	changes	in	real	income,	changes	in	costs	of	living,	their	loans	and	debts	and	savings,	and	net	worth.	The	NAB	Consumer	Anxiety	Index	(NAB	2018)	captures	changes	in	categories	of	both	household	spending	and	causes	for	concern	in	financial	position,	such	as	utilities,	savings,	wages,	job	security,	health,	ability	to	fund	retirement,	cost	of	living,	government	policy.	From	2010	Dun	&	Bradstreet	(2014)	derived	a	consumer	financial	stress	index	as	a	predictive	assessment	of	economic	conditions,	business	expectations	and	payment	
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behaviour,	and	credit	and	spending	activity	in	Australia.	Moody’s	sells	credit	ratings	and	publication	such	as	the	RMBS	Australia:	Mortgage	Delinquency	Map	to	wholesale	clients.			Thanks	to	exhibits	at	the	Financial	Services	Royal	Commission	(FSRC)	in	2018,	the	internal	practices	of	banks	in	this	area	have	become	easier	to	discover.	A	document	from	ANZ	(2017	p31)	shows	multiple	categories	of	risk,	including	the	LTVR,	had	been	discarded	in	assessing	an	applicant’s	eligibility	for	a	loan,	but	continue	to	used	as	a	risk	management	tool	(ANZ	2017	p131).	ANZ	could	avert	its	risks	with	these	tools,	shifting	them	onto	households	instead.			Awareness	of	these	risks	is	integrated	into	financial	processes,	mortgage	insurance,	securities	and	interest	rates.			
Self-regulation	vs	state	regulators		The	tensions	between	profitability,	household	living	standards	and	financial	stability	are	concretised	in	regulation	of	home	lending	practices.	Lending	standards	are	the	rubric	under	which	regulators	monitor	the	risks	and	terms	of	the	relationship	between	borrowers	and	lenders,	and	a	source	of	ongoing	adjustment.			 	
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Finance’s	view	of	lending	standards		The	prospect	of	tighter	lending	standards	is	not	welcomed	by	finance,	particularly	by	brokers	who	have	low	exposure	to	default	risk	or	institutional	insolvency.	They	expect	tighter	standards	to	reduce	the	volume	of	lending	and	therefore	weaken	profits.	“The	next	downturn	will,	ironically,	be	triggered	by	regulation.	Recent	developments	show	that	this	could	soon	play	out….	ANZ	chief	Shayne	Elliott	and	RBA	governor	Philip	Lowe	both	admit	that	lending	is	becoming	more	difficult”	(North	2018c).		Anecdotal	evidence	from	brokers	gives	more	visceral	expression	to	the	relationship	between	lenders	and	the	regulations	on	living	expenses.			 “I’ve	spoken	to	a	number	of	mortgage	brokers,	head	groups	and	lenders	about	this	issue.	On	the	record,	they	see	more	data	around	living	expenses	as	a	positive	development.	Off	the	record,	they	can’t	stand	the	idea	and	anticipate	a	significant	drop	in	volume.	One	broker	put	it	to	me	plain	and	simple:	When	a	person	gets	a	mortgage,	they	change	their	living	expenses	accordingly.	They	stop	spending	on	rent,	reduce	their	entertainment	budget	and	work	harder	for	that	job	promotion.	In	other	words,	they	adapt	to	their	new	financial	position”	(Mitchell	2018).			This	attitude	by	brokers	and	banks	to	wanting	to	issue	loans	without	regulatory	interference	is	framed	more	positively	in	this	example	of	business	intelligence	from	Equifax	UK.	It	found	that	62%	of	rejected	applicants	for	“a	financial	product”	are	“unlikely	to	use	that	company	again	in	the	future.”	So	“fully	understanding	each	consumer’s	transactional	and	credit	behaviour	…	may	[de]crease	the	chances	of	a	rejected	application	–	an	outcome	that	may	be	detrimental	to	both	the	consumer	and	the	lender,	both	of	whom	come	away	from	the	interaction	empty	handed”	(Innovation	in	the	
mortgage	industry,	2017).	
	Some	reactions	by	finance	industry	insiders	to	tighter	lending	standards	indicate	potential	for	macroeconomic	impact.		
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	In	response	to	exposure	of	the	inadequacy	of	the	HEM	to	account	for	household	expenses,	and	evidence	of	banks	circumvention	of	even	that	minimum,	the	banks	that	use	the	HEM	set	up	an	industry	panel	to	work	with	the	and	APRA	to	look	at	raising	the	minimum	level	of	household	living	expenses,	as	benchmarked	by	the	HEM	(FSRC	2018b	p207).		A	rise	in	the	minimum	level	of	household	expenses	for	assessing	lending	would	not	be	without	other	costs	to	the	system.	“UBS	…	analysis	of	the	mortgage	market”	and	the	FSRC,	suggests	that	“households	‘borrowing	power’	could	drop	by	-35%	[sic],	mainly	thanks	to	changes	to	analysis	of	expenses,	as	the	HEM	benchmark…	is	revised”	(North	2018a).		An	editor	of	publications	for	professional	financial	advisors	(Mitchell	2018)	sees	reduced	credit	availability	as	a	problem	with	“forensic	evidence	of	customer	living	expenses	and	tighter	restrictions	on	mortgage	lending”.			“Messing	with	[mortgage	lending]	could	have	serious	implications…	The	risk	is	that	measures	designed	to	strengthen	the	system	could	inadvertently	weaken	economic	growth,	consumer	sentiment	and	the	propensity	for	Australians	to	continue	spending…	Customer	living	expenses	are	at	the	centre	of	this”			If	households	are	able	to	borrow	less	for	housing,	there	will	be	fewer	and	smaller	loans	issued,	eroding	bank	profits,	and	most	likely	lowering	house	prices,	further	shrinking	lending	and	real	estate	profits.	This	brings	into	sharp	relief	the	tension	between	profitability	and	household	living	standards.	These	are	macroeconomic	developments	that	the	RBA	monitors	and	responds	to.		
Financial	stability	reviews	and	the	RBA		The	relevance	of	the	RBA’s	annual	Financial	Stability	Review	lies	in	“changes	in	the	structure	of	financial	regulation	that	have	thrown	the	role	of	central	banks	in	safeguarding	financial	stability	into	sharper	relief”	(RBA	2004	p1).		
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	A	specific	focus	on	household	financial	stability	was	apparent	when	the	Basel	Capital	Accord	was	being	updated	to	differentiate	capital	requirements	according	to	risk.	The	RBA	reported	APRA’s	proposal	for	an	upward	revision	of	capital	ratio	requirements	where	a	lender	“does	not	independently	verify	an	applicant’s	income	as	part	of	the	loan	approval	process”	(RBA	2004	p34).			Several	RBA	papers	stress	the	need	to	“continuously	assess	the	household	sector's	financial	resilience”	because	of	the	weight	of	household	sector	lending,	and	the	significant	risks	“to	financial	stability	and,	consequently,	to	the	broader	macro	economy”	(Bilston,	Johnson	&	Read	2015	p1).	“The	incidence	of	mortgage-related	financial	difficulties	is,	therefore,	an	important	indicator	of	the	financial	health	of	households	and	lenders”(Read,	Stewart	&	La	Cava	2014	p1).		Concern	that	“standard	econometric	stress-testing	methods	based	on	historical	aggregate	data	could	give	a	misleading	picture	of	the	resilience	of	banks	to	household	credit	risk”	led	the	RBA	to	develop	a	“simulation-based	stress-testing	model”	to	“capture	developments	in	household	balance	sheets	over	recent	history”	(Bilston	&	Rodgers	2013	p28).	This	model	uses	data	from	the	HILDA	survey	referred	to	in	previous	chapters	of	this	thesis	in	relation	to	minimum	wages	and	income	support.	The	RBA	has	at	times	identified	“households	that	are	particularly	vulnerable	to	income	or	expenditure	shocks”	(Read,	Stewart	&	La	Cava	2014	p18),	for	example	sourcing	a	“loan-level	dataset”	from	MARQ	Services,	a	firm	that	provides	investors	with	information	on	the	collateral	pools	backing	residential	mortgage-backed	securities	(Read	at	al	2014	p5).		The	Governor	of	the	RBA	was	concerned	in	early	2017	about	the	volume	of	loans	made	“where	the	borrower	has	the	skinniest	of	income	buffers	after	interest	payments.	In	some	cases,	lenders	are	assuming	that	people	can	live	more	frugally	than	in	practice	they	can,	leaving	little	buffer	if	things	go	wrong”	(Lowe	2017).	But	in	2018	the	RBA	assessed	that	there	had	been	“a	significant	improvement	in	the	risk	profile	of	new	lending	over	the	past	couple	of	years,	[which	has]	stemmed	the	deterioration	in	the	resilience	of	
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household	balance	sheets”	as	a	result	of	“regulatory	measures	and	improvements	in	lending	standards”	(RBA	2018a	p20).		The	fall	in	house	prices	that	is	a	consequence	of	these	measures	poses	in	turn	a	risk	from	the	other	direction.	There	is	a	fine	line	between	households	being	at	risk	of	insolvency,	and	risk	from	households	not	spending	enough.				“Recent	purchasers	could	see	their	property	value	fall	below	the	value	of	their	loan	(negative	equity).	This	would	make	it	more	difficult	for	borrowers	struggling	to	repay	their	loans	to	resolve	the	situation	by	selling	the	property.	Falling	housing	prices	also	reduce	household	wealth,	which	can	weigh	on	consumption	and	affect	the	broader	economy”	(RBA	2018b	p26).		Lower	interest	rates	since	2009	have	been	associated	with	more	rapid	house	price	rises	(Owen	2017).	The	RBA’s	primary	tool	for	intervening	in	the	economy	is	interest	rates,	which	it	had	not	increased	since	November	2010.	An	increase	in	interest	rates	would	work	against	“some	pick-up	in	wages	growth,	which	is	a	welcome	development.	The	improvement	in	the	economy	should	see	some	further	lift	in	wages	growth	over	time,	although	this	is	still	expected	to	be	a	gradual	process”	(Lowe	2018).			The	RBA	wanting	to	allow	interest	rates	to	remain	low	so	that	wages	could	grow,	may	have	passed	off	to	the	finance	sector	regulators	APRA	and	ASIC,	the	job	of	reducing	risk	from	households.	The	decline	in	house	prices	from	2017	resulted	from	a	combination	of	regulator	actions,	especially	tighter	lending	standards	and	benchmarks	for	capital	ratios	(RBA	2018b	p3).	APRA	and	ASIC	take	the	link	between	household	living	standards	and	the	financial	system	to	the	institutional	level.			
Regulators	and	living	standards		An	APRA	official	(Richards	2016)	identified	that	any	disruption	in	the	[housing	loan]	sector	would	have	a	much	more	significant	impact	than	in	the	past”	considering	that	in	
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2016	housing	loans	made	up	“nearly	two-thirds	of	Australian	ADI	loan	portfolios”	in	comparison	to	the	early	1990s	when	“housing	credit	overall	was	less	than	one-quarter”	of	the	loan	portfolios.	APRA’s	assesses	bank	standards	used	to	calculate	borrower’s	debt	servicing	ability.	The	NIS	approach	is	a	risk	assessment	tool,	because	it	allows	“the	lender,	in	a	systematic	way,	to	discount	income	streams	or	add	margins	to	living	expenses	and	interest	rates	to	test	whether	a	borrower	could	continue	to	meet	repayments	under	adverse	scenarios”	(Laker	2007	p4).	“Ultimately,	all	lenders	pay	the	price	when	higher	loan	losses	eventually	materialise”	(Richards	2016).		APRA	takes	an	active	interest	in	lenders’	“methodologies	to	calculate	the	borrower’s	capacity	to	repay.	This	work	has	allowed	us	to	benchmark	lending	standards	more	directly,	rather	than	relying	on	indirect	proxies”	(Richards	2016).	APRA	advised	lenders	(2017	p13)	about	prudency	in	serviceability	assessment	models.	Lenders	should	allow	for	“potential	increases	in	mortgage	interest	rates,	increases	in	a	borrower’s	living	expenses	and	decreases	in	the	borrower’s	income,	particularly	for	less	stable	income	sources”	such	as	seasonal,	variable,	temporarily	high	or	uncertain	income.	It	is	notable	that	finance	is	concerned	with	“less	stable	income”	in	assessing	minimum	incomes,	whereas	it	is	absent	in	wage	and	income	support	setting.		The	points	APRA	makes	in	its	guidelines	on	serviceability	are	indicative	of	issues	in	practice.	For	example	“good	practice	is	that	ongoing	serviceability	would	not	rely	on	longer-term	access	to	‘honeymoon’	or	discounted	introductory	rates”	(APRA	2017	p12).	A	companion	measure	to	the	income	surplus	approach	is	the	Loan	to	Income	(LTI)	breakdown.	LTI	data	“indicate	that	mortgage	lending	at	four	times	gross	income	is	…	one-third	of	all	new	ADI	housing	loans.	Lending	at	six	times	or	more	of	gross	income	is	…	nearly	10	per	cent.”	APRA	is	“encouraging	ADIs	to	use	LTI	type	metrics	in	internal	risk	management.”	(Richards	2016).	Here	the	ability	of	households	to	afford	repayments	is	a	concern	for	financial	risk,	not	for	the	well-being	of	households.		A	(next)	layer	of	risk	supervision	that	APRA	takes	on	is	the	mortgage	insurers.	An	APRA	home	loan	stress	test	in	2003	“found	that	deposit	institutions	‘could	withstand	a	
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significant	increase	in	housing	loan	defaults	without	a	material	deterioration	in	their	prudential	soundness’	[because]	a	significant	portion	of	the	risk	is	transferred	to	lenders	mortgage	insurers”	(Grant	2015	p28).	APRA	supervises	in	order	to	contain	the	risk	of	default	is	contained	from	all	sides	advising	lenders	that	“LMI	[Lenders	Mortgage	Insurance]	is	not	an	alternative	to	loan	origination	due	diligence.	A	prudent	ADI	would,	notwithstanding	the	presence	of	LMI	coverage,	conduct	its	own	due	diligence”	(APRA	2017	p27).			Competition	and	profitability	are	a	constraint	on	tighter	serviceability	assessments.	An	ASIC	spokesperson	explained	the	need	to	manage	competition	between	ADIs	to	facilitate	the	“strengthening”	of	their	serviceability	methodology.	“For	individual	ADIs,	there	has	been	no	first-mover	advantage	to	tightening	their	policies”	(Richards	2016	p6),	in	other	words,	a	lender	that	increased	stringency	of	income	assessments,	could	lose	customers	to	a	less	restrictive	lender.	This	assessment	was	later	reinforced	by	Commissioner	Hayne	in	observing	that	“If	one	bank	moves	away	from	HEM	and	the	others	remain	with	HEM	there	will	be	competition	consequences,	won’t	there?”	(FSRC	2018b	p206).		Lenders	“pressed	[APRA]	for	consistency	not	just	in	expectations	but	in	timing	of	implementation”	(Richards	2016).	APRA	(2017	p13)	in	turn	presses	for	consistency	by	lenders.			 “Loan	serviceability	policies	would	include	a	set	of	consistent	serviceability	criteria	across	all	mortgage	products	…	Where	an	ADI	uses	different	serviceability	criteria	for	different	products	or	across	different	‘brands’,	APRA	expects	the	ADI	to	be	able	to	articulate	and	be	aware	of	commercial	and	other	reasons	for	these	differences,	and	any	implications	for	the	ADI’s	risk	profile	and	risk	appetite.”		APRA	seeks	to	allow	for	variation	in	serviceability	assessments	of	loan	“products”,	as	this	allows	lenders	to	compete,	and	for	the	lenders	to	be	aware	of	the	risks	they	face.	“Standardisation”	is	not	designed	to	benefit	households	taking	out	the	loans,	by	making	serviceability	comparable	across	products.	APRA’s	“objective	was	not	to	eradicate	
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differences	in	risk	appetite	or	the	ability	to	offer	competitive	terms”	(Richards	2016).	“A	focus	on	short-term	profits	and	market	share”	can	justify	looser	“standards	because	peers	are	doing	the	same.	Strong	loan	growth	may	be	attributed	to	operating	efficiencies	or	clever	marketing,	when	in	fact	the	real	driver	is	taking	on	more	risk.”	(Richards	2016).		More	realistic	assessments	of	household	needs	inhibit	competition.	These	were	mandated	as	“Responsible	lending	practices”	by	amendments	to	the	2014	the	Regulatory	Guide	for	the	National	Consumer	Credit	Protection	ACT,	and	ASIC	and	APRA	had	already	made	some	moves	to	have	banks	implement	them,	prior	to	the	calling	of	the	FSRC.			APRA	and	ASIC	monitored	lending	standards	and	alerted	banks	to	lending	practices	that	may	not	be	prudent	or	compliant.	The	regulators	were	well	informed	through	their	monitoring.	For	example	the	APRA	Chairman	(Laker	2007	p4)	warned	that	only	around	20	per	cent	of	lenders	were	adding	a	margin	for	error	in	their	estimates	of	living	expenses,	and	found	“that	many	lenders	were	…	using	estimates	of	living	expenses	below	the	HPI	or	were	not	regularly	updating	their	estimates.”	(Laker	2007	p4)	Because	the	NIS	approach	allows	people	to	borrow	more	than	previously	“there	are	fears	that	some	lenders	are	applying	the	new	approach	imprudently.	For	example,	they	may	use	unrealistically	low	estimate	of	living	expenses,	thus	overstating	borrowing	capacity”	(Laker	2007	p4).				In	2014	APRA	implemented	supervisory	measures,	when	it	found	that	“lending	standards	were	not	as	robust	as	they	needed	to	be:	standards	did	not	reflect	the	risks	that	were	building	in	the	environment.”	APRA	Chairman	Byres	(2018)	noted	that	“competitive	pressure	was	restraining	many	ADIs	from	tightening	policies	unilaterally”.	Supervisory	measures	included	benchmarks	on	interest-only	lending	and	reviews	of	lending	practices.	ASIC	had	also	been	concerned	that	lenders	were	not	inquiring	into	borrowers	actual	living	expenses,	as	they	were	supposed	to	do.	When	ASIC	“tested	the	adequacy	of	lenders	and	brokers’	assessments	of	consumer	expenses	by	reviewing	the	distribution	of	expense	figures	across	loans.	…	The	proportion	…where	the	consumer’s	expenses	were	equal	to	or	very	close	to	the	HEM	benchmark	suggests	that	these	
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inquiries	were	not	occurring	properly”	(ASIC	2017	p15).	However	APRA	“doesn’t	provide	specific	dollar	figures	for	banks	to	adhere	to”	in	making	loan	serviceability	assessments	that	make	allowance	for	living	costs	(Living	Expenses	Calculator)	but	rather	sets	broader	standards.			APRA	Chairman	Byres	was	able	to	advise	lenders	in	2018	that	the	supervisory	measures	had	led	to	more	robust	lending	standards	and	“an	uplift	in	capital	resilience”.	Systemic	risk	was	the	primary	concern	of	the	regulators,	rather	than	the	welfare	of	borrowers.		ASIC	has	been	reluctant	to	enforce	regulations	and	standards	on	lending	practices.	ASIC	did	lodge	a	prosecution	of	Westpac	in	March	2017	for	contravention,	because	Westpac’s	“Serviceability	Assessment	and	System	Rule	assessed	the	suitability	of	the	Home	Loan,	and	enabled	the	automated	approval	of	each	of	the	Home	Loans,	by	reference	to	HEM	Benchmark	Figures	as	to	expenses	but	without	regard	to	the	Declared	Living	Expenses”	(ASIC	v	Westpac	2017).	The	FSRC	also	investigated	of	the	use	of	the	HEM,	and	the	suitability	of	any	benchmark	to	establish	an	amount	of	“UMI	[Uncommitted	Monthly	Income]”	(Kane	2018).	The	case	against	Westpac	indicates	the	updated	view	on	regulatory	enforcement.		A	recommendation	of	the	FSRC	arising	from	the	Westpac	prosecution	is	that	“If	the	court	processes	were	to	reveal	some	deficiency	in	the	law’s	requirements	to	make	reasonable	inquiries	about,	and	verify,	the	consumer’s	financial	situation,	amending	legislation	to	fill	in	that	gap	should	be	enacted	as	soon	as	reasonably	practicable”	(2019	p57).		The	regulators	responses	to	the	banks	and	their	home	lending	practices	have	been	far	more	dynamic	since	2000	than	have	the	policies	of	the	state	on	wages	and	income	support,	indicating	that	the	problems	posed	by	households	in	relation	to	the	financial	sector	are	themselves	more	complex	and	volatile.		Commissioner	Hayne	stated	that	“we	need	to	be	taking	financial	institutions	to	court	more	often”	(FSRC	2018d	p6960)	as	he	questioned	ASIC	over	its	preference	for	
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negotiations	with	banks,	the	use	of	community	benefit	payments	and	enforceable	undertakings.	For	Commissioner	Hayne,	legal	proceedings	are	needed	for	a	higher	purpose	than	enforcement	of	a	particular	law,	they	are	needed	to	reinforce	the	legitimacy	of	the	system.			
Legality,	legitimacy	and	reputation		The	banks	were	not	unaware	of	the	risk	of	legal	penalties	(ANZ	Bank	2017	p62).	However	it	was	not	until	the	call	was	raised	for	the	FSRC	that	ASIC	moved	to	prosecute,	a	possible	indication	of	concern	for	its	own	legitimacy.	The	FSRC	put	it	more	sharply.		 “Breach	of	the	law	carries	consequences.	Parliament,	not	the	regulators,	sets	the	law	and	the	consequences.	There	are	cases	where	there	is	good	public	reason	not	to	seek	those	consequences.	…	But	the	starting	point	for	consideration	is,	and	must	always	be,	that	the	law	is	to	be	obeyed	and	enforced.	The	rule	of	law	requires	no	less.	And,	adequate	deterrence	of	misconduct	depends	upon	visible	public	denunciation	and	punishment”	(FSRC	2019	p	430).		Reputation	damage,	or	a	legitimacy	crisis	is	an	emerging	trigger	for	tighter	standards.	The	calling	of	the	FSRC	was	a	response	of	the	government	after	journalists	exposed	the	hardship	that	finance	imposes	on	customers,	and	the	cause	was	taken	up	by	opposition	parties.	As	a	consequence,	and	in	order	to	reestablish	the	reputation	and	legitimacy	of	for	profit	finance,	there	is	likely	to	be	some	“lifting”	of	credit	standards,	as	the	banks	and	APRA	“consider	what	might	be	the	most	appropriate	HEM	measure	that	will	be	used	going	forward”	(FSRC	2018b	p207).	The	banks	are	also	reducing	their	reliance	on	the	HEM	and	“improving	processes	for	inquiries	and	verification”	of	declared	living	expenses	(FSRC	2019	p57).			Whatever	standards	emerge	after	the	disruption	of	the	FSRC,	designed	to	rebuild	reputations,	they	will	continue	to	be	based	on	calculating	the	ability	of	households	to	pay.			
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4.5 Households and home finance as subsistence 	Housing	is	a	subsistence	good	as	well	as	a	value	store	or	asset.	Home	ownership	via	repaying	a	mortgage	grew	rapidly	in	the	post	war	boom.	When	taking	out	a	mortgage	a	household	considers	its	other	living	cost	and	consumption	needs	in	relation	to	the	cost	of	buying	their	home.		Credit	availability	doesn’t	solve	the	supply	of	housing	so	much	as	it	increases	the	competition	between	borrowers	over	the	amount	of	their	income	they	are	able	to	commit	to	purchasing	a	home.	Easier	access	to	finance,	which	was	said	to	support	an	increase	in	housing	supply	and	the	rate	of	home	ownership,	by	providing	credit	to	more	households,	instead	helped	to	accelerate	already	rising	housing	costs,	and	makes	homes	less	affordable	despite	banks	willingness	to	lend.	It	also	accelerated	an	increase	in	working	hours	per	household	referred	to	in	Chapter	two.	“	‘Dual	incomes	is	now	a	necessity	for	home	purchase’”	(Burke,	Stone	and	Ralston	(p.	43)	cited	in	Hall	2017).		Households	trade-off	their	other	subsistence	needs,	and	their	time	away	from	paid	labour,	against	paying	for	their	homes.	In	this	indirect	process,	unwaged	reproductive	labour	has	been	converted	from	a	latent	supply	of	surplus	labour,	to	paid	labour,	by	the	need	to	purchase	a	home.	This	is	one	means	by	which	financialisation	“makes	a	direct	incursion	of	capitalist	calculation	into	the	household”	(Bryan,	Martin	&	Rafferty	2009	p461).		
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Figure	5:	House	prices	have	grown	much	faster	than	incomes	
	(Source:	Pash	2018)		A	rationale	for	deregulating	credit	was	to	enable	more	people	to	have	the	chance	to	borrow	and	purchase	a	home.	The	longer-term	consequences	for	home	ownership	were	not	obvious	to	the	Assistant	Governor	of	the	Reserve	Bank	when	he	assessed	that	the	“overwhelming	effect	[of	easing	lending	standards]	has	been	to	widen	the	range	of	households	who	can	access	finance”	(Debelle	2010).	Falling	levels	of	home	ownership	indicate	that	fewer	households	are	able	to	take	on	a	mortgage.	A	larger	proportion	of	households	with	mortgages	cannot	subsist	on	their	remaining	income	(See	Figure	5).		Banks	and	brokers	generally	offer	online	tools	for	consumers	to	make	at	least	a	preliminary	self-assessment	of	what	they	can	afford,	by	calculating	the	amount	that	could	be	borrowed.	These	are	tools	such	as	NAB’s	GLEE,	ANZ’s	UMI,	and	CBA’s	Smart	calculator	(ANZ	2017).	Even	with	access	to	these	tools,	a	significant	number	of	households	underestimate	their	living	expenses,	at	the	time	of	making	a	formal	application	for	a	loan.			
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The	Commonwealth	bank	says	that	it	takes	“account	of	the	tendency	of	customers	to	underestimate	their	living	expenses	in	credit	applications,	even	when	questions	about	expenses	are	broken	down	into	multiple	categories”	(FSRC	2018a	p35).			The	RBA	and	the	Grattan	Institute	claim	in	2018	that	households	in	the	2016/17	period	were	managing	to	maintain	their	mortgage	repayments.	“The	HILDA	survey	and	the	2015/16	Household	Expenditure	Survey	also	indicate	that	the	share	of	households	experiencing	financial	stress	has	been	the	lowest	since	at	least	the	early	2000s”	(RBA	2018a	p21).	“High	debt	is	not	(yet)	resulting	in	higher	mortgage	stress	At	least	in	the	short	term,	this	increase	in	debt	is	not	causing	defaults.	Mortgage	stress	…	has	fallen	over	the	past	five	years.	But	there	are	risks	if	interest	rates	rise.	Mortgage	stress	would	then	also	rise	quickly”	(Daley,	Coates	&	Wiltshire	2018	p88).		Yet	in	2017	the	percentage	of	loans	that	are	“non-performing”	is	more	than	double	the	rate	in	2003	(Figure	6).			
Figure	6:	Banks	non-performing	housing	loans	
	(Source:	RBA	2018a	p21)		
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The	RBA’s	graph	is	concerned	with	whether	or	not	loans	in	arrears	are	“well-secured”.	The	assessment	that	default	risk	is	low	appears	to	be	based	on	the	slower	increase	in	the	percentage	of	non-performing	loans	since	2016,	but	not	on	the	increase	since	2003	in	percentage	as	an	indicator	of	numbers	of	households	struggling	financially.			Moody’s	Investor	Service	took	a	less	optimistic	view,	and	connected	household	incomes,	including	challenges	of	underemployment,	to	increasing	risk	of	default,	noting	record	levels	of	mortgage	debt.	“Household	debt	as	a	proportion	of	disposable	income	was	188	per	cent	in	September	2017	compared	with	161	per	cent	in	September	2012”	(Moody’s	Investor	Service	2017).	Mortgage	pressures	may	also	be	a	factor	in	increased	labour	supply,	in	form	of	both	household	hours	of	work	(Richards	2009	p20)	and	underemployment.			Other	data	also	suggest	that	households	are	finding	it	harder	to	make	mortgage	payments.	“It	is	getting	harder	to	pay	off	a	home	despite	low	interest	rates,	because	loans	are	larger	and	wages	are	growing	slowly”	(Daley	et	al	2018	p23).	“Households	have	partly	accommodated	…	increases	in	payments	by	lowering	their	voluntary	prepayments	of	principal	and	have	been	aided	by	the	low	interest	rate	environment”	(RBA	2018a	p21).	“There	is	a	small	share	of	borrowers	who	have	not	accumulated	prepayments	despite	having	had	their	loan	for	some	time	and	may	have	little	margin	for	unexpected	increases	in	living	expenses	or	income	falls”	(RBA	2018a	p22).		These	are	indicators	that	households	may	have	declining	resilience	to	interest	rate	rises,	loss	of	income	or	other	stresses.	The	level	of	stress	and	risk	of	arrears	or	default	is	greatest	for	low-income	households.	The	majority	of	the	5%	of	households	in	2016	with	required	mortgage	payments	greater	than	50	per	cent	of	their	disposable	income	were	in	the	lowest	income	quintile	(RBA	2018a	p21).	“HILDA	data	indicate	that	households	who	borrowed	close	to	the	largest	amount	they	could	were	almost	entirely	at	the	lower	end	of	the	income	distribution	of	mortgagor	households”	(RBA	2018b	p36).			
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4.6 Conclusions 	The	setting	of	minimum	standard	of	living	benchmarks	has	been	abandoned	in	wage	setting	and	income	support,	but	has	been	embraced	by	finance	in	its	adoption	of	income	surplus	policy,	or	NIS	models.	The	HEM	as	the	widely	used	NIS	model,	defined	a	lower	level	of	consumption	than	most	households	would	find	realistic	in	practice,	despite	self-assessments	that	may	be	even	lower.			NIS	is	a	risk	management	tool	for	lenders	when	they	seek	to	increase	their	volume	of	business,	and	for	APRA	supervising	the	solvency	of	lenders.	It	is	not	an	expression	of	concern	for	household	well-being	and	needs.			Both	regulations	and	tools	for	applying	a	NIS	model	have	been	revised	several	times	since	2000.	Lenders	initially	commissioned	the	HEM	as	a	measure	for	assessing	income	surplus,	or	ability	to	repay.	The	RBA’s	endorsement	of	NIS	(2018b	pp32-34),	and	the	revision	of	the	HEM	in	2018-2019	following	the	FSRC,	suggests	that	benchmarks	of	household	living	standards	remain	important.	The	RBA	anticipates	a	more	viable	application	of	the	benchmark,	noting	that	“APRA	has required	that	banks	improve	the	calculation	of	the	NIS	in	order	to	ensure	households	have	an	adequate	buffer	in	the	event	of	a	shock”	(RBA	2018b	p34).			The	HEM	served	to	increase	the	availability	of	credit,	which	advocates	claimed	would	open	up	home	ownership	to	lower-income	households.	The	longer-term	result	of	competition	between	lenders	for	mortgage	customers	since	the	early	2000s,	has	been	intensified	competition	between	home	buyers	to	purchase,	an	acceleration	in	house	prices	at	a	much	faster	rate	than	incomes,	a	decline	in	home	ownership,	and	an	increasing	rate	of	arrears	and	defaults	on	mortgages.	The	availability	of	money	did	not	equate	to	home	ownership.			The	driver	for	the	expansion	of	household	credit	has	been	financialised	capital.	The	financial	deregulation	commenced	by	governments	in	the	1970s	was	primarily	designed	
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to	maintain	trade	flows	after	the	end	of	the	boom,	a	case	of	economic	developments	driving	policy	rather	than	vice-versa.	Australian	governments	added	further	deregulatory	and	supervisory	measures	in	finance,	as	capital	developed	new	opportunities	for	profitability	and	risk	management,	particularly	targeting	households	after	the	downturn	of	the	early	1990s,	producing	previously	unforeseen	consequences.	Deregulation	has	not	meant	that	the	state	has	vacated	a	role	in	finance,	the	state	has	adapted	to	new	ways	to	manage	financial	stability	in	partnership	with,	and	often	following	the	initiatives	of	finance,	such	as	in	securitisation.		The	tensions	and	trade-offs	between	the	state	regulators	and	the	lending	institutions	are	not	an	expression	of	abstract	or	ideological	preference	for	free	markets	versus	state	regulation.	There	are	concrete	tensions.	Self-regulating	banks	see	increased	scope	for	profits	from	maximising	assessments	of	borrowers’	ability	to	pay,	where	inability	to	pay	is	a	financial	risk	to	be	managed	across	the	lenders’	portfolio.	The	regulators’	aim	is	to	foster	competitive	conditions	between	lenders	which	allow	them	to	assess	borrowing	capacity	according	to	their	own	risk	appetite,	while	monitoring	the	ability	of	households	to	repay	in	order	to	avoid	mass	defaults	which	would	threaten	financial	system	stability.	Arising	from	this	the	RBA	may	also	trade-off	the	factors	leading	to	excessive	default	risk	against	the	contractionary	dangers	of	insufficient	credit.	A	subsidiary	trade-off	against	profits	imposed	by	the	state,	and	accepted	by	the	lenders,	is	that	consumer	protection	is	necessary	for	the	legitimacy	of	the	financial	relationship	with	households.			The	difficulty	the	regulators	and	finance	have	had	in	settling	on	the	HEM	and	NIS	model	are	indicative	of	the	more	pressing	nature	of	the	contradictions	between	profitability	for	finance,	and	living	standards.	The	FSRC	exposed	the	difficulties	of	legitimating	this	trade-off.			The	prospect	of	improving	living	standards	through	wage	increases	or	income	support	is	potentially	eliminated	in	this	relationship	with	finance,	because	increases	in	household	incomes	are	open	for	assessment	by	finance	as	available	to	be	put	towards	mortgage	repayments.		
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	A	pathway	to	household	agency	to	assert	their	interests	in	direct	relation	to	finance	is	difficult	to	see,	whilst	home	mortgages	are	a	field	of	competition	controlled	by	private	for	profit	finance.	Households	will	make	their	greatest	effort	to	increase	earnings	and/or	decrease	other	subsistence	expenditure	in	order	to	pay	for	their	housing.	However	if	households	in	large	numbers	run	out	of	scope	to	economise,	and	default	on	their	mortgages,	and	fail	to	pay	their	bills	they	pose	a	threat	to	financial	flows,	liquidity	and	economic	stability	(Bryan	2018).	In	this	sense,	households	can	be	seen	to	have	leverage	as	market	actors,	but	not	a	consciously	collective	leverage.			Bryan	(2018)	observes	that	“no	regulator	has	a	mandate	to	ensure	that	the	financial	system	doesn’t	create	stability	problems	for	households.	Someone	or	something	has	to	assume	this	mantle,	for	mounting	poverty	and	default	risk	is	surely	going	to	play	out	as	a	social	crisis,	not	just	a	financial	one”.	My	concluding	chapter	suggests	some	directions	arising	from	discussion	of	the	connections	between	minimum	income	setting	by	finance,	and	in	wages	and	income	support.		
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Chapter	five.	Conclusions		Minimum	incomes	legitimate	a	boundary	between	capital	and	labour,	profits	and	needs,	in	the	contest	over	value.	Stability	of	labour	supply	and	the	financial	system	both	rest	on	a	tension	between	household	living	standards	versus	capital’s	call	on	value	via	low	labour	costs	and	high	contractual	repayments.		
5.1 Public policy and the state 	This	new	terrain	for	valuing	labour	sharpens	the	contradictions	to	be	managed	by	public	policy	that	accepts	profitability	as	the	underlying	imperative,	seeking	stability	and	flows	in	both	labour	markets	and	money	markets.			Public	policy	has	become	increasingly	contained	within	the	assumptions	of	macroeconomic	policy,	formulated	to	achieve	stable	conditions	for	profitability.	The	rationales	for	minimum	income	setting	are	conditioned	by	macroeconomic	goals	in	the	three	domains	of	wages,	income	support	and	finance.	Low	estimations	of	minimum	living	standards	play	out	directly	in	profitability	-	for	wages,	as	a	minimum	cost	for	employing	labour,	in	income	support	as	an	incentive	or	compulsion	to	increase	labour	supply,	and	in	finance	as	a	means	to	increase	credit	volumes	and	value	flows.	The	RBA’s	analysis	and	policies	are	a	unifying	institutional	thread	to	macroeconomic	thinking	amongst	the	agencies	setting	minimum	incomes	in	each	domain.			The	state’s	approach	to	ensuring	working	class	subsistence	and	social	order	has	shifted,	from	concern	to	avert	industrial	and	social	disorder,	to	the	logic	of	economic	stability.	It	is	no	longer	only	the	state	managing	risks	to	social	order	arising	from	poverty,	but	the	RBA	and	financial	institutions	monitoring	household	finances	and	pricing	risk	to	avoid	financial	disorder.			
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This	constitutes	a	set	of	“structurally-inscribed	selectivities”	(Jessop	2006)	that	would	present	complex	obstacles	to	an	elected	government	that	proposed	to	change	the	basis	of	minimum	income	setting.	Such	a	government	would	need	to	understand	how	it	would	respond	not	only	to	opposition	from	capital,	and	the	threat	of	economic	instability,	but	also	to	the	reaction	of	the	network	of	state	agencies	that	is	imbued	with	economic	thinking	predicated	on	managing	conditions	for	profitability	and	enforcing	the	wider	law	of	labour.			
5.2 The three domains and what finance changes 	The	similarities	between	the	domains	are	more	straightforward,	but	differences	and	tensions	within	and	between	them	point	to	lack	of	coherence	and	likely	indicators	of	areas	of	instability	and	further	change,	as	prefigured	in	my	introduction.		In	all	three	domains,	households	absorb	the	consequences	of	underestimation	of	their	needs,	which	translates	to	labour	market	discipline	and	curbing	consumption.	They	all	reflect	the	hold	that	capital	has	over	livelihoods	by	its	ability	to	withdraw	the	means	of	subsistence,	whether	as	employer,	or	home	finance	lender.		The	differences	between	the	domains	are	based	on	the	tensions	in	capture	of	value	from	labour	as	employee	by	employer	capital,	and	capture	of	value	from	households	by	financial	capital.	As	an	avenue	of	value	capture	based	on	calculating	standards	of	living	after	income,	finance	has	generated	new	risks	for	economic	stability.			In	the	period	of	disruption	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	the	state	agencies	setting	minimum	wages	and	income	support	were	able	to	both	remove	industrial	leverage	from	minimum	wage	setting,	and	to	develop	policies	to	increase	labour	supply	by	taking	advantage	of	women’s	interest	in	paid	work.	Economic	policy	on	labour	supply	and	demand	cohered	around	incomes	versus	employment	trade-offs,	with	guidance	especially	from	the	Reserve	Bank.	There	have	not	been	any	fundamental	changes	in	the	approach	of	the	state	to	managing	minimum	incomes	in	the	labour	market	since	the	early	2000s.	
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	In	contrast	it	was	not	the	state	but	finance	itself	that	invented	minimum	income	setting	for	the	purpose	of	maximising	the	volume	of	repayments	and	profits	from	home	lending.	The	banks	trade-off	business	risk.	The	state	became	concerned	after	the	event,	for	the	bigger	picture	of	financial	system	stability.	Where	standards	for	minimum	income	setting	in	wages	and	income	support	have	barely	changed	since	2000,	they	have	been	in	flux	in	finance.			The	issue	of	household	financial	stability	is	possibly	a	successor	as	top	priority	for	the	attention	of	the	RBA.	The	inflation	risk	attributed	to	wage	rises,	that	was	the	focus	of	RBA	attention	for	at	least	two	decades	before	the	GFC	is	a	far	less	immediate	threat	to	stability.	The	RBA	has	mobilised	APRA	and	ASIC	to	contain	risk	by	requiring	banks	to	make	more	realistic	income	surplus	assessments.	The	RBA’s	own	tool,	the	interest	rate,	could	not	be	raised	in	order	to	lower	house	prices	and	lending	volumes,	because	it	would	also	place	downward	pressure	on	wage	incomes,	which	the	RBA	is	concerned	are	not	growing	sufficiently.	The	RBA	through	interest	rates	has	hands	on	both	ends	of	the	flow	of	value	in	living	standards	–	from	wage	earnings	through	to	committing	surplus	wages	above	other	consumption	to	mortgage	repayments.	But	because	of	value	captured	by	capital	in	between,	the	ends	do	not	join	to	form	a	circle.		The	RBA	deals	indirectly	with	labour	supply	through	interest	rates,	and	their	impact	on	growth	in	investment	and	employment.	Labour	supply	on	the	market	is	an	explicit	consideration	of	the	Fair	Work	Commission	in	relation	to	minimum	wages,	and	of	Treasury	and	social	security	departments	in	setting	income	support.	All	explicitly	consider	labour	supply,	the	imperative	to	work.	The	FWC,	like	the	RBA,	poses	a	link	between	lower	investment	costs	and	higher	rates	of	employment.	The	FWC	trades	this	off	against	the	needs	of	employed	households.	The	RBA	until	recently,	traded-off	consumption	needs	against	inflationary	stimulus.		The	significance	that	regulators	attribute	to	household	repayments	is	suggested	by	their	attention	to	revision	and	implementation	of	the	income	surplus	assessment	by	finance.		
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	Where	minimum	income	standards	for	wages	and	income	support	previously	used	benchmarks	of	adequacy	such	as	the	CPI	or	the	HPI,	the	criteria	on	which	they	are	now	set	has	become	less	defined,	and	more	subject	to	opaque	multiple	factor	inputs,	including	variation	between	household	income	sources	and	needs.	In	contrast,	the	revision	and	maintenance	of	calculable	living	standard	benchmarks	remains	important	to	both	finance	and	the	regulators.	The	redesign	of	the	HEM	in	2018	by	a	partnership	between	banks	and	APRA,	brings	minimum	income	setting	in	finance	closer	to	public	policy.			Adequate	minimum	household	living	standards	imposed	through	finance	are	a	significant	underpinning	of	macroeconomic	stability	in	2019.	It	is	a	fragile	stability	as	households	with	time	pressures	and	squeezed	incomes	from	both	wage	earnings	and	mortgages,	have	little	scope	to	increase	their	incomes	or	to	reduce	their	living	costs	any	further	in	the	event	of	increases	in	interest	rates	or	any	other	income	shocks.	Reciprocally,	this	instability	could	be	a	source	of	leverage	for	households,	if	they	organised	around	it.			
5.4 Value in households 	The	labour	relationship	remains	foundational,	even	in	the	financialised	household,	which	must	first	work	for	the	income	to	make	the	payments,	even	if	they	must	also	curtail	consumption.	The	value	captured	by	capital	is	based	on	the	paid	labour	of	households.			The	labour	relationship	is	fundamental	in	that	it	is	through	the	labour	relationship	that	society	produces	the	necessities	and	luxuries	of	life,	subsistence	goods,	human	bodies,	labour	power.	Labour	produces	that	which	meets	the	needs,	which	are	purchased	with	value	share	in	the	form	of	incomes	that	are	open	to	contest,	whether	in	employment	and	wages,	or	finance	and	payment	streams	and	the	trading	of	associated	risks.		Since	the	end	of	the	family	wage,	the	household	has	emerged	as	a	unit	through	which	financial	capital	captures	value,	and	through	which	the	state	imposes	the	labour	
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imperative	and	cheap	labour	supply.	Households	(rather	than	individuals	or	a	normative	family)	as	the	unit	of	consumption,	reproduction	of	labour	power	and	labour	supply	have	become	more	clearly	the	focus	of	policy	for	management	of	these	risks,	and	are	recognised	in	practice,	if	not	theory,	by	both	capital	and	the	state	as	the	source	of	profitability.	Households	have	become	the	source	of	surplus	population	also,	with	scope	to	increase	their	hours	of	waged	labour.		
	
5.5 A labour response 	There	are	new	challenges	for	labour	to	reshape	itself	as	a	conscious	agent	able	to	assert	its	needs	over	profitability,	and	to	challenge	the	hold	of	capital	over	livelihoods.	The	terms	of	contest	for	value	share,	and	the	role	of	the	state	as	well	as	labour’s	own	contributions	to	these	changes,	are	relevant	in	all	three	domains,	not	just	in	wages,	the	traditional	concern	of	unions.		Labour’s	ability	to	assert	needs	over	profitability	is	undermined	by	the	hold	of	capital	over	livelihoods	through	the	investment-employment	nexus,	the	persistence	and	diffusion	of	surplus	population,	and	the	risk	of	loss	of	homes.		Trade	unions	relinquished	their	agency	in	relation	to	minimum	wages	in	the	1980s.	Unemployment	whether	a	result	of	deliberate	policy	(as	in	the	natural	rate)	or	as	a	result	of	market	dynamics	(crises),	or	a	combination	of	the	two,	had	the	effect	of	bringing	unions	to	submit	to	the	capacity	to	pay	arguments	of	capital	and	macroeconomic	managers,	against	wage	rises.			Organised	labour,	via	union	and	ALP	policies,	has	failed	to	understand	early	enough	the	directions	which	capital	has	taken	since	the	1970s	in	investment,	employment	and	finance	at	a	cost	to	minimum	living	standards.	It	continues	to	believe	that	a	Labor	government	can	change	the	rules	in	favour	of	wage	earning	households,	while	having	no	plans	for	avoiding	repetition	of	concessions	such	as	industrial	leverage	and	minimum	wage	standards,	when	labour	and	finance	markets	were	disrupted.	
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	The	decline	of	trade	union	membership	has	been	attributed	to	many	causes,	including	the	inability	of	unions	to	defend	wages	and	conditions.	This	thesis	has	taken	a	wider	picture	beyond	wages,	of	minimum	income	setting	as	a	foundation	of	living	standards.	While	work,	wages	and	withdrawal	of	labour	remain	important,	even	central	points	of	leverage	to	defend	living	standards,	there	are	other	points	of	contest	over	living	standards,	and	changes	to	the	labour	market,	that	call	for	new	priorities	and	identification	of	new	demands,	new	points	of	leverage,	new	forms	of	organising	and	even	a	reimagining	of	the	identity	that	is	called	working	class.			The	wage	earning	household	as	a	whole,	not	just	the	union	member,	is	at	the	centre	of	pressures	to	earn,	to	make	time	for	caring	work,	and	to	keep	making	repayments.	The	needs	of	households	cannot	be	assured	within	only	one	dimension	of	wages,	income	support	or	finance,	and	they	most	certainly	cannot	be	assured	without	organised	disruption	of	the	stability	of	conditions	for	profitability	leading	to	“modification	of	the	balance	of	forces”	(Jessop	2006).			A	public	policy	for	benchmarks	of	need	to	be	drawn	on	in	any	and	all	contexts	-	wages,	income	support	and	mortgage	serviceability	assessments	-	would	allow	need	to	be	recognised	by	public	agreement,	rather	than	to	be	set	behind	closed	doors	to	suit	the	interests	of	capital.	It	would	be	similar	to	a	Universal	Basic	Income,	but	in	order	for	it	to	set	at	a	benchmark	to	fully	meet	needs,	it	would	have	to	be	backed	by	organised	leverage	from	unions	and	other	collectives,	and	a	job	guarantee.	A	minimum	income	cannot	remain	adequate	over	time	if	it	is	not	tied	to	a	position	relative	to	average	or	median	incomes.			The	waged	component	cannot	provide	a	reliable	minimum	income	for	men	and	women	if	it	doesn’t	come	with	standard	hours	that	allow	sufficient	time	for	all	to	contribute	reproductive	labour,	as	well	as	sharing	the	time-saving	benefits	of	productivity	improvements,	such	as	are	gained	through	automation.	Alternative	approaches	to	housing	and	finance	are	also	needed	to	take	them	out	of	competition.	
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	The	abolition	of	deprivation	would	abolish	the	wider	law	of	labour,	the	compulsion	to	accept	low-paid	work.	Organised	labour	needs	to	develop	its	own	picture	of	how	work	can	become	a	form	of	self-determination	and	co-operation,	rather	than	punitive	competition	for	a	livelihood,	as	it	is	in	a	labour	market	dominated	by	the	work	imperative	and	need	for	cheap	labour.					 	
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Appendix	1:	The	Commission	and	its	predecessors			CCCA	 1904	 Commonwealth	Court	of	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	 Commonwealth	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	Act	1904.		CCAC	 1956	 Commonwealth	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	Commission	  ACAC	 1973	 Australian	Conciliation	and	Arbitration	Commission		
 
The	Conciliation	and	
Arbitration	Act	1973		
AIRC	 1988	 Australian	Industrial	Relations	Commission.	
 
Industrial	Relations	
Act	replaces	IRC	 1993	 Industrial	Relations	Court	of	Australia	
 
Industrial	Relations	Reform	
Act		
 1996	 transfers	jurisdiction	of	the	Industrial	Relations	Court	to	other	courts,	mainly	the	Federal	Court	 Workplace	Relations	Act	 AFPC	 2005	 Australian	Fair	Pay	Commission	
 
Workplace	Relations	
Amendment	(Work	Choices).	Act	2005	FWC	 2009	 Fair	Work	Commission	 Fair	Work	Act	2009	
 Source:	History	of	employment	law	(n.d.).				 	
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LTI	–	Loan	to	Income	breakdown	LTVR	–	Loan	To	Value	Ratio	NAB	–	National	Australia	Bank	NAIRU	–	Non	Accelerating	Rate	of	Inflation	Unemployment	NCOA	-	National	Commission	of	Audit	(2014)	NIS	-	Net	Income	recognised	for	Serviceability	NSA	–	NewStart	Allowance	RBA	-	Reserve	Bank	of	Australia				 	
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